To explain real quick. Pyrrhonism is some sort of philosophical practice which does reject (or suspend judgment on) epistemic criteria. It is debatable if they can hold beliefs, but even if the could not, they do have a criterion for action which are the phenomena of everyday life. Hence the apraxia objection loses its appeal.
Pyrrhonism is radical scepticism in the sense that all of our attempts to justifiy do fail, because either they are dogmatist, circular or ad infinitum (see Agrippan Trilemma). Reconciling such an attitude towards truth (that we have not found it YET) with politics - given democracy - does seem to pose a variety of problems, as in normative democratic theory, truth (at least factual truth in the sense of Hannah Arendt) is important. So how could this tension be alleviated, also against the background, that descriptevly, political subjects do not really ground their beliefs according to the ideal of deliberation in the tradition of enlightment.
I can not make my mind up wheather "truth and politics" does matter for "pyrrhonism and politics" since they do provide a criteiron for action. And please,its not about the plausibility of Pyrrhonism. Its more a technical question of how to reconcil (truth of) justification, political beliefs, and political action.
Maybe you guys do have an input?