https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/ says: "According to classical Husserlian phenomenology, our experience is directed toward—represents or “intends”—things only through particular concepts, thoughts, ideas, images, etc. These make up the meaning or content of a given experience, and are distinct from the things they present or mean." This is a long article, but there is no mention of Dennett, Keith Frankish, nor even of John B Watson, or even of the word "heterophenomenolalism".
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phenomenology_(philosophy) Is quite a long article but mentions Dennett only once and gives him point of view just one short sentence, and doesn't mention Frankish or John B. Watson. The word "heterophenomenonalism" is found in the article exactly once, but it is buried in the thirty-one-item-long list of "see also" topics appended to the article.
A short paragraph supposedly shows the falsity of Dennett's view: "The phenomenological analysis of objects is notably different from traditional science. However, several frameworks do phenomenology with an empirical orientation or aim to unite it with the natural sciences or with cognitive science.
For a classical critical point of view, Daniel Dennett argues for the wholesale uselessness of phenomenology considering phenomena as qualia, which cannot be the object of scientific research or do not exist in the first place. Liliana Albertazzi counters such arguments by pointing out that empirical research on phenomena has been successfully carried out employing modern methodology. Human experience can be investigated by surveying, and with brain scanning techniques. For example, ample research on color perception suggests that people with normal color vision see colors similarly and not each in their own way. Thus, it is possible to universalize phenomena of subjective experience on an empirical scientific basis.
Notwithstanding, the scope of phenomenology is gravely restricted by bracketing. Phenomenology's aim is to study experience itself avoiding evolutionary or causal explanations. Husserl himself spoke strongly against the naturalization of phenomenology to fight the reduction of consciousness to psychology.
In the early twenty-first century, phenomenology became a trend in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Some approaches to the naturalization of phenomenology reduce consciousness to the physical-neuronal level and are therefore not universally acknowledged as representing phenomenology. These include the frameworks of neuro-phenomenology, embodied constructivism, and the cognitive neuroscience of phenomenology. Other likewise controversial approaches aim to explain life-world experience on a sociological or anthropological basis despite phenomenology being mostly considered descriptive rather than explanatory."
The "" refers to "Naturalizing Phenomenology: A Must Have?" Liliana Albertazzi https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6204367/
The abstract is: "Quite a few cognitive scientists are working toward a naturalization of phenomenology. Looking more closely at the relevant literature, however, the ‘naturalizing phenomenology’ proposals show the presence of different conceptions, assumptions, and formalisms, further differentiated by different philosophical and/or scientific concerns. This paper shows that the original Husserlian stance is deeper, clearer and more advanced than most supposed contemporary improvements. The recent achievements of experimental phenomenology show how to ‘naturalize’ phenomenology without destroying the guiding assumptions of phenomenology. The requirements grounding the scientific explanation of subjective experience are discussed, such as the nature of the stimuli, their variables, and their manipulation by properly phenomenological methods."
Here's a quote from the body of the article:
"In recent years declaring oneself a phenomenologist, or of a phenomenological persuasion, has become a rather fashionable attitude among philosophers and scientists of cognitive neuroscience. Apparently, it is a sort of must have, in order to refresh the dated and unpopular role of reductionism. Both philosophers and scientists pay increasing attention to the perspectival nature of perceiving [...]"
Not the most powerful argument. A low-effort argument, one might say.
Thus it seems that heterophenonalism is largely getting ignored by those who write encyclopedia articles about phenomenalism.
So my question is, Why are Dan Dennett and his heterophenomenonology largely ignored by the Wikipedia and Stanford articles on phenomenology?