Questions tagged [metaethics]
Metaethics is the attempt to understand the metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and psychological, presuppositions and commitments of moral thought, talk, and practice.
222 questions
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Should one construct a “pursuit” of life through philosophical reasoning?
Should one first construct a systematic understanding of our senses and the world, and then determine a “pursuit” of life (for example, the cumulative feeling of happiness, achieving immortality, or ...
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"Duty and Inclination" in Kant's ethics
Having considered a lot of ideas: Kant's concept of moral worth, Schiller on grace and dignity, the feeling of respect, the effect of reason on feeling, the psychology of moral sentiment, the role of ...
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Is death immoral according to emotivism?
Emotivism (A.J. Ayer) is the meta-ethical theory that our ethical statements can be analytically reduced to emotional reactions (boo, hurrah).
Death is an action which more often than not produces ...
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Unifying property of ethical theories?
Let’s say there are different theories for what the defining properties of “ethicality” are. Some theories think in utilitarian terms and in terms of maximizing subjective goodness or badness (...
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Does metaethics supervene on metaphysics if and only if the ethical supervenes on the physical?
Preamble: since there is supposed to be such a strong consensus about the presupposition of this question, I will not be providing a specified link to any text discussing supervenience in ethics but ...
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Is it possible to have a counterfactual divine-command ethics? [closed]
What I mean is a theory that starts off with two conflicting premises: (A) that the concept of the divine will is relevant to the proper solution to at least one, and if only one, real moral question; ...
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Can the conflict between morality and amorality be resolved? [closed]
Question inspired by another question: How can moral disagreements be resolved when the conflicting parties are guided by fundamentally different value systems?
In the spirit of the aforelinked ...
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Is the metaphysical/methodological distinction fundamentally useful in taxonomies of ethical theories? [closed]
Presupposition of the question: that the realism/non-realism distinction is itself sufficiently fundamental to be worth juxtaposing with the metaphysical/methodological distinction in the first place.
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How can moral disagreements be resolved when the conflicting parties are guided by fundamentally different value systems?
Consider the following scenarios:
Person A holds a belief system that regards human life as inherently sacred, leading them to oppose abortion in all circumstances, without exception. In contrast, ...
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The fourth-person perspective re: neo-Kantian ethics
Christine Korsgaard makes much of the first-/third-person distinction in arguing about the proper standpoint from which to engage in practical reasoning (see e.g. Cummiskey[11] for an overview). ...
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Are there any virtues in virtue ethics that cannot be plausibly grounded in more fundamental utilitarian principles?
I will go over several virtues and explore potential ways they might be derived from or justified within a utilitarian ethical framework:
Courage:
Virtue Ethics: Courage is valued as the ability to ...
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Is there a name for this aspect of Christian moral epistemology?
I would like to know more about the idea that "the law is written on our hearts", but I'm not sure what this idea is called within Christian doctrine or within the tradition of Western ...
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The Euthyphro and Natural Law
I'm interested in the Euthyphro dilemma and its treatment by various Christian thinkers. I'm familiar with Divine Command Theory and I was wondering: Is there a distinctive response from the tradition ...
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Can sociobiology be used as foundation of ethics?
A primatologist or sociobiologist may claim that humans share a basic sense of (distributional) fairness with certain other primates. This claim has in fact been made and is based on rather simple ...
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What are examples of moral principles in religions that secular ethical systems find hard to accept or justify and why?
Love and compassion are arguably universally accepted by all religions and secular ethical systems. Not murdering or torturing people randomly is also probably highly uncontested by everyone.
However, ...
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What are the key differences, with respect to meta-ethics and philosophical method, between P. F. Strawson and Alasdair Macintyre?
There seem to be some similarities. Macintyre argues that the virtues are internal to social practices and traditions while Strawson argues for a method of 'descriptive metaphysics' whereby ...
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What meta-ethical standpoint is this?
What meta-ethical standpoint is this? I am not saying it's my view, and it just come up in conversation. If everyone thought we should make human sacrifices, then it would neither be moral or immoral, ...
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Moral statements that aren't action-guiding?
The "action-guidance thesis" is rather widely accepted, from what I remember the SEP saying.A But somewhere, the SEP also mentioned deniers of the thesis. And though I used to be a strong ...
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Is non-cognitivism self-undermining?
Not quite self-defeat, though: by argument:
The version of non-cognitivism we're addressing: generic or "naive," such as in translating, "X is good," into, "Hooray for X!&...
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In moral philosophy, how do researchers perceive what is right and wrong (and why)? (For humanity, as a whole) [closed]
My question considers what our definition of right and wrong is (i.e. what's the basis of deciding what right and wrong), along with the origin of right and wrong.
In other words, what is the most ...
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The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement
I recently watched this video (this paper seems to argue the same thing), where, near the end of the video, a very interesting argument against the Argument from Disagreement (where, moral skeptics ...
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How do ethical intuitionists avoid relativism?
Why doesn't ethical intuitionism (the form which actually uses intuition as the foundation of morality rather than some other non-inferential method) fall into relativism? It seems that different ...
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According to Atheistic/Agnostic Worldviews, what is the basis for morality? [duplicate]
Western Societies have laws that prevent abhorrent acts like murder, rape, pedophilia, fraud, slavery, and other crimes from happening. These acts seem to be seen as "immoral", in other ...
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Symmetrical patterns of supervenience?
Given all the dualities (c.f. the IEP entry on duality in language and logic) and symmetries and so on that feature in these meta/physical pictures that are prominent both historically and in the ...
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Supervenience vs. "purely good objects"
The concept of a "purely right act" is of some R such that by performing this R, one has done something right, and nothing substantive else: one has not moved here or there, looked at this ...
