Questions tagged [philosophy-of-logic]

Philosophy of logic is a branch of philosophy concerned with investigating the nature, scope and role of logic.

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Yablo's condition on "Truth about a subject matter"

In section 2.4 of "Aboutness" Yablo offers the following analysis of what does it mean that a statament is true about a certain subject matter/topic: So, what is the proposition we are ...
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How do dialetheists determine which contradiction is true?

I have been reading a lot about dialetheism lately. I know for a fact that dialetheists do not believe that every contradiction is true. (Surely there is a difference between asserting that Liar is ...
Constantly confused's user avatar
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What is the 'axiomatic' or epistemological foundation of Analytic philosophy, what is its practice and purpose?

In researching the origin and purpose of the Analytical Tradition in philosophy, all that appeared was that it traces its origin to the 'Tractatus' offshoots following Wittgenstein and Russell, and ...
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Are there examples of ideas that rationally-trained persons agree on?

This question is meant for a bit of fun as a comedic corollary to JDH's top-voted question, "What would it take in a book to convince a rational person that it had been written by or directly ...
TCP's user avatar
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Santa Claus does not exist. Therefore, something does not exist. Valid?

My professor defines logical validity (in the English language) like so: 'An argument is logically valid if and only if there is no (uniform) interpretation (of subject-specific expressions) under ...
Jayjay45's user avatar
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Is it rational to use disjunctive imperative sentences?

Suppose you tell someone, "Go to the store or go to the creek." Now, if this person is otherwise predisposed to one option, and your command triggers this predisposition, then by issuing the ...
Kristian Berry's user avatar
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8 answers
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If you used intuitionistic logic in real life, would you not sound absurd?

Intuitionistic logic does not include the law of the excluded middle and double-negation elimination. I imagine a real-life conversation with an intuitionist might go like this: Amy said you didn't ...
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Why did the mid-19th century and earlier thinkers fixate on one-place predicates?

A book I'm reading mentions the following: A major barrier to the development of first-order logic had been the concentration on one-place predicates to the exclusion of many-place relational ...
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How to reconcile the fact that mathematical proofs are logical implications with the lack of a formal calculus equivalent to the logical implication? [closed]

Theorems follow from axioms. That is, theorems are the logical consequence of axioms. Thus, mathematical proofs are essentially deductive. Proofs are all essentially logical implications. There is ...
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What are the advantages of Aristotle's term logic over predicate logic?

I have read Wikipedia's term logic entry, and the quote by Gareth Evans in the Revival section that's supposed to argue for term logic's advantages over predicate logic: "I come to semantic ...
MWB's user avatar
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Can classical logic hold without causality?

Consider a universe where causality failed to hold. Would that universe be described by classical/standard logic? Or would we have to use a radically different logic where causality was not necessary? ...
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Is it true that if an argument is invalid, any argument of that logical form must be invalid?

I am stuck over whether these statements are true: First: "If an argument is invalid, any argument of that logical form must be invalid." Second: "There may be invalid argument with ...
Not a Salmon Fish's user avatar
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Why is it that the statement "All goblins are yellow" does not contradict the statement "All goblins are pink?"

From what I know, I think it has something to do with vacuous truths, but my understanding is not quite there yet.
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can an argument containing a contradiction be valid argument

I know that validity has nothing with truth of the conclusion or with how good argument is in general, and an argument is valid iff the truth of its premises guarantees the truth of its conclusion. ...
Not a Salmon Fish's user avatar
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Baconian Logical Fallacy

I have been reading about logical fallacies lately, and I saw the Baconian fallacy listed here (of course on everyone's favorite site, Wikipedia). The description provided reads: "using pieces of ...
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Are axioms more important than definitions?

To prove a theorem in mathematics we usually use our axioms, definitions and other already proved theorems. Suppose we wante to prove a specific theorem and we haven't prove any other theorem and also ...
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Do mathematical objects exist after their definition? [duplicate]

Suppose we have a system with a set of axioms. Now we begined to define new terms. E.g. in maths we have a particular set of axioms and then we define what a function is. But do all the functions ...
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Does truth exist without proof?

