Questions tagged [metaethics]

Metaethics is the attempt to understand the metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and psychological, presuppositions and commitments of moral thought, talk, and practice.

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Can erotetic logic be used to devise a noncognitivist moral realism?

The IEP article on moral realism says that noncognitivist realism is logically possible, but goes on to assess the one attempt at such a position (Bruce Waller's) thusly: Waller’s divide-and-conquer ...
Kristian Berry's user avatar
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Does saying "a morally good singer is a morally good person" undermine Geach's attempt to undermine Moore?

Correct me if I'm wrong, but Peter Geach used the infelicity of statements like, "A good singer is thusly a good person," to try to show that G. E. Moore's sense of the word "good" ...
Kristian Berry's user avatar
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A problem regarding an impermanent hell

Regarding the Abrahamic hells, one could say that they are absolutely terrible for it is suffering without end, an eternal suffering; but there is a puzzling different type of hell or hells, those of ...
Rayyan khan's user avatar
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What meta-ethics is most commonly associated with 'hard determinism'?

Since moral responsibility seems to require free will, hard determinism implies that people are not morally responsible for their actions. So what exactly does that imply about supposed moral ...
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Does the private language argument conflict with monotheism?

This blog post opposes the PLA to unitarianism (the belief in only one divine person), which is mostly a parochial, intra-Christian objection that, if generalized over other religions, seems like it ...
Kristian Berry's user avatar
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Relativist or not, if harm is objectively bad, is that sufficient for mind independent values?

I suspect that harm is objectively bad, but I'm unsure whether the negative value of what is harmful is mind independent, because while I cannot take seriously any claim that, relative to me or not, ...
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According to which meta ethical theories are only some things permissible and everyone is right about what is permitted?

Can someone give a run down of the popular ways of thinking about ethics and which meta-ethical theories claim that only some things are permitted? I've read a couple of SEP articles on ethics, ...
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Would an extremely unified being be able to issue more than one particular command?

Suppose that there is an actus purus, a being that is entirely active, impassible (nothing happens to this being), and which has no proper parts (its only part is itself entirely), not even abstract ...
Kristian Berry's user avatar
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Physicalist Critiques of Error Theory

Mackie’s Error Theory makes two parallel arguments that moral qualities have no place in a naturalistic understanding of our universe. That (1) such a bizarre epistemic power unlike any other we ...
Hokon's user avatar
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If we used √OB and √𝓐 operations, could we have a demi-is/demi-ought proposition that bridged full "is" with full "ought"?

The insight that the teleological ethicist seems to have is that final causality is a type of the moral law in the Kantian sense (from the second Critique): ... the moral law has no faculty but the ...
Kristian Berry's user avatar
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Does the Introduction of Teleology into Ethical Discourse Solve Hume's Is/Ought Problem?

For Hume, no one could describe objective reasons for thinking that a man ought to do something generally, becuase there was no way to derive an ought from an is. But, if a classical view of causality ...
jaredad7's user avatar
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Open Self vs. Closed Self/Society Distinction

In political philosophy and cultural studies, certain thinkers from the twentieth-century stand out for their reliance upon distinguishing between open and closed selfhood. It is a long-running theme ...
Paradox Lost's user avatar
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Does the claim of an is/ought gap presuppose relevance logic (at least for morality-talk)?

Imagine Hume's remarks but with reference to the usual disjunction introduction: In every system of conjunction, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for ...
Kristian Berry's user avatar
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1 answer
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Is Aquinas' ethics a case of a supererogation-first system?

Section 2.2 of the SEP article on modal epistemology differentiates possibility-first from necessity-first systems. Per modal logic, one can take these as metaphysical readings of the order-of-...
Kristian Berry's user avatar
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A restriction on an action-language

Suppose that it is possible to "construct" a language where individual virtuous actions can make a referential contribution, sequentially in concerto, so that different patterns are ...
Kristian Berry's user avatar
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If Zalta objects exist, would there be a contingently abstract obligation?

