So this essay covers the idea of "antisets," which are such as A, B such that A ∪ B = 0 (without A and B being themselves 0). This concept is extended in another essay to talk of antigraphs, which when merged with their antitheses result in a null graph.
How would this play into the theory of epistemic graphs? For it would seem like carrying over the theme into the epistemic domain would mean talking about "antiknowledge." Arguably, it would be like saying that one method of positively knowing something X means negating a state of antiknowledge inside one's judgment/mind: there is, or can be, an epistemic force that actively tries to block our acquisition of some X-samples, and it is necessary to overcome(?) this mental(?) force to know/understand those samples.
On the other hand, that kind of sounds absurd. I appreciate that we might go to an epistemic game theory, or game-theoretic semantics for a logic, or what-have-you, and so we might imagine the antiknowledge factor in terms of a competing agent in an epistemic game, so maybe interpreted in that manner, talk of antiknowledge seems less fantastical.
Is antigraph theory relevant to graph-theoretic epistemology, or is this a case where graphs/related concepts are not relevant to epistemology?