When we prove something (e.g. in maths) we show that a particular statement is true. But if we couldn't prove that statement that doesn't mean that the statement would be false right? So is proof a ...
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Possible Models

A model consists in one or more possible worlds. Necessity in a world is determined by its associated set of possible worlds. I am curious whether there is any work that involves an account of ...
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How much of a nonstarter is this argument that tautologies are (true-ish but) not true?

I am wondering how much of a nonstarter you think this argument is. I am also interested in suggestions concerning articles or books to read. (More recent works preferred, as I can follow their ...
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Is atheism the null hypothesis on god's existence? Can the null hypothesis be accepted? Is the proposition "god does not exist" falsifiable?

 Is Atheism the Null Hypothesis?  Is Atheism Falsifiable?  Does Atheism Carry the Burden of Proof? Atheism has distinct definitions which can be categorized as follows: • Weak/Soft ...
Karlen Karapetyan's user avatar
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Any concrete, real life example of Peirce's Law? [closed]

What would be a real life, concrete example of Peirce's Law? ((p → q) → p) → p There is a Wikipedia article on it, if you are unfamiliar with it: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peirce's_law There ...
Speakpigeon's user avatar
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Can animals follow logical rules of inference?

I've been trying to recall a thought experiment, which I very vaguely remember to have come across either in Davidson or Dennett, that considers the following scenario: A hound is chasing its quarry ...
alghazali's user avatar
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Deductive reasoning & conditionals

What would be a good example of explicit deductive reasoning that doesn't seem to be possibly interpreted correctly as a conditional (If A, then B)?
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Is it logically permissible to neither believe nor disbelieve a proposition X? Or does this violate the law of excluded middle?

Given a proposition X, one can either believe it or disbelieve it. Is it logical however to neither believe X nor disbelieve X? Is it logical to neither believe proposition X nor its negation ~X? I ...
Karlen Karapetyan's user avatar
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Equivalence Thesis

What is, if any, the canonical justification accepted in mathematical logic for the Equivalence Thesis, asserting (1) that indicative conditionals are truth-functional logical expressions and (2) that ...
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Semantic rules overdetermine the truth value of Liar Paradox

I am reading Graham Priest's In Contradiction (p.14) and he mentioned that the semantic rules of 'this sentence' and 'is True' overdetermine and underdetermine the Liar Paradox and its counterpart ...
Constantly confused's user avatar
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Arguing that English does not satisfy the Tarski condition by appealing to truth value gap

I am reading Graham Priest's In Contradiction (P.12), where he is asserting that English satisfies the Tarski condition (a variant of semantic closure) and thus contains true contradiction. He ...
Constantly confused's user avatar
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2 answers
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Contradiction vs Impossiblity

When we do proof by contradiction we think in the following way: Suppose we know that Q is true. We assume that not P is true and through implications we conclude not Q is true. Now how we proceed ...
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Was Hans Reichenbach really a logical empiricist? Did he really think that logic was empirical?

I was reading an article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy about Hans Reichenbach 1, and I have a specific question about it that I would like to ask. There, it is said that: Reichenbach ...
Maribel's user avatar
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Non-consistent mathematical axioms

It is known that axioms are the building blocks of mathematics. Differents sets of axioms different "games". What I don't understand is how do we know that we pick axioms that are consistent? . Does ...
ado sar's user avatar
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What is the ontological status of the laws of logic? [duplicate]

Are the laws of logic abstract objects that exist independently of physical things? Are they the same in all possible worlds? Are they man-made constructs, nothing more than ideas in our minds? Or ...
Joa's user avatar
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If-then statements meaning in everyday vs mathematics

In mathematics when a "P implies Q" statement is true it means that every time P is true, Q is true also. What about everyday usage? For example consider the statement: "If it is raining, then I am ...
ado sar's user avatar
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Question on the "Property of an Object" and the "Action of an Object" (+the "State of an Object")

I have confronted a philosophical problem related to the definition of the "property of an object." What I believe is: The capability of an object (the capability to desire) is the property of an ...
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2 votes
2 answers
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How/Why is the explanation/prediction of physical phenomena not deductive?

