There's a famous question that asks whether two people who agree that they are seeing a red object might be seeing (in their respective subjective experiences) different colors. For example, one is seeing the object as red in his private experience and the other is seeing it as blue in his private experience. The idea is that the one who is seeing what the other would call "blue", calls what he sees "red", because he always has done, having been told all his life that this color is called "red". And vice versa: I don't think the idea/question assumes that there is one correct blue or red. It's just that the subjective experiences could be completely different while the stimulus and the utterances are identical. It's a very widely known question/idea even among nonphilosophers.
If I understand Keith Frankish and his consciousness illusionism correctly, he is saying or implying that it doesn't mean anything to ask that, because there is no such thing as a quale. And I am under the impression that Dan Dennett and his heterophenomenology (HP) said or implied something similar, decades before Frankish did.
If I understand HP correctly, it says that subjective impressions are not data, but hypotheseses. Thus qualia do not exist and/or are incoherent concepts, say Dennett and Frankish. The difference in the "experience of color" is a difference between qualia in the example given above, and therefore is meaningless or incoherent according to HP.
But I am not sure whether I have understood Frankish ("An Illusionist Manifesto" https://www.keithfrankish.com/presentations/an-illusionist-manifesto/ and "Lecture 1: The Illusionist Option" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y2n-s6C1iYQ&list=PLhgvALi0LQGXIA7cKNmGNTiQ7dpS-7dLw) and Dennett ("The illusion of consciousness | Dan Dennett" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fjbWr3ODbAo and "Daniel Dennett - Consciousness, Qualia and the "Hard Problem": https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eSaEjLZIDqc&t=101s) correctly.
So my question is whether heterophenomenology (HP) or any other school of thought says that because qualia don't exist,this subjective color question is meaningless, and who was the first to say so. In other words, does HP or any other school of thought say it's meaningless to ask whether the red you see is different from the red I see, because qualia don't exist, and who was first to say it or an equivalent statement, and when?