Skip to main content

All Questions

Tagged with
Filter by
Sorted by
Tagged with
9 votes
2 answers
116 views

How can illusionists about phenomenology think consciousness is explainable through science when science seemingly inquires into phenomonology?

I think I understand that the SEP has Dennett denying the existence of qualia (1) as phenomenal character. "According to illusionists (Dennett 2019, 2020; Frankish 2016; Kammerer 2021), conscious ...
J Kusin's user avatar
  • 3,513
2 votes
3 answers
215 views

Assuming philosophical zombies are possible, could one zombie have an inverted spectrum while the rest do not?

Philosophical zombies by definition (See Chalmers: https://consc.net/zombies-on-the-web/) lack qualia, while being normal human beings in every other way. Like normal humans, zombies make utterances ...
Matthew Christopher Bartsh's user avatar
3 votes
2 answers
273 views

Would the alleged nonexistence of qualia imply that it is meaningless to say that what I call "red" could be what you call "blue"?

This question is similar to (and following on from) but significantly different from this question: Who, if anyone did say it, was the first to say that because no qualia exist it is meaningless to ...
Matthew Christopher Bartsh's user avatar
2 votes
8 answers
619 views

Why do people hide the assumption contained in the philosophical zombies question/idea?

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article called "Zombies" https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/ makes no mention of an assumption that seems to be hidden in the famous ...
Matthew Christopher Bartsh's user avatar
7 votes
2 answers
312 views

Who, if anyone did say it, was the first to say that because no qualia exist it is meaningless to say what I call "red" could be what you call "blue"?

There's a famous question that asks whether two people who agree that they are seeing a red object might be seeing (in their respective subjective experiences) different colors. For example, one is ...
Matthew Christopher Bartsh's user avatar
0 votes
0 answers
67 views

Every experience is a new qualia? In reference to Dennett and RoboMary

Preliminary: RoboMary is a robot, but so are we - large robots made of smaller robots made of smaller robots. She does not yet have the experience of color. Dennett puts forth a physicalist way for ...
J Kusin's user avatar
  • 3,513
1 vote
0 answers
121 views

Scholarly retorts to "Quining Qualia"?

I've been reading and rereading Daniel Dennett's dismissal of qualia, and I have been wanting to see what some of the experts in the field think of his portrayal. For example, has Nagel, Hoffman, or ...
Sermo's user avatar
  • 823
3 votes
0 answers
159 views

Dennett's claims on Qualia (based upon Sweet Dreams)

Dennett claims qualia is a faux pas, a logical fallacy, held by the philosophical community, but this is based upon specific sources that remove some "qualities" of qualia. For instance, not all ...
NationWidePants's user avatar