10 votes
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What's the current status of the "paradox of analysis"? And are there any strong and widely accepted resolutions?

A good paper to read on this subject is an old classic: Gilbert Ryle's Systematically Misleading Expressions. (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 32: 139-170 (1932). Also in his Collected Papers,...
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7 votes

Is there any reason to believe that there are things which science cannot tell us?

Science consists of empirically testable explanations about the world. So any idea that's not empirically testable is not science. For example, the idea that there is a real world as described by ...
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  • 7,053
7 votes
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Did the Logical Positivists accept synthetic a priori knowledge?

The Logical Positivists did not accept synthetic a priori knowledge. They accepted only Hume's Fork, two kinds of knowledge, as you suggested in the question. Logical Positivism was not a single ...
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  • 7,201
7 votes
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What would be gained philosophically if logicism succeeds?

Logicism's original goal certainly was not to diffuse Platonist impulses, although it was later adapted to that end, Frege was a devout Platonist. It was an epistemological reduction programme (aside ...
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7 votes

Is the proposition "I feel happy" analytic or synthetic?

When Kant tells us that in an analytic statement the predicate is contained in the subject, he intends a quite different sense of 'subject' from what you have in mind. 'A triangle has three sides and ...
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6 votes

Quine - two dogmas of empiricism

He is not rejecting meaning; what he says is: My present suggestion is that it is nonsense, and the root of much nonsense, to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component in the truth of ...
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5 votes

If one agrees with Quine's dissolution of the Analytic/Synthetic distinction, what is left of Kant's epistemology?

Recall that to Kant since Aristotle "logic has not been able to advance a single step, and is thus to all appearance a closed and completed body of doctrine" (Critique of Pure ...
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5 votes

Kant's analytic/synthetic propositions

Analytic and synthetic judgements His definition is rather straight and it seems as if you correctly applied it: analytic essentially means 'already thought within the concept itself': Either the ...
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5 votes

Quine - two dogmas of empiricism

Quine doesn't hold that statements don't mean anything (that indeed would be quite an extreme form of skepticism), but rather that the meaningfulness of statements should be considered not in ...
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4 votes
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The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction in false mathematical propositions

If we stay with the definition of Analytic according to which : “Analytic” sentences are those whose truth seems to be knowable by knowing the meanings of the constituent words alone, unlike the more ...
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4 votes
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Why can we not reduce necessity to analyticity?

The OP is very close to Quine's considered view of necessity, as e.g. in Pursuit of Truth: "In respect of utility there is less to be said for necessity than for the propositional attitudes. The ...
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4 votes

Does this reformulation of the the analytic / synthetic distinction overcome Quine's objections?

One cannot get around Quine's objection to analyticity simply by appeal to stipulated definitions. For one thing, the vast majority of words in a natural language such as English don't have stipulated ...
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3 votes

Redefining the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction in Terms of Computational Complexity

It's very hard to understand what a connection between the analytic/synthetic distinction and computational complexity could mean. As an example objection to the idea: if you are saying that ...
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3 votes
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Is the existence of a thing an analytic proposition?

No, existence does not seem to me analytic. Your argument for the analyticity of existence relies on extraction from context, like this: a exists "in some sense" => a exists If this were a valid ...
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3 votes

Is Quine's epistemology really just a linguistic reinterpretation of Kant's?

Kant's epistemology: There are facts out there, but we can never access them directly, we can only perceive them the way they are presented to us by our own minds. No, this specific piece has no ...
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3 votes
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Kant's cleavage of knowledge

Both of the terms you're mentioning are odd ways of compressing down what is going on in Kant. Odd enough that I wasn't sure Kant had stated either of them in that way. "transcendental knowledge" is ...
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3 votes
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Why does it matter whether knowledge is synthetic or analytic?

The issue has a long and debated tradition in modern philosophy since Kant; see The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. Against it, see at least the position of Willard van Orman Quine and his famous ...
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3 votes

Is there any reason to believe that there are things which science cannot tell us?

If Quine is right there is no clear distinction between the linguistic and factual components of language, both are interrelated (caricatural example: if someone else utter a false sentence such as "...
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3 votes

If one agrees with Quine's dissolution of the Analytic/Synthetic distinction, what is left of Kant's epistemology?

Singling out Quine, in the context of Kant's synthetic apriori, seems to me out of place. There was nothing special about Quine's attitude towards Kant's synthetic apriori. Quine's specialty was his ...
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3 votes

Does this reformulation of the the analytic / synthetic distinction overcome Quine's objections?

Actually, the claim 'Dogs generally bark' is synthetic, not analytic. How would one ever know that they generally bark without hearing them bark, and frequently (for the 'generally' part). In fact, ...
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Two dogmas of empiricism - logical vs analytic truths... is there really a distinction?

To paraphrase your question, Quine allows himself to distinguish between 'logical particles' and other words. The logical particles (or constants) allow us to recognise sentences like "no unmarried ...
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3 votes

Is this definition a necessary or possible (contingent) truth?

My two cents: Even if "Pegasus" is rigid, why shouldn't there be a (mythological) world where this thing does not fly? So, it is flying contingently. Not sure, what you mean by definition, ...
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2 votes
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Kant - analytic/synthetic propositons

A proposition is analytic if true or false in virtue of its meaning only. The contradiction of an analytic truth is nonsense. Example: red is a colour. Bachelors are unmarried. It is synthetic if ...
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2 votes
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Is a posteriori analytic philosophy just science?

The term "analytic philosophy" comes from the logical empiricists who thought (with Wittgenstein) that philosophy is pure a-priori language analysis whereas science is about confronting claims to the ...
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2 votes
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Does 5 + 7 = 12 really say anything new?

You seem to have hit upon the paradox of analysis, or at least issues in the vicinity. The whole SEP article on Conceptions of Analysis in Analytic Philosophy is worth a read, but the section on G.E. ...
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Quine on Necessity

I. I do agree with Barcan and Kripke: if two things are actually one and the same, then they are necessarily one and the same. As far as my judgment can discern, this is just the statement that, for ...
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