10

A good paper to read on this subject is an old classic: Gilbert Ryle's Systematically Misleading Expressions. (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 32: 139-170 (1932). Also in his Collected Papers, vol 2.) Ryle's view is that ordinary non-philosophical use of language frequently contains "improper" usages, by which he means usages that, while having a ...


7

Science consists of empirically testable explanations about the world. So any idea that's not empirically testable is not science. For example, the idea that there is a real world as described by science is not empirically testable. If parts of the world stopped existing when you aren't interacting with it, but the rest of the world acted exactly as if it ...


7

Logicism's original goal certainly was not to diffuse Platonist impulses, although it was later adapted to that end, Frege was a devout Platonist. It was an epistemological reduction programme (aside from the more technical mathematical project): show that mathematics reduces to logic, which is more "secure" on any conception, and deal with the justificatory ...


7

When Kant tells us that in an analytic statement the predicate is contained in the subject, he intends a quite different sense of 'subject' from what you have in mind. 'A triangle has three sides and three internal angles' is analytic because having three sides and three internal angles - possessing these predicates - is inherent in the subject of the ...


6

The Logical Positivists did not accept synthetic a priori knowledge. They accepted only Hume's Fork, two kinds of knowledge, as you suggested in the question. Logical Positivism was not a single shared opinion, but a variety of opinions and arguments under a shared general approach. We can take A.J.Ayer's Language, Truth And Logic (1936) as one ...


6

He is not rejecting meaning; what he says is: My present suggestion is that it is nonsense, and the root of much nonsense, to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component in the truth of any individual statement. Taken collectively, science has its double dependence upon language and experience; but this duality is not significantly traceable ...


5

Analytic and synthetic judgements His definition is rather straight and it seems as if you correctly applied it: analytic essentially means 'already thought within the concept itself': Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies entirely outside the concept A, though to be sure it ...


4

Quine doesn't hold that statements don't mean anything (that indeed would be quite an extreme form of skepticism), but rather that the meaningfulness of statements should be considered not in isolation but only as a part of a broader theory or language. This is of course of Quine's holism. You can read more here.


4

Recall that to Kant since Aristotle "logic has not been able to advance a single step, and is thus to all appearance a closed and completed body of doctrine" (Critique of Pure Reason): no propositional variables, no connectives, no multi-place predicates, and no quantifiers. So Kant's notion of analytic is so impoverished that he would ...


4

If we stay with the definition of Analytic according to which : “Analytic” sentences are those whose truth seems to be knowable by knowing the meanings of the constituent words alone, unlike the more usual “synthetic” ones whose truth is knowable by both knowing the meaning of the words and something about the world, we have that from : 2+2=5 and the ...


4

The OP is very close to Quine's considered view of necessity, as e.g. in Pursuit of Truth: "In respect of utility there is less to be said for necessity than for the propositional attitudes. The expression does serve a purpose in daily discourse, but of a shallow sort. We modify a sentence with the adverb 'necessarily' when it is a sentence presumed ...


4

One cannot get around Quine's objection to analyticity simply by appeal to stipulated definitions. For one thing, the vast majority of words in a natural language such as English don't have stipulated definitions. Carnap is not a deity who hands down definitions on tablets of stone that we are obliged to use. Lexicographers do not stipulate definitions when ...


3

Kant's epistemology: There are facts out there, but we can never access them directly, we can only perceive them the way they are presented to us by our own minds. No, this specific piece has no special relation to Kant. It has been accepted by (almost) every western philosopher in the last 500 years, together with the rejection of the Aristotelian/...


3

No, existence does not seem to me analytic. Your argument for the analyticity of existence relies on extraction from context, like this: a exists "in some sense" => a exists If this were a valid inference, we would have also, by analogy: a doesn't exist "in some sense" => a doesn't exists Now, for any controversial object, e.g. Batman, there will be ...


3

It's very hard to understand what a connection between the analytic/synthetic distinction and computational complexity could mean. As an example objection to the idea: if you are saying that synthetic statements are somehow equivalent to an NP-complete question, how would you handle the statement: New Orleans is the largest city in Louisiana. What is NP-...


3

Both of the terms you're mentioning are odd ways of compressing down what is going on in Kant. Odd enough that I wasn't sure Kant had stated either of them in that way. "transcendental knowledge" is knowledge that is not of objects but rather about the apparatus of knowledge. In other words, for him, it is the metaphysics of knowing, i.e. it is knowing the ...


3

The issue has a long and debated tradition in modern philosophy since Kant; see The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. Against it, see at least the position of Willard van Orman Quine and his famous rejection of the distinction in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951). The distinction is related to : The problem of accounting for mathematical knowledge [...] one ...


3

If Quine is right there is no clear distinction between the linguistic and factual components of language, both are interrelated (caricatural example: if someone else utter a false sentence such as "this cat is blue", maybe he is wrong on the meaning, maybe on the facts, but you can never be sure). Quine emphasizes that no statement can be tested in ...


3

Singling out Quine, in the context of Kant's synthetic apriori, seems to me out of place. There was nothing special about Quine's attitude towards Kant's synthetic apriori. Quine's specialty was his criticism of the analytic apriori, and this in turn has no special relation to Kant. Kant's synthetic apriori had some following during the 19th century. But by ...


3

Actually, the claim 'Dogs generally bark' is synthetic, not analytic. How would one ever know that they generally bark without hearing them bark, and frequently (for the 'generally' part). In fact, how would one even have the concept of barking without first hearing barking, or that it is dogs that bark without hearing barking from dogs?


3

To paraphrase your question, Quine allows himself to distinguish between 'logical particles' and other words. The logical particles (or constants) allow us to recognise sentences like "no unmarried man is unmarried" as logical truths because we do not need to understand the meaning of 'unmarried' or 'man' to know they are true. They are true under all ...


2

A proposition is analytic if true or false in virtue of its meaning only. The contradiction of an analytic truth is nonsense. Example: red is a colour. Bachelors are unmarried. It is synthetic if true or false in virtue of the world. The contradiction of a synthetic truth is meaningful (albeit false). Example: human blood is red. John is a bachelor. It is ...


2

The term "analytic philosophy" comes from the logical empiricists who thought (with Wittgenstein) that philosophy is pure a-priori language analysis whereas science is about confronting claims to the world a-posteriori. Following this framework there is no such thing as "a posteriori analysis" because you need to be clear about what you mean before testing ...


2

You seem to have hit upon the paradox of analysis, or at least issues in the vicinity. The whole SEP article on Conceptions of Analysis in Analytic Philosophy is worth a read, but the section on G.E. Moore is particularly relevant. A little snippet: Consider an analysis of the form ‘A is C’, where A is the analysandum (what is analysed) and C the ...


2

I. I do agree with Barcan and Kripke: if two things are actually one and the same, then they are necessarily one and the same. As far as my judgment can discern, this is just the statement that, for all possible worlds or scenarios, x exists if and only if x exists. So when we say that "Hesperus is Phosphorus," or that "the morning star is the evening star,"...


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