Has there been any philosopher making an argument along the lines that logic is an obstacle to knowledge about the world?
The informal argument could go something like: logic is created by humans (evidence: humans can create different logics) ; humans cling to logic because it "makes sense" to them ; but Nature does not necessarily follow human logic ; therefore to understand Nature we should use inductive, empirical methods, no matter how "illogical" the results may seem ; furthermore, insisting on using logic is an impediment to gaining knowledge (because Nature is not guaranteed to follow any logic we have created anyway).
There may well be significant flaws with this informal argument, of course. There can be various nuances too, such as asserting that logic does not ever lead to true knowledge about the world, or the weaker position that logic alone does not lead to true knowledge about the world. But the gist would be that logic is the wrong (or an insufficient) tool to gain real knowledge about Nature, because Nature doesn't necessarily follow human logic. This position would also claim that only inductive, empirical methods yield actual knowledge about Nature.
Just curious if this position or a similar one has ever been defended in philosophy.