Much to the horror of certain philosophers of science particularly those who clung to the logical positivists' notion that science was universally objective, Thomas Kuhn proposed that the politics of science weren't purely rational, and instead the motivations of scientists might be bifurcated into the paradigmatic and the normal. This is covered in detail in Zammitto's A Nice Derangement of Epistemes (GB), Chapter 5: How Kuhn Became a Sociologist. Kuhn's philosophical thesis has made his work rather immortal in 20th century philosophy as a controversy.
Metaphilosophers (IEP) routinely engage in discussion about what constitutes philosophy. For instance, Deleuze and Guattari explore the topic thoroughly in their What is Philosophy?, though most philosophers of renown have taken a stab at defining what constitutes legitimate logical or philosophical discourse. While there are some who reject in their ontology 'metaphilosophy' (itself an obvious metaphilosophical choice), the state of the field of contemporary philosophy is such that there are journals devoted to the topic and books printed by the big publishers, Chicago, Oxford, etc.
The PhilSE question Why is Dawkins hated on by philosophers when his strongest argument against God seems to be a new one and is a philosophical one itself? (PhilSE) has provoked a claim that the motivations of philosophers is not a philosophical matter. While this appears to me to be a question that the Wiley's Metaphilsophy would happily entertain, perhaps I'm mistaken. Thus, what is the consensus of contemporary professional philosophers on the the social aspects of philosophical practice, and do they support or reject the claim that the motivations of philosophers is itself a question for philosophical discourse?
(I'm looking for a learned response with citations to support metaphilosophical claims, such as appeals to arguments of famous philosophers, metaphilosophical arguments, or empirical data regarding the practices of philosophers.)