Couldn’t we critique Ontological Arguments’ compatibility with the concept of God by suggesting that an omnipotent being should be able to be proved by something outside of the mind, or something along those lines? (Otherwise this is a limit on it’s power)

An argument I wrote a while ago (excuse my sloppy standard form):

  1. The only reason we have for God to exist is the concept within our mind
  2. If we did not have the concept of God, or if no one had a mind, we would not know of or experience God’s existence
  3. Therefore God’s existence would not be true for us if we did not have the concept of God
  4. God’s existence is dependent on our minds
  5. A being which is independent of our mind is greater than one which is dependent on our mind
  6. God cannot be the greatest possible being

I am aware of a (quite big) logical gap between 3 and 4. To 'bridge' this I think you could either:

  1. Use a form of idealism (i.e when we don’t conceive of God, God doesn’t exist, therefore God’s existence is dependent on our minds)
  2. Use the absence of empirical evidence for God in the world (as I have tried to do slightly here)

Upon rereading this I feel like it’s weirdly kind of like an inverse Ontological argument as we are essentially taking issue with the definition of God’s compatibility with being used in arguments that attempt to prove God’s necessary existence.

Quite likely fallacious but a fun thought.

  • See Sobel's "Logic and Theism".
    – Frank
    Apr 24 at 20:03


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