Questions tagged [deontic-logic]

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How many possible worlds does SDL need (at a minimum)?

The SEP article on deontic logic, in sec. 2.3, reads: We assume that we have a set of possible worlds, W, and a relation, A, relating worlds to worlds, with the intention that Aij iff j is a world ...
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Does OB-RM support, "If A is good, and if B then A, then B is good"?

OB-RM is a proposition in deontic logic according to which: Now I was trying to work with a different moral operator g for "it is good that,"W and I wanted to be able to show that: (gA &...
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If p then it is not obligatory to know p and if not p then it is not obligatory to know not p → not obligatory to know p or not p?

Suppose that if I am happy I am not obliged to know it, and if I am not happy I am not obliged to know it, then does that mean that I am not obliged to know if I am happy or not? It seems non ...
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How to express an is/too-much gap?

Phrases like "too much" and "not enough" can be morally charged fairly easily, so how would we express the fact/value distinction in these terms? I was thinking of using special ...
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Characterizing Mally's infamous theoretical outcomes as degenerate cases of moral representation

The gist of those outcomes is a collapse of "is" and "ought" into each other, e.g.: (Apologies for the cutoff.) Is it safe to say that what Mally "discovered" was not, ...
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In a situational deontic logic, is a permission with no alternative degenerate?

Relativize issues of permissibility to situations, so that we would say things like, "In situation S, it is permitted that P." Let PMA = "It is permitted that A," and OBA = "...
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Rather than "ought to be true = is true" being impossible, might it not just be a trivial stage of moral representation?

I just finished reading Eugenia Cheng's essay on moral phraseology in mathematics, and so I want to go over something she says on pg. 20: A recent lecturer of Part III Category Theory declared that ...
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