Not everyone has an "inner monologue" or ability to vividly imagine things: this is known as aphantasia. At an imaginary-angled diagonal from that, there are also people who are pain-asymbolic, conscious of the raw qualia of pain but not its prescriptive "illocutionary force" (this would be like perceiving a patch of color, but not the patch-as-extended, but only the pure "quale" of the color, perhaps).
There is an epistemic possibility, then, that some people relate to their own minds in a primarily discursive rather than perceptual manner, as it were. This could inspire philosophical intuitions about the difficulty of harmonizing mind and matter in either direction: people with vivid phantasia/symbolia conditions might note yet that they seem able to cause inner representations at will, while external matter is more recalcitrant; on the flip side, some aphantasians might get the impression that their minds "just are" discursive/nonperceptual forces, and the lack of perceptual integration between the "faculty" of discursion and the faculty of material perception would seem to them as though it were an "unbridgeable gulf."
Of course, even more obversely, some phantasians/aphantasians might come to other conclusions based on the relevant strains of introspection (I personally, as a phantasian with a stereotypical "overactive imagination," find myself wondering how the mind couldn't be a form of matter, rather than how it could be).
But now there are options in cosmology/physics and related metaphysics where the interaction between types of matter "proper" is either noncausal-in-the-commonsense-manner (because the common concept of causation is suspect/suppressed), or "holographic", etc., so from the perspective of these options, either the question of one type of matter interacting with another isn't well-formed in the first place, or is perhaps just as mystifying as the question of a mental type of substance (as matter, maybe, e.g. as a "Rusakov field", though note that that hypothesis is actually a piece of a fictional setting) interacting with matter. In terms of quantum field theory, maybe the issue could be framed as a comparison/contrast between explaining how a primarily mental field couples to/decouples from the other fields, and explaining how those other fields couple/decouple to/from each other; we have some mathematical sense of how the hypothetical inflaton field dissolved in stages to become the multitude of elementary fields we now believe in, but so far no theory, really, of an elementary consciousness field, much less how such a thing might have "broken off" from the others at this date.
Addendum
In light of neurodiversity more broadly, consider the "argument from queerness" against "moral realism" (in a Platonic/Moorean sense). Mackie said that "objectively prescriptive realities" are too weird to be real in the "world as we know it" (although then Christine Korsgaard pointed out that the objective side of any human being's existence is tantamount to the existence of objectively prescriptive entities). But anything can seem weird if you're paranoid enough (just think of the epidemic in America of people being manipulated by a global death cult into fearing vaccines because "isn't it weird how people are dying suddenly?"; and they say many other things, mere coincidences betimes, are too weird to be coincidences (while they ignore, deliberately or not, the fact that the description "died suddenly" has been in operation for years and years on end, e.g. think of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome).
So one person might think it's weird that particles can be entangled, weird enough that the phenomenon merits being compared to something "spooky" no less. Another person might think the concept of God is really weird (and it can be), and wonder about how God can interact with a world so different from It. Another person might think the Big Bang was weird, or that the accelerating expansion of the universe is weird, or so on and on.