So only liar paradox Liar said: Im liar or little easy lie is existing ... as Gödel sad you can't fix paradox in it's own space, so you need a protospace.obviously. Okey, lets talk about what is a lie. You have the nut in a core(a core in the shell). You don't know what is inside. But it is the nut. It is probably good, or probably wormy. You need a good one - crack! It is good - true! Another one - crack! Wormy - liar baker sold wormy nut, give my money back! Or You need wormy one - crack! The best one - lie, liar-backer sold good nut to me! That means, lie depends on your waiting. Waiting is the predictable result. If the prediction is same as the result - true. If the prediction is not same as the result - lie. But what is the prediction - it is default the TRUTH. a LIE can't be a predicted, it is not a predicted result. The TRUTH is exist as the prediction, a LIE is not exist as the prediction. lie is existing - incorrect input (we have no full parts). Except lie=/=LIE or it is not a prediction. if lie=/= LIE then lie it is local true mean, and true is local lie mean. local means confusion. if it is not The prediction, then it is a result. If this it ll mirror image but back view, lie is exist and true is not exist. okey, another nut - crack! Empty one...

Text is from my answer. There is a solving lemma, that a lie may exist and it is true, when the "lie" and the "truth" from different spaces: truth is from protospace to lie's space, but the lie's space is a prediction to protospace.

Here's how it works. For example, you bought a house on the island, but you but you couldn't to get into it, because while you go there tornado destroyed the house. So, no more house - house existence is the lie, but your seller is not a liar, he told truth to you? But a truth is not existence.

So, Russell's Paradox can be solved in inverted space. This model also can solve "liar paradox" too.

Am I wrong in my approach?

Okey, i think i have to continue atleast to get more downvoted reactions. How can be solved liar paradox?

Answer is the sheel without core. Nut is not a nut, but it cant be examined. There are two variants:

  1. 0 existing. Liar said : I am lying. But no one who can criticise it while don't hear him. You have no predication with phrase and criticise ability.
  2. Truth has 0 existing. All can't say truth. For example: you have a paper. This paper is equity to some good. But this is a paper. Okey, paper with print symbols. But avery one use it as goods equity. And more. You have a story that always and every one use paper or same as equity to goods. And you can't act that it is paper - all hear "that is not a paper, that is another". But paper is existing, and it is a paper. And destroying printing paper is unlegal so you can get real punish, for the false utilisation nut's core. Liar is existing and all have to lying.

and now my questions for you: How it is happens (in math or logic), that something can have 0 existing. How can 0 exist and what is 0 nature?

if you have an eternity and infinity objects, how can they be criticise? And what needed to make something available to criticise?

Edit 2. RTT: Thanks to K*, this solve is looks close to RTT, but not same at 100%, and it is possible to solve other circle paradoxes:

'protospace' is close to M base of L(is space) - the T'-language in RTT. Nut is h0, and core is h, but there was also a shell...

So, when you have a cat(dead or alive) in the box, and you ll check the cat, you get cat(dead or alive) and an empty box.

and the Truth is: M base of L, that is why T in L have biconditional stance

Edit 3. In search of Aletheia:

i become to understand why that is obviously for me is totally inconsistent for you.

that is problem with Aletheia - greece "truth". In my native language i have 2 words for "truth" first one is close to the truth, and second is close to aletheia.

Aletheia is "the prediction" as say your philosopher:

'Truth (aletheia), in Greek, is the virtue of a discourse that subordinates itself to what is, assuming second hand the same form as the beings whose being makes the discourse true. 'If we bear in mind the structure of the veridical use of the verb, we will easily see how the philosophers' interest in knowledge and truth, taken together with this use of 'to be,' immediately leads to the concept of Being(einai ti) as ... the facts(esti) that make true statements true.'

As i said i have 2 words for truth, but there are also 2 words for lie stance: a lie and a false-pseudo. As you can see that in English these 2 stances of the lies are kept, but not 2 position of true:the truth as true verification, and aletheia. When you thought about the truth, it is something that connect true and the law(or axiomatic base) but it is not that predicted to the law.

