Markus Gabriel proposes a permissive ontology ("New Realism") according to, if there exists a certain "field of sense" in which an entity appears, the entity exists. Even fictional entities like unicorns.
On the other hand, in "Why the World Does Not Exist", he tries to show the inconsistency and therefore nonexistence of an all-encompassing world-concept (paradoxes of naive set theory?).
As far as I know, Meinong accepted inconsistent (inconceivable) fictional objects like the round square as existing - so why does Markus Gabriel draw the line there?
If "fields of sense" isn't an overly artificial construct, there must be one in which "the world" appears. That's more natural than a field of sense in which "unicorns on the far side of the moon wearing police uniforms" appear.
His definition of existence is obviously self-referential. I don't know how serious this problem is, but isn't this issue very similar to the supposedly fatally inconsistent infinite nesting that occurs when defining the world as the collection of all existing objects conceived as an object?
