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Well, there are different kinds of physical computers as the other answer touched on. But if you're asking about types of computation, then in mathematics and computer science this often refers to formal systems that are able to calculate different classes of functions. See the article on automata theory which highlights four important models of ...


3

One cannot get around Quine's objection to analyticity simply by appeal to stipulated definitions. For one thing, the vast majority of words in a natural language such as English don't have stipulated definitions. Carnap is not a deity who hands down definitions on tablets of stone that we are obliged to use. Lexicographers do not stipulate definitions when ...


2

You can see: Michael Dummett, Origins of Analytical Philosophy (1993). And see some fundamental statements from Russell: B.Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World (1914), page 26: "The topics we discussed [...] all reduce themselves, in so far as they are genuinely philosophical, to problems of logic. This is not due to any accident, but to the ...


2

Suppose that B is "All five original Take That members are American", and X is "Robbie is American". There's an intuitive sense in which X does not add falsity to B, in that the content that X has that is false is part of the content of B. But if X was, say "Robbie and Mick Jagger are both American", then X would be adding ...


2

There are several ways in which a statement can be neither true nor false: Indeterminant with an assigned truth value between 0 and 1. Probabilistic, expressing a probability that it might be true. Such statements are common in quantum physics, as exemplified by Schroedinger's cat. Paradoxical, such as "this statement is untrue". Meaningless, ...


2

In systems of formal logic, you can go from having two truth values (True or False) to infinitely many truth values. If something is neither True or False, it can be deemed as Indeterminant. One type of infinitely many-valued logic is Fuzzy logic. It is a logic that assigns a value from 0 to 1, where 0 is completely false and 1 is completely true. This logic ...


1

The passage you quote appears in the context of a discussion of what it means to speak of the subtraction of two propositions "A-B" when A implies B. A-B should have the property that when combined with B it yields A. One proposal is that A-B is the material implication B → A. Yablo rejects this because it gives the wrong result. It would make A-B ...


1

B→¬X being true for a reason that can obtain even when B is true One might interpret this as follows. Say that X adds falsity to B, when there exists a set of true premises from which we can derive B→¬X, where the premises are not inconsistent with B. Edit: This set of premises ought to be further constrained, e.g. to be chosen as a subset of a fixed, ...


1

Feinberg's Accordion Effect has already been mentioned, so I will not repeat it. His view, in short, seems to amount to this: A’s y-ing causes x = A does x I am not too familiar with the literature, but Elizabeth Anscombe advocated a similar idea before Feinberg, and I think her image is more subtle: “Are we to say that the man who (intentionally) moves ...


1

Welcome, rikuwang. For any action and any consequence it is always possible to redesribe the action so as to include the consequence. Joel Feinberg made this point in referring to what he called 'the accordion effect'. He talks of 'effects' but his point is readily applicable to conseqence(s). We can, if we wish, inflate our conception of an action to ...


1

Russell, in his logicist programme, tries to prove that mathematics is analytic and not synthetic as argued by Kant. However, he hides his own programme quite successfully in PoP. Maybe, because Russell thinks it should be a book about the problems of philosphy rather than about their solutions. Or, because he thinks the logicist's solution to the problem of ...


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I find it peculiar that this question associates 'universality' with 'intuition'; the two concepts are fundamentally in tension with each other, not in alignment. Let's go back to that age-old debate about whether any two people are referring to the same color when they use the word 'Red'. Perception of color is internal and subjective. If I say 'Red' I may ...


1

In what text, or conference, or where, does George Edward Moore confess that we do not really know those sentences that he so much defended that we knew? There's a confusion here about what Ayer is saying. Ayer--in the quote you provide--says that Moore doesn't know the correct analysis of the propositions. He does not say that Moore doesn't know the ...


1

Your post seems to involve two question. A first shallower and a second deeper one. The first question: "Why does the very mathematics work that has been axiomatically developed in the 20th century"? The semi-obivous answer: Because it has been axiomatized exactly in order to render mathematical results which were in use in the empirical sciencies for ...


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