I highly suggest checking out Kenneth Pearce's Leibniz's Theistic Case Against Humean Miracles, which argues that miracles themselves ought to be thought of as law-abiding within the Judeo-Christian system of thought. So let us suppose that the universe is ultimately rational—that is, rule-abiding. Can we know those rules fully?
Let's take a step aside and look at Rex Kerr's use of 'whims'. Strictly speaking, this could mean two things:
- God's whims are fundamentally irrational, unpredictable, and unable to be modeled.
- God's whims are actually the result of rational thought, but we'll never understand it.
The first option is probably similar to how many thought about the gods of the Roman and Greek pantheons. Those gods did all sorts of weird and crazy things, and there didn't seem to be any fundamental, underlying pattern to them except that they act like humans do.
The second option is discussed in Pearce's work as understandable by 'infinite minds', but not 'finite minds'. The idea that human rationality is somehow 'less powerful' than the rationality of the universe is a thought that has been around for a while. WP: Epistemic theories of truth may be of interest on this topic, although comments are welcome for something better.
The commonality between both options is that a barrier to human knowledge is set up. This is essentially the idea behind Intelligent Design: there are some things we will never know [fully], and therefore we must start from intelligence which can do things, and not impersonal particles & fields. But where precisely is this 'barrier to human knowledge'? We would only know it by banging our heads up against it. For example, suppose that science grinds to a halt. No matter what experiment is conceived of and run, we don't learn anything new.
Does Richard Dawkins ever believe science will 'end', or hit a barrier? I don't know, but that is almost irrelevant: he surely acts as if we haven't hit any such barriers yet. The creationist, on the other hand, seems to have 'given up' in some respects. Not all: they're working on stuff like baraminology. The ultimate test of their efforts, in my mind, is whether they can tell us about new and cool aspects of reality that we didn't know before. Mere stories are indistinguishable from the Emperor's New Clothes, but if e.g. medical cures were derived from YEC 'research', they would be accepted.
You could say that YECs accept divine revelation as a source of knowledge while Richard Dawkins rejects it. How important this distinction is, is unclear to me. Suppose that YECs figured out a way to read the Bible, come up with new physics, test that physics, and find it to be an improvement on what we have already. Dawkins would, perhaps after a bit of consternation, admit that the Bible may well be a good source of hypotheses, when read correctly. This, it seems, would diminish the gap between accepting divine revelation as knowledge and accepting it as tentative knowledge.