The fine tuning argument posits a designer because if certain parameters were changed a bit, life would not exist. The chance of this is considered to be very small so a designer is posited. I’m not sure how this calculation comes about since as far as I’m aware, I don’t think these constants were produced as part of some lottery process, but let’s just assume the “chance”, whatever it means, is very low.
My question is this: Suppose, for instance, this set of particular fundamental constants occupied another set of values, a set of values not conducive to life.
The probability of this set of values would be just as low as the set of values that is conducive to life (assuming a uniform distribution of course). Why can’t one then use this fact to posit a God that simply wanted these particular constants to come about?
In other words, why is a God that wanted this set of particular constants to come about any less likely to exist than a God that wanted a set of particular constants that are conducive to life? Sure, we can imagine a God who cares more about life more easily than one who would care about some other arbitrary set of constants, but I fail to see how this makes a difference as to how likely it is for these kinds of gods to exist.
Given that we have no verifiable evidence of God prior to learning about these fundamental constants, how can one justify this difference in likelihood? If this cannot be justified, then doesn’t this mean any set of constants would be equivalent evidence for a particular god, hence removing the power behind the fine tuning argument?