One of the responses to [Pascal’s Wager][1] is that it may be meaningless to assign a probability to a certain metaphysical proposition such as God’s existence.

In this [post][2] about the assignment of probability with respect to metaphysical realities, @Conifold comments, 

> The assignment is of course meaningless, along with "more", "less", "many other", etc., applied to something as vague as "metaphysical possibilities". See [Bertrand paradox][3] for a simple illustration of how probability values depend on arranging "possibilities" into a sample space. Even if one was willing to accept the "base assumption" of equiprobability it is impossible to make sense of what that means here.

Suppose that you are a person who thinks that it is meaningless to assign a probability to God’s existence *or* that you think the probability of God’s existence is unknown given the lack of experience with any supernatural entities. 

Now, in the interpretation of [subjective probability][4], which is often linked to Bayesian thinking, probability is defined as a degree of belief as such: 


> Your degree of belief in E is p iff p units of utility is the price at which you would buy or sell a bet that pays 1 unit of utility if E, 0 if not E

The neat thing about this definition is that it defines probability in a practical way, in the form of a bet. 

Now imagine that this bet is somehow forced upon you, either by the government, or by punishment in such a way where you have no choice but to take this bet. Suppose, also, that if you are correct on the bet, you survive. If you are wrong on the bet, you are murdered. Now, a person who is forced to take this bet where he can only pick between 0 and 1 units, must still take an action (or else, he may be murdered for example). 

But if he does pick one, which he must, does this not mean that he undeniably *has* a credence in the proposition (which can be translated into a probability) even if he claims not to, making him inconsistent?


----------

*Disclaimer*: I am not myself a Bayesian and don’t know on which side of the fence I belong here yet (unless, of course, I was forced to bet on it ;))

P.S. to the current downvoters, **explain** the downvotes instead of being cowardly, especially since answers by prominent posters have already been given, giving at least some level of indication that they thought the question was worth responding to. This site unfortunately has a wonky history of downvoting/closing things without explanation which is sometimes a sign that there’s no basis for them except a dislike of users.

  [1]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pascal-wager/
  [2]: https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/42942/is-it-valid-to-calculate-the-probability-of-different-metaphysical-realities
  [3]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bertrand_paradox_(probability)
  [4]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/#SubPro