Questions tagged [philosophy-of-language]

for philosophical questions concerning the nature, origins, and usage of natural language

Filter by
Sorted by
Tagged with
1
vote
3answers
77 views

Is there a conflict between self-reference and ontology? (In relation to mathematics)

I am a total layman when it comes to math, but I promise at least to clearly spell out my thought process. Some like Elaine Landry say "mathematics is not metaphysics" https://youtu.be/...
4
votes
6answers
1k views

Why don't we say the "unreasonable effectiveness of language"?

What's so special or unique about mathematics that we keep coming back to this phrasing? It isn't universal concision - there are many concepts more concisely put in English than math. Like to show ...
2
votes
2answers
283 views

Is this a solution to the disjunction problem of causal representation?

As I understand it, the disjunction problem is how could a causal theory of inner representation account for mistaken identification of external objects or object types. For example, if I see a fox ...
3
votes
3answers
221 views

Feynman's name of the bird

Consider this quote by Richard Feynman (from "What Do You Care What Other People Think?": Further Adventures of a Curious Character, edited by Ralph Leighton, 1988, available at archive.org):...
-2
votes
0answers
45 views

Can a statement be general? [closed]

Like a general rule: an adjective modifies a noun (this statement can be applied to any case) Just a statement can be applied to any case? Ex. a banana was expensive (this statement can be applied to ...
0
votes
0answers
45 views

What does Carnap mean by the extensionality requirement in an observational language?

In his article Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts (Section II), he lists the requirements proposed for any language L to be meaningful. However, I don't understand what he means exactly ...
9
votes
1answer
140 views

Meaning in use and naturalisation of intentionality

What is the relation between pragmatism and intentionality? Two different enterprises in philosophy seem to be well established and yet contradicting: Inferential Pragmatism: from Wittgenstein and ...
0
votes
1answer
186 views

Statements about real world

We make statements like "This table is composed from atoms". This statement must be true or false. But what if tomorrow the atomic theory is completely abandoned and we work with another ...
-1
votes
0answers
150 views

Why it is that Bertrand Russell's 1905 analysis of definite descriptions remains dominant in some parts of academia?

Here is a linguist's typical view about Russell's theory of descriptions: Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions has been dominant until the emergence of criticism of Strawson [in 1950] — ...
2
votes
3answers
266 views

Are there some kinds of arguments in defense of Private Language?

Could the beetle in the box not play any role in our…?Or will the similar neurological constituents and the same physical input provide some supports to the "pain",in a (Kantian) way that each person ...
-1
votes
0answers
48 views

Can philosophy be defined? [duplicate]

If you were to defend one of these views: a. “Philosophy” can be defined. b. “Philosophy” cannot be defined. Which would go for? and why?
0
votes
2answers
126 views

Can I call these “two things”?

Thing: an idea, action, feeling, or fact that someone thinks, does, says, or talks about, or that happens If I’m sad (feeling), and I’m crying (action), can I call a feeling and an action “two things”?...
0
votes
2answers
56 views

Relationship between early Wittgenstein and late Wittgenstein

I think most books treat his early and late theories as inconsistent theories, in a sense that one can agree on either his early or late theory, but not both. However, I think the two theories are ...
-1
votes
3answers
111 views

Although only half of a dish is red, can I call it ‘red dish’?

Although only half of a dish is red, can I call it ‘red dish’? Or only when an entire dish is red, can I call it ‘red dish’?
0
votes
1answer
112 views

According to Wittgenstein, why are the laws of logic valid?

According to Wittgenstein's tractatus, A fact is composed of atomic facts. An atomic fact corresponds to an elemental proposition. (Picture theory) A proposition is a series of elemental propositions ...
1
vote
3answers
172 views

What are the limits of language?

