16

I'd say it started around the 1950 and got off the ground around 1980 ;) That is to say, the divide as been introduced as a fighting word from the beginning; it is more about asserting the divide than about giving an adequate picture of the philosophical landscape. And it is really not advisable to do proper history of philosophy by using fighting words! ...


15

Because he provides a logical framework within which to understand what it means to say that a thing has some property necessarily. Call this view essentialism. Quine had thought that essentialism was false because necessity could only be a property of sentences. (So there could be necessary truths, but not necessary properties of objects.) Quine's reason ...


11

First, "le sacre monstre" is bad French for "le monstre sacré" which while literally meaning "the holy monster" (thus the bad French putting the adjective in the wrong place) means "a public figure that is left alone" or isolated. Many continental philosophers see Hegel as evil and the source of problems, thus the devil role. He's often a target for ...


10

A good paper to read on this subject is an old classic: Gilbert Ryle's Systematically Misleading Expressions. (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 32: 139-170 (1932). Also in his Collected Papers, vol 2.) Ryle's view is that ordinary non-philosophical use of language frequently contains "improper" usages, by which he means usages that, while having a ...


9

why can't all words mean an exact thing? The most concise answer you are going to find is in Section 293: the famous "beetle in a box" thought experiment. If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly? ...


9

The Derrida volume Limited, Inc. contains the critical documents, minus Searle's piece, due to Searle's refusing permission. The publications went like this: Derrida, in 1971, delivered a lecture in Montreal entitled "Signature Event Context", which discussed the notion of communication in various philosophers from Condillac to Austin. This work was ...


9

I have two remarks. First, I observe that every statement is logically equivalent to a conditional statement. Specifically, any proposition p is logically equivalent to the conditional proposition ¬p → p, among numerous other conditional propositions, such as (p ↔ p) → p, which the reader may easily verify. In this sense, if one allows ...


8

Based on your summary, it appears both methods of reading interpret the writings of the Tractatus as senseless (irresolute) or nonsense (resolute). In other words, both readings, if applied to the whole of the text, would classify it as belonging to something beyond the limits of "world, thought and language". It seems safe to assume that Wittgenstein's ...


8

Here is some historical context. In Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884) Frege introduced his ill-fated Axiom V, now known as the axiom of unrestricted comprehension: every predicate defines a class of objects that satisfy it, called its extension (Frege's own formulation is more technical). This led to the set of all sets and then to the Russell's paradox in ...


7

The assertion that complex statements are reducible to statements about particulars standing in logical relations to one another is associated with logical atomism and the philosophical method of analysis popularized by Bertrand Russell, Moore and the early Wittgenstein. The doctrine is both metaphysical and methodological. Metaphysically, logical atomism ...


7

Your question, "What is the origin of the Continental vs. Analytic divide?" will probably not return many satisfying answers. There is no precise origin because the topic is very complicated and not well defined. The terms "continental" and "analytic" are not even clearly applicable to the differences today because of the global prominence of analytic ...


7

This is a deceptively complex question, and very on the nose when it comes to Tractarian interpretation. My line on this is to say that we need to pay attention to the distinction in the semantics of TLP between "Propositions" (the German "Satz") and "Elementary Propositions" ("Elementarsatz"), and to note the theoretical difficulties in explaining how to ...


7

Frankly, the terms analytic and continental are not especially meaningful when applied to contemporary philosophers. Let me explain what I mean by that. Sure, there have been and still are clearly analytic and clearly continental philosophers. No one would confuse Carnap or Quine with continental philosophy. And no one is calling Foucault, Heidegger, ...


7

This is not an easy question. The first problem is that the German ‘bedeuten’ means something like ‘mean’ or ‘signify’ or ‘indicate’, which led to the translators changing the translation from ‘reference’ in the original edition to ‘Meaning’. Thus ‘sense and Meaning’, not ‘sense and reference’. This was controversial. The second is that Frege seems to have ...


7

Early analytic philosophy did reject "metaphysics." But it's important to understand why they would be motivated to do so. The answer for English-speaking ones is the Oxford Hegelians. In other words, Hegel (or at least an interpretation of it) was the dominant philosophy in the English-speaking world in the 19th century. One of the humorous details of how ...


