Questions tagged [quine]

W.V.O. Quine (1908-2000) was a prominent 20th century analytic philosopher.

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1answer
597 views

How does Quine answer the metaphysician's charge that scientism is self-refuting?

General scientism seems to hold that due to the predictive powers of our scientific methods, such methods are preferred to other methods of knowledge, such as metaphysics (radical scientism claiming ...
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320 views

Is Quine's epistemology really just a linguistic reinterpretation of Kant's?

Kant's epistemology: There are facts out there, but we can never access them directly, we can only perceive them the way they are presented to us by our own minds. Quine: There are facts out there, ...
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When Quine is criticizing the notion of analyticity what exactly is his criterion?

Quine criticizes analyticity for presupposing another notion, that of synonymy, which for Quine either must be explained in terms of analyticity or synonymy itself. But what exactly does Quine think ...
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Is Quine begging the question against the traditional epistemologist?

Quine's naturalistic holism is marked by the idea that our methodology should be concerned with empirical data as understood by modern science in conjunction with the idea that every theory is ...
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367 views

Does Quine consider the Homeric gods to have predictive power?

Quine wrote in his 1951 paper "Two Dogmas of Empiricism": "Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries not by definition in terms of experience, but ...
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How does Quine effectively shift from points he has made about knowledge acquisition to conclusions he makes about knowledge simpliciter?

Quine propagated forward an approach to epistemology wherein there was no need of any sort of justification "beyond observation and the hypothetico-deductive method" (Quine 1981). Quine is going ...
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194 views

Why is “similarity” not a logical relation? (from “Natural Kinds” by Quine)

I have two questions regarding Quine's paper “Natural Kinds”: Why isn't similarity a logical relation? Why is our ability to recognize similarity so fundamental? These two things are explained in ...
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85 views

Did Quine have another reason to be skeptical of reference besides its context-dependence?

Quine, like many others before him, thought that the meaning of words depends on the context they are in. But what compelled Quine to hold that in light of this there is an ambiguity as to what any ...
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Does Quine's relativism only follow if the data of theories is the only source of a theory's justification?

Quine saw that any group of theories could have the same pieces of data. There is a gap between any set of data and the interpretation we have of it. Quine then felt that in light of this, whether ...
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How is self-reference understood in the pragmatist tradition?

Gödel and Tarski's works have been especially influential in the pragmatist tradition, but what exactly did their theorems usher in? What is left of self-reference in the pragmatist tradition? More ...
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What distinctions does Quine draw between ontological and ideological commitments?

Quine held in "On What There Is" the following: "A theory is committed to those and only those entities to which the bound variables of the theory must be capable of referring in order that the ...
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Was indeterminacy of linguistic meaning, as understood by Quine, anticipated by the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition?

Quine held that the meaning of words was indeterminate. The reasons he holds this view all seem to have in common a certain aspect; the indeterminacy that occurs occurs within what might be called '...
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219 views

Why does Quine expand the underdetermination thesis through his global holism?

Quine's application of the problem of underdetermination took the thesis to be a problem not only for physics (as Duhem before him), nor even for the particular sciences, but for any and all theories ...
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141 views

To what extent do variations of Hume's Fork permeate modern philosophy, and specifically the analytical community?

Hume's Fork, which divides knowledge into 'relations of ideas' and 'matters of fact' has had an incredible influence on philosophy ever since its conception (though it is sometimes claimed that others ...
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Is there a certain connection between Quine and Buridan in their understanding of the distinction between meaning and naming?

In "On What There Is" Quine notes that "there is a gulf between meaning and naming even in the case of a singular term which is genuinely a name of the object". This distinction can be made more clear ...
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Looking for references for some remark of Quine's

I'm looking for a comment I think I remember Quine having made. He's talking about our understanding of proofs. I think he says something along the following lines... If you understand many different ...
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Quine's cordate/renate argument and specifying the domain of discourse

Can the specifications of domain of applicability be part of analytic statements? The problem involves my reading of Quine's Two Dogmas, and trying to elaborate the "creatures with hearts" and "...
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140 views

Quine's Naturalized Epistemology

Quine argues for a naturalized epistemology over traditional kinds. The implications of this move lead to pure descriptions that relinquishes all normativity. Is Quine's method of science as a "...
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Is there such a thing as a 'necessary truth'?

Wikipedia (note the redirect) defines 'necessary truth' as statements which "could not be untrue", and I assume that this is how the term is usually used. A search through the SEP shows that while ...
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What is *lost* and *gained* in repudiating the analytic/synthetic distinction?

Analytic sentences are characterized as sentences whose truth values derive from their meanings alone. The truth of synthetic sentences depend on both meaning and fact. In the early modern ...

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