Anton Zeilinger argues (well: suggests) that superdeterminism would undercut science itself.
[W]e always implicitly assume the freedom of the experimentalist... This fundamental assumption is essential to doing science. If this were not true, then, I suggest, it would make no sense at all to ask nature questions in an experiment, since then nature could determine what our questions are, and that could guide our questions such that we arrive at a false picture of nature.
Source (not verified): A. Zeilinger, Dance of the Photons, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2010, p. 266. I copied the quote from Wikipedia, but I think it is not 100% accurately quoted there, at least not according to quoting conventions used by me.
That looks a lot like your question, right? :)
You are in luck, Gerard 't Hooft (not a fan of no-go theorems in general; apparently one of the few notable advocates of investigating this loophole to Bell's theorem more seriously; and a Nobel laureate in the relevant field) responds in a comment on Physics SE (so this possibly doesn't quite count as a published statement).
I just don't agree with the Zeilinger quote. Determinism indeed implies that the experimenter's decisions, and questions, are generated by physical forces themselves, so his attitude would dismiss determinism categorically, and I am not ready to go that far. And my bottom line remains to be a simple one: I now have models telling me what might happen, and what they say does not disturb me. Important: I still keep causality intact.
Source: Physics SE. I suggest also reading the related answer by 't Hooft.
Here is a more recent interview with 't Hooft on superdeterminism.
GM: Most people can accept that our experimental decisions are determined, but the degree of freedom that determine them are usually taken as independent from the degrees of freedom of the system we’re studying.
GtH: Then you’re stuck not only with Bell’s inequalities, but more generally with the whole quantum picture of reality. So, I think you have to assume that Bob has made a decision not out of free will, but by some predetermined correlation.
In quantum physics, there’s a notion of counterfactual measurement. You measure what happens if I put the polarizer this way, and then you ask, what if I had it that way? In my opinion, that is basically illegal. There’s only one thing you can measure.
And this is his latest paper related to the subject.
Let us emphasize one thing clearly, since ‘super determinism’ raises much suspicion in general: there is no spooky acausality, or ‘retro-causality’, of any sort in the classical description of our models.
My own take on this. 't Hooft's position certainly looks fair to me, although I don't immidiately see the need to improve on quantum mechanics. But I have this nagging feeling that, if "we" ever get there, ultimately, there will turn out to be alternative and equally true ToEs. Some will be superdeterministic and some (perhaps exactly one) won't. That would mean that (non)superdeterminismness can't be considered (for non-philosophical purposes) an intrinsic property of reality. And, as such, it could never be proven that i) superdeterminism is true and ii) nonsuperdeterminism is false, thus answering your question. But that's just me, so you might choose to ignore this last part of my answer.