7

Good overviews of the more recent history of analytic philosophy are Burge's Philosophy of Language and Mind: 1950-1990 and Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 (ch.20), the philosophy of science side in a very lively and polemical form is described in Zammito's Nice Derangement of Epistemes, "the best history of post-positivist philosophy and sociology of science ...


7

The first four chapters of The Oxford Handbook of The History of Analytic Philosophy are available for free from that webpage. The four chapters are: "What is Analytic Philosophy?" "The Historiography of Analytic Philosophy" "Chronology of Analytic Philosophy and its Historiography" "Bibliography of Analytic Philosophy and its ...


6

All I have to contribute is that if you're still having trouble finding it, Searle's response has been made available on Scribd: http://www.scribd.com/doc/29238861/Reiterating-the-Differences-A-Reply-to-Derrida-by-John-R-Searle


6

Derrida attempted to answer this question in his Letter to a Japanese Friend. I don't think you're going to find a better explanation as to his intentions than the one found there.


6

In first order logic: P(x) is has a free variable - x. ∃x P(x) has no free variables, x is bound by the existential operator. This is what is normally called a closed formula or a sentence. Sentences are a key concept in model theory as they allow for well-defined truth values. A set of sentences is called a theory; any individual sentence is a theorem. ...


6

I am not terribly optimistic that the division will be overcome in any sort of principled way. After all, the analytic and continental divide is still alive and well, and to mend that one there isn't even a need to be versed in a second field. One problem is that science works. Scientists don't, therefore, have much incentive to mend anything with "...


6

I would suggest that our salvation from this dilemma may come from exactly the sciences it deprives of a decent footing. Classical psychology contains places where it is still possible to study humanities from a skeptical and systematizing perspective with testable implications. The leading light in this kind of endeavor was Jung, who clearly saw his work ...


6

Kripke's Naming and Necessity, definitely. If any of Quine's books counts as a magnum opus, it would probably be Word and Object. Other seminal works in analytical philosophy include Austin's How to Do Things with Words; Gilbert Ryle's Concept of Mind; Strawson's Bounds of Sense. I'd like to include David Lewis' Plurality of Worlds too, but I find his modal ...


5

Phillipa Foot discussed the trolley problem in her article, "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect," which originally appeared in the Oxford Review, Number 5, 1967. A copy of this article is free on line. The extract that you posted was originally from that article. What I have copied below is how the article continues after your ...


5

Perhaps read Marx and Weber first? Otherwise it is indeed impossible to follow Adorno and Habermas. I don't know what one would have to do to "understand" Derida, Deleuze and Foucault. A lot of it traces back to Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. All this is a complete mess, and I have decided to stay out of it. (Marx, Nietzsche, Freud I certainly find worth ...


5

Analytic philosophy has taken quite a few different developments. I'll use some Quine and a little bit of Kuhn in order to show what the expression of "hasn't been proven" might mean in analytic philosophy and how this may answer your question. According to Quine to exist is to be the value of a bound variable. Variables are bound by quantifiers to form ...


5

Yes, I believe Hegel has been treated largely with hostility or neglect in the analytic camp from the time Russell accused him "simple logical errors."Russell himself was originally steeped in Hegel, Bradley, and the British idealists, so his renunciation carried weight. (As the famous weather report goes: "Fog Over Channel, Continent Cut Off.") The parting ...


5

'Eichmann in Jerusalem' by Hannah Arendt discusses the questions of "what could the Jews do?" and "Why did they permit themselves to be led, like sheep, onto trains; into camps?" Arendt was a Jew that attended the trials after the war was over and asks many of the controversial questions. I don't wish to ruin the answer to these questions by quoting the book,...


5

In a nutshell, the issue arises from the definition of number of as a second-order concept (i.e. a numerical quantifier) in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884). Consider e.g. 0xϕ(x)=df Card[xy] (y ≠ y) [ϕx], that reads: To assert 0xϕ(x) is to say that the objects that are ϕ are in one-to-one correlation with the objects that are not self-identical, i.e....


5

You can get an MA in philosophy in the US without doing an undergraduate in philosophy. If you do so, most programs will be looking for a strong background in analytic skills (here not with the exact meaning it has in "analytic philosophy") such as a hard science, math, or other difficult degree. The University of Chicago has a masters in humanities where ...


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