Analytic Philosophy: An Anthology ed. Martinich and Sosa includes the following seminal papers:
Part I :Philosophy of Language.
1 “On Sense and Reference”(Gottlob Frege).
2 “Thought”(Gottlob Frege.
3 “On Denoting”(Bertrand Russell).
4 “On Referring”(P. F. Strawson).
5 “Meaning”(H. P. Grice).
6 “Truth and Meaning”(Donald Davidson).
7 “Identity and Necessity”(...
Analytic philosophy focusses on these key areas:
language & logic
Your classification includes a number of non-analytic topics including:
axiology, social epistemology, culture, political philosophy
see 'Analytic Philosophy: An Anthology' ed. Martinich and Sosa
Analytic philosophy can be argued to have diverged from the Continental tradition with logical positivism and the Vienna Circle. Which Wittgenstein was associated with, and is considered to have done some of the most important work to develop, with his Tractatus. The 'linguistic turn' is considered to have begun to the influence of his later work, primarily ...
I just put here an add-on on the previous question, in order to specify a point.
" I want to say that X adds falsity to B 5 when B&X is false for a reason that does not trade on B being false, as is shown by its being instantiable even when B is true. "
This is a point that I can't make sense of: why should we intuitively regard X as adding ...
The passage you quote appears in the context of a discussion of what it means to speak of the subtraction of two propositions "A-B" when A implies B. A-B should have the property that when combined with B it yields A. One proposal is that A-B is the material implication B → A. Yablo rejects this because it gives the wrong result. It would make A-B ...
Suppose that B is "All five original Take That members are American", and X is "Robbie is American". There's an intuitive sense in which X does not add falsity to B, in that the content that X has that is false is part of the content of B.
But if X was, say "Robbie and Mick Jagger are both American", then X would be adding ...
B→¬X being true for a reason that can obtain even when B is true
One might interpret this as follows. Say that X adds falsity to B, when there exists a set of true premises from which we can derive B→¬X, where the premises are not inconsistent with B.
Edit: This set of premises ought to be further constrained, e.g. to be chosen as a subset of a fixed, ...