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Questions tagged [physicalism]

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How does representationalism respond to the "Mary's room argument"?

So here's Frank Jackson himself responding to his own argument using "representationalism": https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YPT0BE1WAHk So as I'm understanding Frank's newer view... when ...
Ameet Sharma's user avatar
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3 votes
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Experience as an initial value problem?

Question The argument seems to say just as I have a physical initial value problem and with the laws of physics tell the time evolution, similarly, I can have an initial value problem of experience ...
More Anonymous's user avatar
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Does the Knowledge argument refute physicalism?

Is there any research that disproves Jackson's three premises? Is there any research which argues that Mary does not learn all the physical facts whilst in the room, because experience itself ...
Dandy's user avatar
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Are you familiar with a similar argument against the (nomological) supervenience of the mental on the physical?

The SEP article on supervenience claims "Just about everyone, even a Cartesian dualist, believes some version of this supervenience claim [that the mental nomologically supervenes on the physical]." ...
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Emergence and status of the wave function, do any philosophers define physics and physicalism in 21st Century?

Emergence not as the antithesis of physical reduction, more the realization every level can be wildly different. This view of emergence supports reduction, that things are just quarks and fields after ...
J Kusin's user avatar
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1 vote
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Something similar to The Knowledge Argument which works within Physicalism?

Here is The Knowledge Argument according to SEP (Mary is either monochrome or views the world through monochrome monitor): (1) Mary has all the physical information concerning human color vision ...
J Kusin's user avatar
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Is there a materialist explanation for the type-token distinction?

Is there a materialist theory in philosophy that goes beyond giving a dictionary definition of the type/token distinction and attempts to explain what types and tokens really are in material terms, e....
ali's user avatar
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Where does computations occur, in Mind or in Matter?

Short and silly question, but it opens-up to a separation of idealism and materialism on the basis of information. If computations (in the scenario of a materialistic-computational perspective of the ...
Gloserio's user avatar
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Non-random indeterminism in physicalist reductionism?

In lectures on free will, often a dichotomy between determinism and random is alluded. This dichotomy always is not a true dichotomy, there are some known and even trivial examples of non-random ...
tkruse's user avatar
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Can anyone provide an argument against astralphysical dualism that is not reductionist materialist, purely physicalist/supportive of physicalism?

In one of my recent literary works, I have chosen to posit an advance of the concept of dualism, via coining the term astralphysical dualism. This concept requires understandings of three root terms: ...
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Knowing the laws of the universe but not its total state or ontology, what does philosophy have to say?

Since GR but also in special relativity and QM we can have laws, yet never access to the total physical state of the universe at any time. And that the ontology of science, the physical, is changing ...
J Kusin's user avatar
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Every experience is a new qualia? In reference to Dennett and RoboMary

Preliminary: RoboMary is a robot, but so are we - large robots made of smaller robots made of smaller robots. She does not yet have the experience of color. Dennett puts forth a physicalist way for ...
J Kusin's user avatar
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Do panpsychism and its variants (such as Russellian monism) face an interaction problem?

Many philosophers of the mind—such as David Chalmers, Galen Strawson and Philip Goff—have become sympathetic to variants of panpsychism when it comes to explaining consciousness. Yet, on their own ...
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Does physicalism think a priori knowledge exists?

Does physicalism think a priori knowledge exists? If so, how is this knowledge explained? Is the idea like morality being coded in DNA?
wang zhihao's user avatar
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Physicalism: If consciousness isn't an illusion, what's its nature? What are the best clues?

I'm asking very generally so I'm expecting very general answers. I've read the answers from the question: How can consciousness be an illusion? and I pretty much got understanding of how our brain ...
Probably's user avatar
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