I've seen similar questions asked once or twice on here, but I wasn't able to find a satisfying defense of libertarian free will. The answers seemed to be kind of scattered. So, I wanted to make clear terms, definitions and place the argument in a syllogism.
- Determined action: an action on the causal chain which is fully determined by the previous state of the causal chain
- Random action: an action on the causal chain that is not determined to any degree by the previous state of the causal chain
- Probabilistic action: an action on the causal chain that is partially determined by the previous state of the causal chain
- Agent: any entity capable of choice. I'm intentionally vague here so that agent would include someone who has libertarian free will or determined choices (like AI choices)
- All actions are part of the casual chain. (This does not exclude non-determined actions. Imagine that we created a true RNG. It's output would be on the causal chain, but what number comes out would not be determined by the previous state of the causal chain.)
- There are no casual loops
- When random, determined and probabilistic are mentioned, I'm speaking ontologically, not epistemically. So, it only matters if something is actually random; it doesn't matter if we cannot tell whether or not it is random.
- Premise 1: All actions are ultimately either random, determined, or probabilistic actions.
- Premise 2: Agents that only make ultimately random, determined, or probabilistic actions are not ultimately responsible for their actions.
- Conclusion: Agents are not ultimately responsible for their actions.
I'm specifically seeking a definition for libertarian freewill in terms of how it exists on the causal chain. I've seen the term "agent-causation", but have been able to find a definition for it (as how it would exist on the causal chain).