Logical pluralism, in an attempted slogan, is, "There is no One True Logic, but a plurality of 'true' logics." But so on this site I have seen the phrase "logical pluralism" applied to what seems more like logical relativism, or, "There are different true logics for different fields of inquiry," e.g. perhaps independence-friendly logic for mathematics and some flavor of Schrödinger logic for quantum physics.
And though for a while I've thought of myself as a logical pluralist in a sort of "political" fashion—I comfortably give the time of day to dialethists and try (with admittedly not the best of luck) to empathize with intuitionists—yet then now it's occurred to me that I might actually be a logical inclusivist instead.
To clarify what that would mean, here are my working definitions of logical relativism and logical pluralism, followed up by the third relevant category:
Logical relativism: different logics are strongly normative for reasoning about different subjects. (I say "strongly normative" in lieu of "obligatory" to try to avoid misunderstanding, yet see (2)).
Logical pluralism: different logics are permissible for use in reasoning about most any subject matter. In the limit, there is no absolutely impersonal, transcendent standard of logic for anything under the sun, and so in fact anyone can adopt whichever logic they please for whatever reason, for the sake of any topic, and there's nothing to gainsay them with in the end—not even the charge of hypocrisy, perhaps, in the event that someone adopts dialethic logic at will and tout court. (For example, a logical relativist might think that we can perceive quantum-physical reality to obey a certain type of logic; the radical pluralist says that the theory of perception-grounded inference is itself pluralized in such a way that an empirical observation by person A licenses A to infer X but can license some B to infer Y instead, even with respect to the question of which theory of inference applies to perception itself!)
Logical inclusivism: the question of "One True Logic" is not well-defined because "logic" is (or should be) used more as a mass noun than a count noun. It makes no more sense to ask how many "true" or "correct" logics there are than to ask, "How many iron are there?" (Though c.f., "How much iron is there?") Accordingly, rather than try to sharply demarcate theories of inference one from another, we would do best to review individual rules of inference, e.g. explosion arguments, double-negation eliminations, etc., and see if we can't combine as many rules as possible into an indefinitely expanding theoretical system of inference. (Case-in-point: as of my current writing of this post, I am willing to suspend the argument from explosions for finitary reasoning but accept it wholeheartedly for reasoning about infinite sets.)
(1) allows criticism of others to proceed apace, if an absolutely transcendent standard of relative correctness can be arrived at. (2) does away with criticism (in the limit), and I doubt it would be openly popular among Internet-goers, seeing how much of the Internet worships contempt and hatred for others. But how would (3) actually be worked out? Does it too need a sort of "litmus test" for its inclusions? If it does, how much does it differ from (1)? If it doesn't, how much does it differ from (2)? Or do (1) and (2) differ all that much, besides the emphasized normative status in play per each ("obligation" for (1) and "permission" for (2))?