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4 votes
1 answer
203 views

Understanding Dennett's Philosophy of Mind

Daniel Dennett was a reductionist; he argued that the mind is entirely physical and can be reduced to the physical world. In one his lectures, he spoke about the colors on the American flag and ...
Dario Mirić's user avatar
2 votes
2 answers
583 views

Has anyone ever claimed that if Daniel Dennett, or a like-minded person, did actually manage to explain consciousness, humans would be diminished?

Here's a link to a free, seemingly legal, PDF of an awesome book, Sweet Dreams by Dan Dennett. I finished reading it a day or two ago. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/...
Matthew Christopher Bartsh's user avatar
2 votes
3 answers
215 views

Assuming philosophical zombies are possible, could one zombie have an inverted spectrum while the rest do not?

Philosophical zombies by definition (See Chalmers: https://consc.net/zombies-on-the-web/) lack qualia, while being normal human beings in every other way. Like normal humans, zombies make utterances ...
Matthew Christopher Bartsh's user avatar
3 votes
2 answers
273 views

Would the alleged nonexistence of qualia imply that it is meaningless to say that what I call "red" could be what you call "blue"?

This question is similar to (and following on from) but significantly different from this question: Who, if anyone did say it, was the first to say that because no qualia exist it is meaningless to ...
Matthew Christopher Bartsh's user avatar
2 votes
8 answers
619 views

Why do people hide the assumption contained in the philosophical zombies question/idea?

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article called "Zombies" https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/ makes no mention of an assumption that seems to be hidden in the famous ...
Matthew Christopher Bartsh's user avatar
7 votes
2 answers
312 views

Who, if anyone did say it, was the first to say that because no qualia exist it is meaningless to say what I call "red" could be what you call "blue"?

There's a famous question that asks whether two people who agree that they are seeing a red object might be seeing (in their respective subjective experiences) different colors. For example, one is ...
Matthew Christopher Bartsh's user avatar
1 vote
2 answers
128 views

Who first came up with heterophenomenology, and when?

Dan Dennett, in his article "Who’s On First? Heterophenomenology Explained" (https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/JCSarticle.pdf) says: "In short, heterophenomenology is nothing ...
Matthew Christopher Bartsh's user avatar
4 votes
6 answers
782 views

Critique of those missing the Hard Problem?

From everything I've ever seen about the “Hard Problem of Consciousness”, the issue is that materialists and physicalists presume a different question and answer that one instead. I feel like the two ...
Al Brown's user avatar
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9 votes
5 answers
837 views

From a functionalist point of view: when is an algorithm an A.I., and when is it just software?

Recently, The Atlantic published an article claiming that "Google Taught an AI That Sorts Cat Photos to Analyze DNA". When you look at the original paper published by the Google team, what they really ...
Alexander S King's user avatar