I have never understood what the solution to the problem of other minds is.
At first, the article said that: "One standard line of reply to this question has been to appeal to analogy, another to best explanation."
Then the article says that the argument by analogy has become unusable. "While this argument was once popular (see, e.g., Russell 1923; Hampshire 1952), it soon came to be considered unfit for purpose due to the following considerations".
Then the article says that the argument from best explanation is the best solution to the problem: "the argument from best explanation is—either explicitly or implicitly—a form of argument that enjoys wide acceptance today. David Chalmers, for example, writes, "It … seems that this [argument from best explanation] is as good a solution to the problem of other minds as we are going to get""
Then the argument of the best explanation is criticized and supplemented: "Melnyk (1994) has argued that there is an important disanalogy between the scientific realist's reason for believing in theoretical entities and an ordinary person's reason for believing that other people have minds. His argument rests on the observation that gross behavioral evidence is insufficient for belief in another mind without additional reference to what one knows from one's own case. Melnyk can be read as advocating a hybrid account of our knowledge here, incorporating elements from the argument from analogy as a supplement to the inference from the best explanation."
And after all this: "A complete response to the problem of other minds seems obliged to incorporate more than one approach, and may have to incorporate several" (1994: 487). This is an observation others have also begun to advocate"
What then is the solution to the problem of other minds?