One of the posits of Zaltaesque object theory (let's call it that, since there is something vaguely Kafkaesque about logicist realism) is that for every set of assertible encoding relations there is ...
Kristian Berry's user avatar
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Understanding meta ethical judgement in nicomachean ethics

I'm reading Nicomachean Ethics's penguin classics version and the introduction section contains this paragraph and I'm having some trouble understanding this. From what I've read so far I understand ...
atin's user avatar
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Is my understanding of projectivism correct?

From Miller's An Introduction to Contemporary Meta-ethics: "Emotivism is a form of projectivism: when we use 'is wrong' in an evaluative judgement [...] we are treating 'wrong' as if it is a ...
Sam's user avatar
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How can projectivism explain the ban on mixed worlds?

The following is from section 4.2(b) of Miller's Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Supervenience says that if two acts, events, or situations share the same naturalistic properties, then they ...
Sam's user avatar
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Can moral dilemmas be resolved in an amoral way?

By a moral dilemma I mean a situation in which there are multiple possible courses of action (or inaction) each of which leads to different outcomes and the agent has to choose which one to take. The ...
rus9384's user avatar
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Good literature on the implications of philosophy of mind for ethics?

It seems to me that positions in philosophy of mind have implications for ethics that most of the literature I have read does not explore. Some examples: Does mental externalism imply torturing a ...
Noah Mancino's user avatar
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Is the ideal agent the ideal observer?

Is the ideal agent the ideal observer? Without googling it, I mean the former is the best moral agent, and the latter some meta-ethical (can't recall what meta-ethics) abstraction that judges everyone'...
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Under which meta-ethical theories can we forfeit any rights?

I don't mean "human rights", which has a question already. I suppose that not all rights are human rights, though that may not be the case: I think people may actually have a right not to be ...
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8 votes
15 answers
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Is it logical to seek revenge?

People believe revenge or "violence" to be illogical, impractical and immoral; illogical because the "violence" is executed in impulsive rage, impractical because the wheel of &...
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Would objectivist utilitarianism be considered to be a form of moral absolutism?

Wikipedia defines moral absolutism as the view that "there is at least one principle that ought never to be violated". Does this mean that even someone who holds morally objectivist ...
Probably's user avatar
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Can non-agents be moral or immoral?

Human children and non-human animals are denied moral status or equal consideration with human adults due to their lack of consciousness, reason or autonomy They are not moral agents or subjects of ...
ActualCry's user avatar
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What's wrong with aretaic consequentialism?

What problems does it face, either as a classification of Buddhism or as meta ethical theory in general? Another approach [to how to classify Buddhist ethics] is aretaic consequentialism, an indirect ...
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Is the set of all good things incommensurable with the sets we use the natural/related numbers for?

Suppose that there is a set of all good things, and that it is well-founded. Then it would not be an element of itself, i.e. would not be a good thing. Maybe it would be hypergood, but maybe it would ...
Kristian Berry's user avatar
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In divine command theory, is there anything malum in se? Or in other words, is there a distinction between malum in se and malum prohibitum?

In Divine Command Theory, is there any distinction between malum in se and malum prohibitum, when it comes to divine commandments (as opposed to human defined laws)? For example, I would see failure ...
kutschkem's user avatar
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What is the name of the philosophy that believes one should do whatever they want?

The philosophy in question believes: You only live once, and you have predetermined desires from your genetics and environment. If these desires are not fulfilled as short-term or long-term goals you ...
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Does Kant read the is/ought question in a way different from the "normal" reading?

First, to quote Hume: In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the ...
Kristian Berry's user avatar
6 votes
3 answers
292 views

Are there any philosophers who argue for a non-utilitarian moral realism from phenomenology?

What I have in mind is a non-utilitarian alternative to Sharon Hewitt Rawlette (a summary from a podcast) which would propose something like: Morality is objective because moral facts are equally as ...
Probably's user avatar
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1 answer
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Why is the argument of companions in guilt in moral realism no cosidered meaningless?

The argument of Companions in guilt is meta-ethics says: Even if there is no rational reason to think to think that something is ethical, that is irrelevant because there is no rational reason to ...
Rieke's user avatar
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3 votes
6 answers
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Why does the infamous is/ought problem fail to defeat the claim that objective morality exists?

