I am beginning reading Anti-Oedipus and am trying to understand the synthesis of two notions D+G discuss in the first section on Desiring Machines:
The quasi-metaphysical conception of everything as a 'circuit' of flows and interruptions; basically the universe as compromised of an infinite and linear grid of machines.
The subsumption of all categories into the category of production; D+G seem to argue that any given entity can be identified with the production of itself; analogously a category theorist identifies any object with its identity morphism.
To begin, is this universe of machines solely the structure of the unconscious, and hence the vision of reality as a matrix of machines is the schizophrenic process, which produces clinical schizophrenia when it is wholly conscious? In short, is the notion of machines an ontology D+G offer for reality itself or merely a characteristic of the "schizophrenic out for a walk", which they then use as a conceptual model for the entire unconscious?
In http://people.duke.edu/~hardt/ao1.htm , the conception of everything as machines seems to be taken "properly ontological" in that reality itself is taken to be composed of machines. Should we say that this holds insofar as reality is filtered through the psychical apparatus in the Kantian sense of conforming to our perception? Or are D+G making a genuinely metaphysical claim that machines are the atomic units of reality?
If they are making a genuine metaphysical claim, then it seems that all categories are subsumed by production in the sense that "being is becoming" or our reality is continuously produced by the machine matrix (similarly to the movie of the same name). But this 'writing large' of the machine-nature of reality seems to entail a huge number of metaphysical and ontological claims, which D+G don't seem to acknowledge or otherwise expect the reader to be familiar with. Contrast Nietzsche's insistence that a prospective reader of the Genealogy of Morals be familiar with "all of my books". Hence in total I am inclined towards the interpretation of machinism as the schizophrenic process.
In this light it would seem that the slightly more traditional notion of the schizophrenic as an individual for whom there is no filter of 'impossibility' or 'censorship' in the conception of what is reality is homologous to D+G's description of reality as machines.
Note: I have edited this post several times with massive changes to reflect the changing nature of the question, apologies if it is confusing.
As an update, let me (sort of) continue with the category-theory analogy for desiring-production, and see if I am correct in my conceptualization.
Production overwhelms all categories inasmuch as we can identify any category with the production of itself in the sense of continuously becoming itself - "being is becoming". Each category then becomes a production-machine that continuously produces itself. But production-machines can also connect to each other in the sense that 'A produces B'. This parallels category-theory in mathematics in the sense I mentioned above.
For example, the hand produces the grip which produces the holding of the pen which produces the ink which produces the writing which produces the inscription. This assemblage is itself a production-machine, namely the production of inscription, but is subdivided into component production-machines. This is what D+G mean when they say production is always grafted onto the producer-product.
Now, specializing the unconscious, we use this as a model. Freud (very roughly) posits the unconscious as consisting of 'impulses', which D+G call 'partial-objects'. These partial objects are identified with the desiring of themselves, and hence are 'desiring-machines'. These are then connected in the sense of 'A desires B', where 'desires' is not a lack but is productive in the same manner as 'produces' above. To use D+G's standard example, the mouth desires the breast.
Its clear that both desire (immanently) and production (transeuntly) are of the same essential form - this form is called desiring-production. D+G in fact break down 'morphisms' connecting desiring-or-production-machines into connection, disjunction, and conjunction.
Continuing the parallel of transeunt production and immanent desire, the Body without Organs is basically a parallel of the Self and Capital, both of which are composed of matrices of desiring-machines and production-machines, respectively, yet appear as there source: Desire appears to come 'from' the self, and production appears to come 'from' capital. More precisely, the machines constituting the BwO take on a dual nature as a constituent part of the assemblage producing the BwO (connection), and as a subset or congealment of the BwO as an undifferentiated mass (disjunction).