Provably (or by sufficiently rigorous arguments), what are the limits of language (natural & formal)? What can a language not speak about? If there is something non-senseless which language cannot ...
1
vote
3answers
632 views

Some questions on "context" in Mathematical Logic

Recently I was having a discussion with user21820 in this chatroom. There very naively (in the sense that I didn't choose carefully each word of my following statement) I expressed the opinion that, ...
0
votes
1answer
131 views

Moral argument against grammatical gender

Many languages have grammatical gender, according to which every object has a gender that determines what form of articles to use with that noun, how to decline adjectives modifying that noun, etc. ...
3
votes
3answers
334 views

The Picture Theory of Meaning

I'm not quite clear as to exactly how how Wittgenstein concludes that metaphysical/non-phenomenal talk is meaningless in his Tractatus. Doesn't a statement like, "God exists" and its propositional ...
1
vote
2answers
106 views

Is the reason why we can't come up with a perfect definition of causation, that our common idea of causation is diffuse?

I have read a lot about theories of causation lately. None of them define causation satisfactorily. Either you end up with a definition that comes very close to common sense, but at the same time is ...
0
votes
2answers
124 views

Objective vs Absolute Morality: Is one possible without the other?

Can something be objectively immoral and not simultaneously absolutely immoral? Definitions of the difference between objective and absolute morality tend to commit a comparison error. For instance: &...
-1
votes
1answer
47 views

Can 'Trust' be quantified?

I believe the concept of trust or the word trust itself can be given many definitions depending on someone's understanding of it. Agreeing with the definition given on dictionnary.com website as ...
2
votes
0answers
35 views

The glass-half-full/glass-half-empty distinction beyond Fregean semantics?

What's a useful framework within which to make sense of the glass-half-full/glass-half-empty distinction? In particular, one which admits both descriptions as not only valid but also useful, that is, ...
2
votes
5answers
247 views

What actually is a simulation philosophically?

Everyone has heard of the idea that the universe might be a simulation - which we understand to mean that there is some computer in the "base" universe, which is running a program that is ...
-1
votes
3answers
100 views

From what did we instantiated the concept of "Nothingness"

So as i understand according to Aristotle's theory of abstraction every abstract concept (i.e universal) is instantiated (or abstracted) from it particulars in the outside world if that so how can we ...
1
vote
1answer
88 views

Can we make statements for persons/objects that cease to exist?

I am asking this question because I thought what truth value would have a have a quantifier over a set that contains persons that are dead. For example suppose I state: "For every x that is ...
3
votes
4answers
740 views

Are opinions considered statements?

‘Aristotle was great’. Is this a statement? I consider a statement to be something either true or false (but not both). For an individual, this may be considered a statement (because either you ...
2
votes
1answer
218 views

Difficulty finding real life examples of the bad reasons fallacy, is this fallacy committed often?

I understand that the bad reasons fallacy is committed when one assumes that a conclusion is false just because the argument is bad. But is this fallacy committed very often?
0
votes
0answers
38 views

Is there no epistemic criteria to determine a heap?

When one thinks about language, there are many phrases that are inexact or vague and ambiguous. For example, when one thinks about the Sorites paradox, one encounters inexactness in language as to ...
1
vote
1answer
59 views

Lewis' argument against Stalnaker's Hypothesis regarding conditional probability

I've encountered a strange argument in an article, and I don't quite understand what the author means. “If A, then if B, then C” and “If A and B, then C” are logically equivalent, and logical ...
2
votes
1answer
33 views

What is meant by 'interdiscursivity' in discursive practice by Fairclough?

I am conducting a Critical Discourse Analysis on Chinese newspapers, such as the Global Times, to investigate how ethnicity became a securitized threat in the media. However, Fairclough's second ...
2
votes
2answers
90 views

Tarski's sufficient conditions for the Liar paradox and self-reference

Tarski gave three sufficient conditions in his 1944 paper The Semantic Conception of Truth for the Liar paradox to occur: The language in which the Liar sentence is stated in is semantically closed, ...
1
vote
3answers
184 views

What is the core problem of intentionality?

