In Bayesianism, every theory has a certain prior probability. Now of course, this can be a very subjective task, and so I am anticipating that there is no correct answer, but am still curious for a response.
Now, certain theories may seem more implausible than others simply because they are necessarily more improbable. For example, it makes sense to give the prior probability of supernaturalism in general a higher or equal value than a specific god. The former contains the latter.
But what about theories that haven’t been tested and yet are differentiated by how plausible they seem. For example, a god who is bored and plays a random draw by people’s names and then decides which person to help that day may seem less plausible and harder to imagine than a god who decides to help someone who did good deeds that day.
Of course, there is no verifiable or testable evidence of either. But should one of these be given a higher or lower prior probability simply by the ease it which it is imagined?