I'll start off with how [the other answer](https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/a/108636/6350) starts off:

>The paper correctly points out that physicalist naturalism requires a large number of mind-body relationships. However, it falsely claims that these are difficult to explain in principle within physicalist naturalism. Physicalists propose identity theories. Mind is proposed to be identical to some physical or functional state, or emergence from such a state, and this relation is assumed to be a feature of physics.

The "correlation" of phenomenal states with physical states is not at all "fortunate", if those physical states are just what phenomenal states *are*.

The correlation of phenomenal/physical states with one another would be explained by evolution. If a creature has a bunch of neurons just firing randomly with no rhyme or reason, that's probably not going to help them survive. But if some sensory perception causes neurons to fire, and this causes a chain of neurons to fire in a way that ends with sending signals to other body parts to respond appropriately given the perception, that's certainly going to give a survival advantage, and mutations that correspond to this will be selected for. This is evolution 101.

So it would be more strange if we *don't* see this correlation under physicalism.

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But even if we put that glaring issue aside, another more fundamental problem with the paper is that it doesn't actually make a positive case for what it's trying to argue for.

At best, it seems to be saying "this thing seems unlikely, therefore God". That's not strong evidence. To call it weak evidence would be generous. That's little more than "we don't know why this happens", and then [inserting God in the gap in our understanding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/God_of_the_gaps). It's equally valid as evidence for invisible fairies that give babies consciousness using magic. Now maybe you have reasons to favour the God hypothesis above invisible fairies, but this argument certainly isn't it.

The paper mentions the similarity to fine tuning, and that has been criticised [for similar reasons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teleological_argument#Criticism) (but fine tuning is a popular apologetic, so this might meet that very low bar).