Why is the explanation of the triboelectric effect or the electrostatic effect(indicative examples) not deductive? How so we have a set of premises and from them follows the conclusion which is what ...
George Ntoulos's user avatar
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2 answers
286 views

Is Classical Logic the proper model of the deductive logic of human reasoning?

Which mathematicians and philosophers unambiguously claimed that Classical Logic was the proper model of the deductive logic of human reasoning, and when did they say it? The expression "Classical ...
Speakpigeon's user avatar
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Where is the fallacy in Seth Yalcin's counterexample to the modus tollens?

Where is the fallacy, do you think, in Seth Yalcin’s argument (2012) that the Modus Tollens is not a generally valid form of argument? Seth Yalcin’s counterexample to the Modus Tollens (MT) https://...
Speakpigeon's user avatar
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3 votes
1 answer
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Excluded middle versus bivalence [duplicate]

In logic, the law of excluded middle (or the principle of excluded middle) states that for any proposition, either that proposition is true or its negation is true. This principle should not be ...
Beginner's user avatar
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Are mathematical axioms arbitrary?

I've been thinking recently about whether or not mathematical axioms are arbitrary. I'm trying to figure out what axioms in systems are derived from and just how arbitrary they really are. My main ...
JAG's user avatar
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Does it hold that everything exists necessarily?

In Quantified modal logic, "constancy’s defenders can point to certain powerful arguments in its favor. Here’s a quick sketch of one such argument. First, the following seems to be a logical truth: ...
AnduinWilde's user avatar
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4 answers
590 views

Can we know that law of non contradiction is true a priori?

I have seen some arguments for why should we accept law of non contradiction, and it seems to works in almost all areas. But some argument for it is like an argument for principle "nothing comes from ...
Hare Krishna's user avatar
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1 answer
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How do Descartes' definitions of 'a priori' and a 'posteriori' effect the current generalized understanding of these two distinctions?

The noted and highly respected pluralist, Dr. Richard Mckeon, in his introductory comments to the International Institute of Philosophy's 'Entretiens in Jerusalem, in 1977, quotes from Descartes ...
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2 votes
2 answers
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In non-platonism, can undecidable statements have truth value?

Most sources I can find about Gödel's incompleteness theorems summarize the result as "there exist true arithmetical statements that have no proof." It seems coherent to say that there exist ...
WillG's user avatar
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1 answer
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Can/Do there exist any quantifiers other than "there exists" and "for all"?

I'm curious about why there are only the two logical quantifiers there exists and for all. Intuition and human language support the idea that these quantifiers make sense, but otherwise it seems ...
WillG's user avatar
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Bibliography about non-mathematical applications of logic:

I have been recently playing with modal and temporal modal logics in the context of "organisms" (mostly after some study of entelechy in Aristotle and relatedly, some ideas of current biology). I have ...
Vagoltof's user avatar
3 votes
2 answers
188 views

Justification for the paradigm of abductive reasoning

In Chance , Love and Logic, Peirce defines reasoning into two categories: analytic and non-analytic. All forms of reasoning have three fundamental components: rule, case, result. Analytic reasoning ...
nyke's user avatar
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Which of common rules of inference are rejected on some philosophical grounds?

My question is: is there a mathematical or philosophical basis for rejecting any of the following rules of inference? If yes, then what is the argument for rejecting any of them? I am asking this ...
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Did logicists use mathematical entities (in their attempt) to reduce mathematics to logic?

Two concepts F,G are equinumerous if there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the objects that fall under F and G. Equinumerosity is one the most fundamental building blocks of Gottlob ...
Andrew's user avatar
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What are the eventual purposes of symbolic logic?

What is the teleology of logic? Every body of knowledge has to have a teleology for which it's designed. The body of knowledge in logic doesn't clearly have any teleology or any purpose to which it ...
user43163's user avatar
2 votes
2 answers
232 views

Using logic to do metalogical proofs? Is there a circularity problem here?

(1) If modus tollens were not correct, then I could have (P-->Q), ~Q and P. (2) But I cannot have (P--> Q) , ~Q and P. For, in that case, I would have (~P v Q) and ~Q and P; which means I would have ...
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