  • 2
    This question is borderline incoherent. Jan 28 at 21:34
  • sure. this is an attempt to broke the logic borders. Jan 28 at 21:47
  • 1
    I wouldn't disagree that there might, in principle, be some relationship between approaches to the liar paradox and approaches to Russell's paradox, but as far as this OP goes, I'm not sure what the relationship is argued to be, except that you refer to protospace. Unfortunately, that's not a term I'm familiar with. Mathematics features a wide variety of "spaces," e.g. compact Hausdorff or affine, is protospace one of the variations on the theme? Jan 28 at 22:01
  • Im sorry, but i haven't familiar term to(i really don't know how it is call right), but it is not a term, it is just a mark to devide parts by orientation. Why protospace, cuz it is not a predict to space, it is not a foundation that set the space. Also i gave an 2 examples without terms or marks. So, you don't need terms to understanding the examples. About liar's part i didn't complete it deliberately, but i give an hint - empty nut. Jan 28 at 22:11
  • protospace is not a predict to space, it is not a foundation that set the space, at the same time space is still expectation to protospace.* Protospace is not foundation to space already, but space is still a "roof" of protospace. Jan 28 at 22:22

1 Answer 1


On a linguistic note, it is not possible to 'solve' Russell's paradox (SEP). One can 'avoid' it or 'dissolve' it, but paradoxes as philosophical problems are not like mathmematical problem per se. To dissolve the paradox, the main thrust is on formulating axioms that avoid the production of the paradox in the formal system. To wit:

Standard responses to the paradox attempt to limit in some way the conditions under which sets are formed. The goal is usually both to eliminate R (and similar contradictory sets) and, at the same time, to retain all other sets needed for mathematics. This is often done by replacing the unrestricted Comprehension Axiom with the more restrictive Separation Axiom, namely the axiom that given any (consistent) set S and any formula ϕ(x) with x free, there will be a set {x∈S:ϕ(x)} whose members are exactly those members of S that satisfy ϕ(x). If we now let ϕ(x) stand for the formula x∉x, it turns out that the corresponding set, {x∈S:x∉x} will not be contradictory since it consists only of those members found within S that are not members of themselves. Hence the set fails to include itself.

So today, at least two philosophically recognized strategies exist in analytical philosophy:


I've reread. It should be noted that while a lie, which is taken as a communication with the intent to deceive, is pragmatic, a contradiction, which violates the Law of Non-Contradiction, is logical. Therefore, in truth-conditional theories of semantics, lies are not considered, because the pragmatic speech act of lying is 'abstracted away' and the problem left is one of logical values of truth. Therefore, one cannot solve a logical contradiction by addressing pragmatic aspects of communication.

  • Yes, but there is no an axiom that i should to read something from left to right. Jan 28 at 20:41
  • 1
    Vectors are used because they describe the extension of physical space. A lie algebra, which is an algebra of vector spaces reduces to arithmetic, metric spaces, etc. has logical presuppositions. Those presuppositions are axioms usually of set-theory. Vector spaces are built on top of logic systems, so an algebra can't solve the problems of the system on which it is built any more than a good roof can solve the problems of a poor foundation in a house.
    – J D
    Jan 28 at 20:59
  • 2
    My own view is that since dimorphic existence is redoubled upon themic reversal, a false paralepsis may be presupposed ataclectic, leaving scope for diverse avoidance strategies with enharmonic cognitive dissonance, especially if one skips every other word in a sentence. Jan 28 at 23:18
  • 2
    Apologies, the Devil made me type that. Please ignore me. Jan 28 at 23:18
  • 1
    A not too well known result is that the Russian mathematician V. N. Grishin showed that you can have unrestricted comprehension in set theory, and avoid Russell's paradox, by using a substructural logic that lacks the rule of contraction. You don't need to go off the deep end into paraconsistency.
    – Bumble
    Jan 29 at 8:54

Not the answer you're looking for? Browse other questions tagged .