In a comment to the question Astronomical Waste @armand put Utilitarianism is a moral theory trying to codify "what people should do" type of questions. As such it can't really be refuted (...
Rieke's user avatar
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1 answer
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Taxonomy of the Ethic Theories

I have read some about ethics, and I would like the most compressible possible taxonomy of ethics. Is to note that by my previous research I have identified the following dichotomies: Dentological/...
Erdel von Mises's user avatar
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1 answer
65 views

Is there such a thing as a moral statement?

Logical positivists, notably A.J. Ayer, have stated that there is no such thing as a moral statement. In his example, saying the words "you acted wrongly in stealing that money" are ...
Yorick's user avatar
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If moral nihilism doesn't imply right or wrong, why is the common response filled with vitriol along the lines of "you must think murder is okay"? [closed]

If nothing is right or wrong, then murder would be neither right or wrong. If you're a moral nihilist, "morality" ultimately just becomes a set of wants and a matter of preference for the ...
thinkingman's user avatar
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Nietzsche's model of sociality in the ubermensch

As I understand it, Fredrich Nietzsche-- at least in the latest works he had scribed before his death-- was neither an advocate of antisocial nor prosocial passions. How he professes this position is ...
Jackson's user avatar
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3 answers
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Does Moore's Open Question Argument beg the question?

So as I understand, Moore's Open Question Argument can be formulated like this: -- I. If x is the same thing as y, then the question "I know it's x, but is it y?" would be meaningless II. ...
Jacob Sloat's user avatar
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If it is possibly good that the world actually exists, is it actually good that the world possibly exists?

Note: the question involves some version/vector of the Barcan formula, albeit with the existential quantifier swapped out for an actuality operator (possibly on terms under propositions rather than ...
Kristian Berry's user avatar
24 votes
7 answers
3k views

Does any philosophy designate thoughts (independent of expression or action) as a subject of morality?

Most moral philosophers consider only physical actions, speech and thoughts that may have an impact on others as within the scope of morality, while many religion believers who suppose the omniscience ...
James Young's user avatar
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Construct describing an inherent sense of right/wrong?

In Christian and especially Protestant philosophy there seems to be an implied notion that humans possess some ability to "sense" moral right and wrong. When one performs or contemplates an ...
Him's user avatar
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3 answers
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Ethical evaluation of outcomes vs actions

Consider two ethical questions: (1) Is action A more or less ethical than action B? (2) Is outcome A more or less ethical than outcome B? Question 1 is the focus of normative ethics. Question 2 seems ...
C.M.O.B.'s user avatar
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1 answer
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Is Utilitarianism a theory of normative ethics or meta-ethics?

I would have thought Utilitarianism should be viewed as a theory of meta-ethics. This is because, in my view, Utilitarianism addresses the issue of "what is good?" by providing a method (i.e....
C.M.O.B.'s user avatar
8 votes
2 answers
820 views

Neo-liberalism, language and freedom?

Background Byung Chulhan in his book psychopolitics defines freedom in two ways: a. He defines it as an interlude which the subject feels when passing between lifestyles or ideologies. This is a ...
More Anonymous's user avatar
3 votes
1 answer
67 views

Gratitude without knowing for who?

Is it possible to have gratitude without a source? A simple example would be can an atheist have gratitude towards no one for the circumstances he finds himself in? I think I'm presupposing a human ...
More Anonymous's user avatar
2 votes
5 answers
399 views

Are love and sexual attraction completely unrelated?

The philosophy of sexuality is a more recent development. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy says: Among the many topics explored by the philosophy of sexuality are procreation, contraception, ...
Bach's user avatar
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Could ethics be grounded in a law of nature?

Assuming that morality is objective, is it possible that the reason there are moral truths (i.e it is wrong to harm children) is because of an undiscovered law of nature (like gravity)?
bob johnson's user avatar
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Erotetic quantifiers?

I can't find it, but I have a distinct memory of there being an SEP article that says something like as if the ordinals were there before the sets in relation to a question about whether ordinals (or ...
Kristian Berry's user avatar
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Mathematical style and ethical fictionalism

The SEP article on mathematical style got me thinking: what is the relationship between mathematical style, mathematical fictionalism, and ethical style/fictionalism? There seem to be at least three ...
Kristian Berry's user avatar