Questions tagged [mind-body]
The mind–body problem is the problem of explaining how our mental states, events and processes—like beliefs, actions and thinking—are related to the physical states,events and processes in our bodies, given that the human body is a physical entity and the mind is non-physical.
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What happens to statements like cause must precede effect for the mental events for this model?
My understanding is that for this model (epiphenomenalism (?)) is there isn't mental causation rather a kind of mapping between physical and mental events?
What happens to statements like cause must ...
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What is the dichotomy called when being implicitly 'without' when one says to look 'within', and what does it mean?
I think the phrase 'Look within' is used often in the context of meditation. If someone can actually perform the act of looking within, it implicitly means that someone is currently 'without', and ...
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Is dualism unlikely because the mind is inextricable in its activity from matter?
I've been thinking about dualism lately, but one thing that deals a pretty strong blow to this view in my mind is that it implies that the mind can exist apart from physical reality (an immaterial ...
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Are you familiar with a similar argument against the (nomological) supervenience of the mental on the physical?
The SEP article on supervenience claims "Just about everyone, even a Cartesian dualist, believes some version of this supervenience claim [that the mental nomologically supervenes on the physical]." ...
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in light of shaffers analysis, what do you think is the best position for and against dualism and materialism?
on shaffers arguments for and against dualism and materialism, what is the best position? and is there a solution to the mind body problem?
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How does Chalmers' "hard problem" differ from the "mind-body problem"?
They both seem be be asking how neurological processes can give rise to consciousness. Is there a real difference between the two questions, or is one just a reformulation of the other?
user27291
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Do all arguments against mind-body identity theory assume that every pain is the same?
I don’t get (any of) the arguments against mind-brain identity theories.
It’s usually argued that multiple realisability kills MBIT (see also this post). In a talk I attended it was stated as ...
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According to Descartes, the mind and body communicate through a tiny part of the brain (the pineal gland) where the 'common sense' is located
True or False?
I'm unsure about this question because it seems like he only refers to the mind and the brain in this context, but not the body as a whole.
Here's the passage:
"The mind isn't ...
user34653
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As someone studying philosophy and applying it to my life with success, how far does one take the ideals learnt?
I am studying several philosophers and applying all the knowledge I am learning into a 'melting pot' of ideals and characteristics I am applying to my life to better myself and attempt to live more ...
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How can Brie Gertler's disembodiment argument account for the minds of others?
I'm currently reading Brie Gertler's essay In Defense of Mind-Body Dualism. She uses Descartes' conceivability argument to make her own disembodiment argument. For example, she says someone can ...
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Can the Mind-Body Question ignore Non-locality?
Paul M. Churchland's Matter and Consciousness which I enjoyed, except for his conclusion. He never mentioned non-locality. Assuming boundaries to the 4-D S-T Continuum, how can a First-Efficient-...
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Implications of Cartesian Psychophysical Dualism for free-will and determinism
For Descartes, reality consists of two fundamental substances: the mental, and the physical.
The mental substance is distinct from the physical substance in that it is not bound by the deterministic, ...
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Can Thomas Nagel be considered an epiphenomenalist?
Regarding the mind-body-problem, Thomas Nagel argues against both materialism and ontological dualism, presenting a view which revolves around subjective phenomena (individualism).
Could these ...
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Are Epicurean 'pleasures of mind' clearly stated as being of a unique or universal nature?
I read that Epicurean 'pleasures of body' are unique to each individual. i.e. each person experiences the "pleasures of the body" in a different way.
I wondered whether Epicurean 'pleasures ...
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Is a reason to believe something can be explained, also a reason to think that the explanadum exists?
Is a reason to believe something can be explained, also a reason to think that the explanadum exists?
So, suppose someone agrees that our mental lives can be explained by brains and bodies, because ...
user25714