One of the responses to [Pascal’s Wager][1] is that it may be meaningless to assign a probability to a certain metaphysical proposition such as God’s existence.

In this [post][2] about the meaning of probability with respect to metaphysical realities, @Conifold notes, 

> The assignment is of course meaningless, along with "more", "less", "many other", etc., applied to something as vague as "metaphysical possibilities". See [Bertrand paradox][3] for a simple illustration of how probability values depend on arranging "possibilities" into a sample space. Even if one was willing to accept the "base assumption" of equiprobability it is impossible to make sense of what that means here.

Suppose that you are a person who thinks that it is meaningless to assign a probability to God’s existence *or* that you think the probability of God’s existence is unknown given the lack of experience with any supernatural entities. 

Now, in the interpretation of [subjective probability][4], which is often linked to Bayesian thinking, probability is defined as a degree of belief as such: 


> Your degree of belief in E is p iff p units of utility is the price at which you would buy or sell a bet that pays 1 unit of utility if E, 0 if not E

The neat thing about this definition is that it defines probability in a practical way, in the form of a bet. 

Now imagine that this bet is somehow forced upon you, either by the government, or by punishment in such a way where you have no choice but to take this bet. Now, a person who is forced to take this bet where he can only pick between 0 and 1 units, must still take an action (or else, he may be murdered for example). 

But if he thinks that it is meaningless to assign a probability here, what possible reason could he have to pick one figure instead of another? If he does pick one, which he must, does this not mean that he undeniably *has* a credence in the proposition even if he claims not to? 


  [1]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pascal-wager/
  [2]: https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/42942/is-it-valid-to-calculate-the-probability-of-different-metaphysical-realities
  [3]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bertrand_paradox_(probability)
  [4]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/#SubPro