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The Liar seems to have been universally regarded as paradoxical from the moment philosophers started to discuss its logic. Is that really the case, though?

My question is as follows:

Outside philosophers who one way or the other just dismissed the Liar, are there logicians in the past who thought and argued that the Liar was just false, or just true, or possibly true or false depending on some condition?

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    "Another way out says the Liar Sentence is meaningful and is true or else false, but one special step of the argument in the Liar Paradox is incorrect, namely, the inference from the Liar Sentence’s being false to its being true. Arthur Prior, following the informal suggestions of Jean Buridan and C. S. Peirce, takes this way out and concludes that the Liar Sentence is simply false. So do Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy, but they go on to present a detailed, formal treatment of the Paradox..." IEP, Liar Paradox.
    – Conifold
    May 29 at 5:26
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    C.f. Thomas Bradwardine's approach to "insolubles," incl. the liar paradox.
    – Kristian Berry
    May 29 at 5:32

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