In the philosophy of mind, I have read that "intentionality" is a difficult thing to explain in a naturalistic fashion. But I don't necessarily see the heart of the problem in the same way ...
6
votes
1answer
239 views

Which problem is Russell focusing on while providing a solution, in his introduction to the Tractatus?

In the final part of his introduction to the Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, Russell provides a possible solution to the problem of the impossibility of self-reference of logic: There is one ...
1
vote
0answers
48 views

Problems with truth value gap theory against Strengthened Liar

I have been reading Burge's Semantical Paradox, Burge explains how gap theorists have trouble handling the Strengthened Liar, i.e. β: β is not true and there are two things I do not understand: ...
2
votes
1answer
606 views

What is an example of a predictive conditional?

Can someone explain to me with an example what a predictive conditional is? Does this type of conditional have necessary and sufficient conditions?
17
votes
12answers
6k views

Why is the Münchhausen trilemma an unsolved problem?

Why is the Münchhausen trilemma unsolved? Couldn't anybody find some reasons for proving/disproving it? Or are there other reasons for it being called "unsolved"? the trilemma If we ask of ...
2
votes
2answers
103 views

On Searle's _Proper Names_ (1958)

I just read Searle's article Proper Names (1958) which was published before Kripke's seminal take on the subject in Naming and Necessity (1980). I think it is a very lucid article but I have a ...
6
votes
3answers
163 views

How to model "forget about" in first order logic?

The other day, my housemate said "Don't forget to not leave the spoon at the bottom of the container". I understood what he meant: "Do not leave the spoon at the bottom of the ...
2
votes
2answers
96 views

Is there a clear cut distinction between Philosophy and Philology?

I’ve been recently mulling over semantic and linguistic issues and I realized that my understanding of these fields may not correspond to the commonly accepted wisdom, so to speak. Although the ...
0
votes
1answer
70 views

Are these valid examples of axiomatic statements?

I'm trying to understand if a couple of statements would be considered axiomatic: Example 1: "murder is the unjustified killing of a person; if there was a murder, then a person was killed ...
7
votes
4answers
781 views

Is Chomskys universal grammar synthetic a priori?

Chomskys notion of a universal grammar is his way of comprehending that human languages appear to have a deep grammar, and that children appear to learn language as though they are primed for it. It ...
-4
votes
4answers
209 views

Deductive reasoning & conditionals

What would be a good example of explicit deductive reasoning that doesn't seem to be possibly interpreted correctly as a conditional (If A, then B)?
4
votes
1answer
197 views

Yablo's notion of adding truth

I try to stress a point I've already made in Stephen Yablo's Aboutness and logical subtraction, but from another perspective. From what Yablo is saying in his appendix to Aboutness (http://assets....
2
votes
2answers
191 views

How can one formalize that an argument composed of a true and a false statement is "partly true"?

In classical logic if either A or B is false then "A and B" is false. But in natural language it's often the case to hear someone say "that's only partially true" or "that's ...
3
votes
3answers
324 views

Why are imperatives not propositions according to Frege?

I'm reading Frege's "On Sense and Nominatum" and I am confused with: "Imperatives have no nominata; they have only sense. It is true, commands or requests are not propositions, but they are of the ...
2
votes
2answers
83 views

Non catastrophic presupposition failure

In a previous question, I asked something similar but without explicitely referring to the source material of my doubt. Now I try to state it here with more precision: In "Non-catastrophic ...
-1
votes
6answers
423 views

Liars paradox towards a solution?

This statement is not true 2.This statement is true only if true and not true. (1) and (2) are clearly different sentences, but do they express the same proposition? If yes, then it becomes clear ...
0
votes
0answers
42 views

Is language objective or subjective?

Can somebody explain why the word “why” for example is objectively the word “why” and spelt as such in the English language when it was formed through subjective experience?
0
votes
1answer
45 views

Can approximation be true?

For example, can approximation ‘approximately 3 people are running,’ ‘I’m almost there,’ or ‘I’ve almost done my homework’ be true or they are just close to truth?

1
2 3 4 5
12