Search Results

There is nothing special about epistemics regarding whether oughts can exist. Whatever theory one uses to generally determine oughts would apply equally to oughts relating to beliefs. So yes, epistemi …

Let P be the proposition "A knows X." P & ~P is always false. Therefore it cannot be the case that "A knows X" and "A does not know X."

Accuracy is relative. Descriptions convey limited information about an actual entity. One can describe a human with varying degrees of precision: that it is an instance of homo sapiens physical dimen …

You have simply stated the well-known and widely accepted position that knowledge is justified true belief (SEP; Wikipedia). You present the following hypothetical: Person A expressing that they beli …

From Conifold: This sounds close to what Aaaronson advocates as "Bayesian rationality" and "Aumannian ideal" for epistemic communities in Common Knowledge and Aumann’s Agreement Theorem:"We get a cle …

Improbability of an event arising from non-design does not necessitate the conclusion of design. See Is it ever reasonable to infer impossibility from high improbability? Even some zero-probability ev …

The probability that someone somewhere will experience a hallucination or any other perceptual anomaly (misperceiving depth, speed, or size; blind spots; other visual illusions) leading them to to hav …

Your question is an empirical question about whether unsymbolized thinking happens. Any consensus among philosophers is of no import to this question; what matters is what neuroscience has revealed. P …

Only if one treats A's testimony about X as credible and reliable. If A is not credible (e.g. they're an embellisher or liar), then what they say about X will not have much weight as to the truth of X …

You first ask: Would all disagreements vanish if everyone had access to the same information and followed the same reasoning process? Access to the same information does not sufficiently constrain t …

Moving an answer from Conifold from the comments: It is broadly accepted that we have no direct control over beliefs, see Doxastic Voluntarism. But I doubt that the subjective "level of skepticism" i …

You seem to be assuming a correspondence theory of truth. It is only under this theory of truth that I see the tension you're trying to present. However, there are other relativist theories of truth, …

This answers the first version of this question, which asked "Can the laws of physics be deduced from pure mathematical reasoning?" The question has since been inappropriately edited to apparently inv …

As quoted by Conifold: Kant mentions Aristotle and Aristotelian philosophers only a hundred times in all of his works (printed and manuscript). This is not so much if we think that most of the times …

Observation is never theory-free. Even when a person relies on sight, they have a theory of perception that they are implicitly or explicitly relying upon. When we use sensitive scientific instruments …