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Earlier and later Wittgenstein - reasons for change in thought, and resultant conclusions

The subject of this question is the comparison betweenth the earlier and later Wittgenstien.

So, I begin this brief crtique on the assumption his metaphisics bears some correlation to a naive interpretation of the Descartian scepticism that the Devil is playing tricks on the existence of a prmentalt personal identity. In particular, I would lie to draw on Russell's most basic critic of the permenance of the "I" as a syntictic gestalt. Of course, Russel's own attempt at forming complete systems constistent within themselves was unexpectedly undermined by Godel's famous proove a few decades hence.

But essensially, Russell's argument that the "I" is impermenant is a concept that has had reverberations that extend not only throughout the the ivory tower of academia, but have had very real implications of the concept of permenace and change in the concept of identity as a construct that range from the Existential to Eastern philosophical doctrines such as Taoism (and those influenced by them: Schopenhouer, etc.)

What lead to Wittgenstein's departure from his more classical textual critique to his more radical and celebrated consideration (that involved nop doubt no small admission of humility on his part) that his obsevations of the section of society that his observations were based on brought his conclusions based almost entirely on theory as oposed to having any empirica basis were evectively brought to its kness. In its place grew a more natural and organic philosophy based on empirical study whereby he imbued in the language of "the masses" an almost transendental quality in which resided an intrinsic quality of the language as on organic entity and the employers of such a natural circumventing of the academic rigmarol of subjecting themselves to years of study of an appreciation of a linguistic life that they were living already.

In the words of Derek Jarman,

Because he was a very clever young man, he actually managed to do it. When he'd finished his work, he stood back and admired it. It was beautiful. A world purged of imperfection and indeterminacy. Countless acres of gleaming ice stretching to the horizon. So the clever young man looked around the world he'd created and decided to explore it. He took one step forward and fell flat on his back. You see, he'd forgotten about friction. The ice was smooth and level and stainless. But you couldn't walk there. So the clever young man sat down and wept bitter tears. But as he grew into a wise old man, he came to understand that roughness and ambiguity aren't imperfections, they're what make the world turn. He wanted to run and dance.

So is this "runing and dancing" (clearly a superficial metaphor for the more difficultly defined concept of "living") the living that the non-philosopher does instinctively, and hence the crux of Jarman's epitaph in a critique on Russell's, (speaking of mathematics, but easily applied to the study of philosophy: particularly that of the field of self-contained logical systems),

... a beauty cold and austere, like that of sculpture, without appeal to any part of our weaker nature, without the gorgeous trappings of painting or music, yet sublimely pure, and capable of a stern perfection such as only the greatest art can show. The true spirit of delight, the exaltation, the sense of being more than Man, which is the touchstone of the highest excellence, is to be found in mathematics as surely as poetry.

Is the above the, the essence of Wittgenstein's claim that he proclaimed the end of philosophy, just as Nietzsche proclaimed the death of god as a metaphor for the death of morality within the framework of the defunct metanarrative of religion, was merely an admission that philosophy of linguistics was defunct, albeit an effective vehicle for the dry (and useless in terms of practical application, if the study of philosophy was also to exhibit the ability to live by one's philosophy, as though philosophy were an ethos or a system that the practitioner must adhere to if the world of ideas were to somehow have some intrinsic part to play in the day to day living of a virtuous life (an idea that was propounded by the pre-Socratics and beyond, and still holds credance)).

Does Wittgenstein's later philosopy not merely stand as a critique to the Socratic epithet that, "An unexamined life is not worth living?"