Is this a way to solve to Russell's/"liar paradox"? [closed]

Question

So only liar paradox Liar said: Im liar or little easy lie is existing ... as Gödel sad you can't fix paradox in it's own space, so you need a protospace.obviously. Okey, lets talk about what is a lie. You have the nut in a core(a core in the shell). You don't know what is inside. But it is the nut. It is probably good, or probably wormy. You need a good one - crack! It is good - true! Another one - crack! Wormy - liar baker sold wormy nut, give my money back! Or You need wormy one - crack! The best one - lie, liar-backer sold good nut to me! That means, lie depends on your waiting. Waiting is the predictable result. If the prediction is same as the result - true. If the prediction is not same as the result - lie. But what is the prediction - it is default the TRUTH. a LIE can't be a predicted, it is not a predicted result. The TRUTH is exist as the prediction, a LIE is not exist as the prediction. lie is existing - incorrect input (we have no full parts). Except lie=/=LIE or it is not a prediction. if lie=/= LIE then lie it is local true mean, and true is local lie mean. local means confusion. if it is not The prediction, then it is a result. If this it ll mirror image but back view, lie is exist and true is not exist. okey, another nut - crack! Empty one...

Text is from my answer. There is a solving lemma, that a lie may exist and it is true, when the "lie" and the "truth" from different spaces: truth is from protospace to lie's space, but the lie's space is a prediction to protospace.

Here's how it works. For example, you bought a house on the island, but you but you couldn't to get into it, because while you go there tornado destroyed the house. So, no more house - house existence is the lie, but your seller is not a liar, he told truth to you? But a truth is not existence.

So, Russell's Paradox can be solved in inverted space. This model also can solve "liar paradox" too.

Am I wrong in my approach?

Okey, i think i have to continue atleast to get more downvoted reactions. How can be solved liar paradox?

Answer is the sheel without core. Nut is not a nut, but it cant be examined. There are two variants:

1. 0 existing. Liar said : I am lying. But no one who can criticise it while don't hear him. You have no predication with phrase and criticise ability.
2. Truth has 0 existing. All can't say truth. For example: you have a paper. This paper is equity to some good. But this is a paper. Okey, paper with print symbols. But avery one use it as goods equity. And more. You have a story that always and every one use paper or same as equity to goods. And you can't act that it is paper - all hear "that is not a paper, that is another". But paper is existing, and it is a paper. And destroying printing paper is unlegal so you can get real punish, for the false utilisation nut's core. Liar is existing and all have to lying.

and now my questions for you: How it is happens (in math or logic), that something can have 0 existing. How can 0 exist and what is 0 nature?

if you have an eternity and infinity objects, how can they be criticise? And what needed to make something available to criticise?

Edit 2. RTT: Thanks to K*, this solve is looks close to RTT, but not same at 100%, and it is possible to solve other circle paradoxes:

'protospace' is close to M base of L(is space) - the T'-language in RTT. Nut is h0, and core is h, but there was also a shell...

So, when you have a cat(dead or alive) in the box, and you ll check the cat, you get cat(dead or alive) and an empty box.

and the Truth is: M base of L, that is why T in L have biconditional stance

Edit 3. In search of Aletheia:

i become to understand why that is obviously for me is totally inconsistent for you.

that is problem with Aletheia - greece "truth". In my native language i have 2 words for "truth" first one is close to the truth, and second is close to aletheia.

Aletheia is "the prediction" as say your philosopher:

'Truth (aletheia), in Greek, is the virtue of a discourse that subordinates itself to what is, assuming second hand the same form as the beings whose being makes the discourse true. 'If we bear in mind the structure of the veridical use of the verb, we will easily see how the philosophers' interest in knowledge and truth, taken together with this use of 'to be,' immediately leads to the concept of Being(einai ti) as ... the facts(esti) that make true statements true.'

As i said i have 2 words for truth, but there are also 2 words for lie stance: a lie and a false-pseudo. As you can see that in English these 2 stances of the lies are kept, but not 2 position of true:the truth as true verification, and aletheia. When you thought about the truth, it is something that connect true and the law(or axiomatic base) but it is not that predicted to the law.

Answer 1

On a linguistic note, it is not possible to 'solve' Russell's paradox (SEP). One can 'avoid' it or 'dissolve' it, but paradoxes as philosophical problems are not like mathmematical problem per se. To dissolve the paradox, the main thrust is on formulating axioms that avoid the production of the paradox in the formal system. To wit:

Standard responses to the paradox attempt to limit in some way the conditions under which sets are formed. The goal is usually both to eliminate R (and similar contradictory sets) and, at the same time, to retain all other sets needed for mathematics. This is often done by replacing the unrestricted Comprehension Axiom with the more restrictive Separation Axiom, namely the axiom that given any (consistent) set S and any formula ϕ(x) with x free, there will be a set {x∈S:ϕ(x)} whose members are exactly those members of S that satisfy ϕ(x). If we now let ϕ(x) stand for the formula x∉x, it turns out that the corresponding set, {x∈S:x∉x} will not be contradictory since it consists only of those members found within S that are not members of themselves. Hence the set fails to include itself.

So today, at least two philosophically recognized strategies exist in analytical philosophy:

• Use restrictions placed on a theory of collections, such as using the axioms of ZF or using a type theory instead. In fact, the latter approach was taken by Russell himself.
• Undermine the logical assumptions that undergird it as dialetheism (SEP) does. Dialetheism rejects the Law of Non-Contradiction, but one can also do away with the Law of Excluded Middle or the Principle of Bivalence also. Non-classical logics are of great interest to philosophers. See Bumble's "In how many and which ways can a logic be non-classical? Are there systems for organizing them?"

EDIT

I've reread. It should be noted that while a lie, which is taken as a communication with the intent to deceive, is pragmatic, a contradiction, which violates the Law of Non-Contradiction, is logical. Therefore, in truth-conditional theories of semantics, lies are not considered, because the pragmatic speech act of lying is 'abstracted away' and the problem left is one of logical values of truth. Therefore, one cannot solve a logical contradiction by addressing pragmatic aspects of communication.