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I am reading Difference and Repitition currently by Deleuze. In it he describes his metaphysics as subverting identity, and instead replacing how people could process the world as an endless series of differences in itself, with difference also being the Eternal Return (Repitition) via Nietzsche. However, without the use of identities in Deleuzian metaphysics, and considering Bergson as one of his influences is it fair to classify Deleuze as an intuitionist with his metaphysics? It seems to be at least superficially a tenant of his metaphysics as he also talks at length of subverting previous modes of thought such as classificationism or more specifically a correspondence theory of truth. Furthermore his metaphysics is described as transcenfental empiricism, whereas Bergson describes his bergsonian intuitionism as true empiricism, so there is also a nominal similarity here as well. Therefore, given these aspects, and maybe more reasons, is the Deleuzian Metaphysics as proposed in Difference and Repition a form of intuitionism?

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    Intuitionism has multiple meanings, and the one that applies to Bergson is not a commonly used one. It is better to call it Bergsonism, as Deleuze did. The multiple commonalities are explored in Lundy's book Deleuze's Bergsonism. Deleuze was a Bergsonian of sorts, but he was a post-modernist first, antithetical to the tradition to which Bergson belonged.
    – Conifold
    Commented Apr 8, 2023 at 3:25
  • So is that a "yes"? (Also, isn't the technical term "post-structuralist"? As it is a critique on structuralism which came before?)
    – TCoff
    Commented Apr 8, 2023 at 3:33
  • No, it is the term is too vague for the question to be answerable as asked.
    – Conifold
    Commented Apr 8, 2023 at 3:35
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    How is it more complicated than that?
    – TCoff
    Commented Apr 8, 2023 at 4:09
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    it is reasonable to classify Deleuze's metaphysics in Difference and Repetition as a form of transcendental differential intuitionism, given its emphasis on direct experience, rejection of fixed identities, rejection of correspondence theory of truth and classificationism aligns with the intuitionist rejection of the idea that truth and knowledge can be reduced to fixed and objective standards. Thus its implication would not be that different from traditional Cartesian dualism though it's certainly has differance... Commented Apr 8, 2023 at 4:37

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