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Why would the ideal observer make moral judgements?
Ideal observer theory states that an action is morally right/wrong if a theoretical, impartial, ideal observer has a positive or negative attitude towards said action, and that moral claims express ...
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The ethics of “pulling out”
This might seem trivial, but it’s earnestly been on my mind, so I do want to use it as an opportunity for philosophical learning.
Abortion is to me a very complex philosophical topic. I’ll only focus ...
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Hume's Guillotine
I struggle to understand how logic doesn't validate the deduction of a moral judgement that's not present in the first premise, even if we add a second premise?
I might not be profound upon the matter,...
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Can obligations be substances/objects?
Background idea: H. A. Prichard's following thesis:
Prichard’s second argument is equally idiosyncratic. We can have an obligation to do an action long before the action is done. If so, the ...
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Classifying the ethical characteristics of entities by cognitive properties, non-human-specific
I am wondering if any theorists have developed a way of classifying entities by their cognitive properties in order to build general theories such as ethics, based on such properties. It should ...
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Can moral theories be "elegant" or beautiful or sublime?
It is often said that mathematics has some (peculiar) sort of beauty to its name. Whether beauty attaches as such primarily to the notation/style of mathematical writing, or to the interplay of the ...
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How does the quasi-realist claim that the claim to moral mind-independence is a moral claim work?
As part of metaethical quasi-realism, a noncognitivist (expressivist and projectivist) position which attempts to justify the use of realist language without committing itself fully to cognitivism or ...
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Is it possible to steal what a person does not believe he owns?
Expanded question:
A theft is here defined as a wrongful taking. To steal is to do a theft.
Suppose a hypothetical theft of X does not impede the ability of the hypothetical owner of X to exercise ...
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Is psychological egoism, or some other descriptive theory about some inescapable pattern of human nature, compatible with normativity?
Can true normative statements exist if our behaviour is determined by some uncontrollable process? If we can only act in our self-interest, is the norm 'you ought not kill' reasonable to hold someone ...
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Do companions in guilt arguments wrongly assign the burden of proof to the antirealist?
Proving the existence of epistemic normativity might pose issues for some arguments for antirealism, like the queerness argument, but it doesn't seem like sufficient proof. There is one ground on ...
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Can erotetic logic be used to devise a noncognitivist moral realism?
The IEP article on moral realism says that noncognitivist realism is logically possible, but goes on to assess the one attempt at such a position (Bruce Waller's) thusly:
Waller’s divide-and-conquer ...
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Does saying "a morally good singer is a morally good person" undermine Geach's attempt to undermine Moore?
Correct me if I'm wrong, but Peter Geach used the infelicity of statements like, "A good singer is thusly a good person," to try to show that G. E. Moore's sense of the word "good" ...
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A problem regarding an impermanent hell
Regarding the Abrahamic hells, one could say that they are absolutely terrible for it is suffering without end, an eternal suffering; but there is a puzzling different type of hell or hells, those of ...
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What meta-ethics is most commonly associated with 'hard determinism'?
Since moral responsibility seems to require free will, hard
determinism implies that people are not morally responsible for their
actions.
So what exactly does that imply about supposed moral ...
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Does the private language argument conflict with monotheism?
This blog post opposes the PLA to unitarianism (the belief in only one divine person), which is mostly a parochial, intra-Christian objection that, if generalized over other religions, seems like it ...
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Relativist or not, if harm is objectively bad, is that sufficient for mind independent values?
I suspect that harm is objectively bad, but I'm unsure whether the negative value of what is harmful is mind independent, because while I cannot take seriously any claim that, relative to me or not, ...
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According to which meta ethical theories are only some things permissible and everyone is right about what is permitted?
Can someone give a run down of the popular ways of thinking about ethics and which meta-ethical theories claim that only some things are permitted? I've read a couple of SEP articles on ethics, ...
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Would an extremely unified being be able to issue more than one particular command?
Suppose that there is an actus purus, a being that is entirely active, impassible (nothing happens to this being), and which has no proper parts (its only part is itself entirely), not even abstract ...
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Physicalist Critiques of Error Theory
Mackie’s Error Theory makes two parallel arguments that moral qualities have no place in a naturalistic understanding of our universe. That (1) such a bizarre epistemic power unlike any other we ...
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If we used √OB and √𝓐 operations, could we have a demi-is/demi-ought proposition that bridged full "is" with full "ought"?
The insight that the teleological ethicist seems to have is that final causality is a type of the moral law in the Kantian sense (from the second Critique):
... the moral law has no faculty but the ...
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Does the Introduction of Teleology into Ethical Discourse Solve Hume's Is/Ought Problem?
For Hume, no one could describe objective reasons for thinking that a man ought to do something generally, becuase there was no way to derive an ought from an is. But, if a classical view of causality ...
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Open Self vs. Closed Self/Society Distinction
In political philosophy and cultural studies, certain thinkers from the twentieth-century stand out for their reliance upon distinguishing between open and closed selfhood. It is a long-running theme ...
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Does the claim of an is/ought gap presuppose relevance logic (at least for morality-talk)?
Imagine Hume's remarks but with reference to the usual disjunction introduction:
In every system of conjunction, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for ...
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Is Aquinas' ethics a case of a supererogation-first system?
Section 2.2 of the SEP article on modal epistemology differentiates possibility-first from necessity-first systems. Per modal logic, one can take these as metaphysical readings of the order-of-...
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A restriction on an action-language
Suppose that it is possible to "construct" a language where individual virtuous actions can make a referential contribution, sequentially in concerto, so that different patterns are ...