If a question-answer pair (Q, A) is compared as to the amount of information each encodes, we might say that A > Q insofar as A "fills in the blanks" in Q. For example, 2x + 11.7 = 449,304 might be seen as having three "chunks" of given information (the fixed numbers, maybe including the implied indexes for the arithmetical operators (the + having an index of 1 in the basic hyperoperator sequence, the 11.7 having an implicit moment of division in the representation of its fractional component and then division being a negative operation of index 2). Decoding what x is might be thought of as providing you with more information, then, and so any question that can be formulated in such a way (as a matter of solving for variables, so to say) would be one where, if it has a uniquely paired-up answer, has less information in it than the answer.
However, consider the difference between:
- Is 1123 a prime number?
- Is 1123 a balanced prime number?
- What number is next after 2?
- What prime number is next after 2?
Either pair of questions seems, internal to the pair, to have the same answer ("Yes," for the first two and, "3," for the second). But here the framing of the questions involves different amounts of specification, and so some "virtual" information, at least, that varies.
Now, if the subquestion relation is a logical example of the powerset relation (maybe via category-theoretic mappings involving "power objects"), we might say:
Take a set of questions Q1 paired to a set of answers A. Assume that A enters into the evocation relation in (one version of) erotetic logic. Now define the set of all questions evoked by A as the erotetic powerset of Q1, i.e. here Q2 (this need not indicate the numerical successor exactly, but only the successor by type). By Cantor's theorem, erotetic powersets will always be different in cardinality compared to their bases, and given sufficient well-ordering procedures (classically the generic choice axiom), we can say that an erotetic powerset is more specifically larger than its base (in the same overall well-order) (in an unorderly or outright disorderly world of sets, it could be more precise to speak of powersets as incommensurable with their bases, at least in the zone of infinity).
Moreover, there are some reasons to believe that the powerset relation might inflate its bases to the size of the entire universe of sets. This is trivially so in a pocket-sized set theory where the universe has size ℵ1 (if well-ordered, anyway) regardless, but less trivially, see Storer, esp. ch. 3 and 4 for the predicativist equation of an unrestricted subset collection over the naturals with an unrestricted set simpliciter, or closer to the mainline Matthew, e.g. pg. 34 for forcing class-many Cohen reals to inhabit the natural powerset. And Conway's surreal infinitesimals occur for every transfinite ordinal, so a Continuum made up of surreal infinitesimals is divisible to absolute infinity, i.e. to a degree equivalent (as an ordinal) to the cardinality of a proper class. So perhaps the erotetic powerset relation can take any infinite set of questions and any infinite set of answers to those questions, and extrapolate a cosmic-scale question-set.
It does seem epistemological, though (c.f. Ted Wrigley's answer to this OP), in the sense that we can imagine a proper class of questions and a proper class of answers, or one set (even a set) of all possible questions and answers together, but it is not as if we know even all the questions themselves, much less their answers. "Long ago," Aristotle thought to carve nature at some finite number of overarching joints, characteristically reflected from kinds of questions, but such theories about categorizing objects always seem to branch off indefinitely or loop in on themselves, or to have trivial or excessively obscure primary conditions of identification, in the end. So one imagines that of the domain of questions there will be no end, and the horizon of our knowledge will always hold the edge of question-space at least a little farther out than the edge of answer-space (or inchoately superimposed upon each other, and changing, so that definitely the space of settled questions and solved problems appears subsumed at the edges in a greater space of open questions and unproven solutions).
As far as the quoted passage goes, you can take "more equal than the other" in the sense that, e.g., "What is x?" can be read for, "What = x?" or even, then, "W = x?" The variable that grounds the process of determining the other variable has something "more to it," something to do with equivalence relations/equality (note that those phrases "equivalence relations" and "equality" are not the same in meaning), so there is some propriety in saying that W or x is "more equal" to the other, than the other is to it. Suppose, if you will, that there is an equivalence relation, we'll use a repeated equals sign to mark it out, which is not commutative. So: W = x, W == x, but ~(x == W), perhaps. (I realize that equivalence relations are defined as symmetric, but this phrase "more equal than" might then be construed as a degenerate such relation, or we would expand to some broader context involving also pseudo-equivalence, etc. and so there's probably a more canonical possible explanation of the quoted phrase than what I'm offering here.)
ADDENDUM: there is a theory, going back as far as I know to one Lennart Åqvist, according to which questions can be interpreted as epistemic imperatives. I used to think that George Lakoff's thing about "don't think of an elephant" meant that even normal assertoric functions encoded for imperatives, too, but I later thought that we could distinguish "don't think of a general unicorn" from "don't think of a particular one" and so now I'm not so sure. So maybe questions can be differentiated from answers in part by reference to the former having imperative counterparts that the latter lack.