16

This is quite a controversial issue, but before getting to whether the Turing test is legitimate or not, let me respond to the second part of your question. I mean, whatever the test maybe, the robot/ computer only understands machine code. Our brain only understands electrical/chemical signals. If we were to pass some text in Chinese to the computer, ...


15

Wittgenstein in his intermediate period provided a response, before the age of AI research and Searle's objections. In a nutshell: semantics is another syntax. Words only mean as role players in a linguistic calculus, and their meaning reduces to the collection of rules governing their use in the calculus. Of course, he was thinking of mathematics and ...


14

Your argument is of the following form: Premise 1: x hasn't happened yet. Premise 2: If x was possible, x would have happened by now. Conclusion: x isn't possible. Perfectly valid (it's just modus ponens). Premise 1 is obviously true in this case. But what about Premise 2? There are all sorts of obvious counterexamples of the same form: A manned mission ...


13

I'm very familiar with the argument John makes with his Chinese Room argument, and he's extremely consistent about what he means it to portray: that our concept of what it means to understand language is mistaken when we try to apply the term to any machine which operates only syntactically. It's primarily a refutation of the notion that a Turing Test is ...


9

For detailed discussions of the so-called Lucas-Penrose arguments, see : Torkel Franzén, Gödel's theorem : An incomplete guide to its use and abuse (2005), Ch.6 Gödel, Minds, and Computers, page 115-on and Francesco Berto, There's Something about Gödel : The Complete Guide to the Incompleteness Theorem (2009), Ch.11 Mind versus Computer: Gödel and ...


9

Will computers ever have consciousness? Depends on who you ask. 3 possible responses: Consciousness and the mind are non physical phenomena, and computers are physical systems so, no, computers can't be conscious since they lack the non-physical component. The idea that consciousness is non-physical is called (mind-body) Dualism. Consciousness is a ...


8

I can think of a few alternatives: One could argue for a case where a human mind grade AI is theoretically producible, but the universe lacks sufficient resources to do so. This would be a practicality argument, not a theoretical possibility argument. Idealism can claim strong-AI is impossible, without being dualistic. Not all finite sized physical ...


7

What you indicate is that the tome which allows John to simulate communication in Chinese is a rather tremendous computational resource: one which is very close in complexity — assuming that its rules are complex enough to successfully years of conversation in the same way that a Chinese essayist might — to simply conferring with a Chinese person. And I ...


7

This kind of misguided/soft/wrong/vague reasoning about Gödel's theorem is an example of what Franzen had in mind with his criticisms in the book Gödel's Theorem: An Incomplete Guide to Its Use and Abuse. See also Feferman's criticism of Penrose's similar arguments involving Gödel's theorem.


7

We can construct a computer that implements an inconsistent formal theory to which Gödel theorem does not apply just like we can construct a computer that implements Peano arithmetic. A simple example is Meyer's relevant arithmetic R# that allows some contradictions, but uses paraconsistent logic (without the law of explosion) to limit their effect. In R# ...


7

Intelligence is typically associated with "how" activities, such as problem solving. What makes Watson so interesting (particularly to potential IBM customers) is how it organizes large volumes of natural language information in a way that yields the "best" answer a remarkably large portion of the time. This is, of course, how we think of it in AI. I ...


7

Different schools of thought within the philosophy of mind would answer your question differently. I will try to describe the answer that each position implies, based on the information from the two links you provided. The various positions with regards to the mind-body problem are richer and more diverse than the 4 I describe below (In each case I refer you ...


7

The answers to your questions are not going to be completely settled because they rely on specific theories of philosophy of language and language's relation to philosophy of mind. One very interesting thing to note before any explanations, however, is that Wittgenstein himself did not believe that machines could think. Additionally, he believes thinking &...


7

To the question whether machines can generate ideas, I will say the answer is affirmative. If you define ideas operationally (like "I have an idea": i.e., solving problems and offering causal hypotheses), clearly machines can be said to generate ideas. Machines do not need specific algorithms or to be pre-programmed to generate this meaning of ideas. "Deep ...


6

Lovely! I was musing on the very same question. I believe it is the sheer complexity of our cognitive machinery, that gives us a much much greater degree of freedom than the chess program, but yes, I believe we are both similar and both have the agency that we call "free will". Hard determinism is very hard to escape, especially with matters of the mind, ...


6

I would argue that humans first have a "built in" sense of what's good and bad to themselves - in the form of passions and emotions. Pleasant and unpleasant feelings provide our basic set of motivations, especially in early childhood. Only later do we develop a capability for logical and abstract thinking, which is related to the ability to "reprogram" ...


6

The OP proposal is similar in spirit to the one in Farkas's paper Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge. His primary example is Otto, a guy with severe memory loss, who keeps all important information in a notebook which he carries with him at all times, and which "extends" his mind: "There are parts of knowledge that are too tedious to ...


6

Greek Distinction I think there have been several perhaps innumerable attempts to look at different modes of "knowing" in philosophy (here reading know as a larger category word for know, understand, comprehend, fathom). Obviously, the oldest one we have a substantial amount of writing from is Plato's account of knowledge in the idea of the Forms / ...


6

You seem to be misunderstanding compatibilsim. The compatibilist position isn't that robots can "freely choose to kill their masters", but instead that robots do have freewill even though they never disobey their masters. At the heart of the compatibilist position is a redefinition of the meaning of freewill, so that anyone who is acting according to their ...


6

What you describe is a typical runaway issue with a utilitarian ethics system. There's a few flaws: There's the assumption that we should be considering the happiness of future conscious entities, which gets difficult because we cannot be 100% certain what the future will bring. There's the assumption that, because living appears to bring happiness, that ...


6

Yes, he (correctly) means "a formal-symbol manipulating device". But "manipulation" needs a little clarification. The usual textbook formalism is given by the lambda calculus, e.g., https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lambda_calculus#Formal_definition (google "lambda calculus" for lots more). But electronic devices natively implement only a much simpler (...


6

John R. Searle is a non-theist who believes in biological naturalism. Wikipedia describes Searle's position as: Searle denies Cartesian dualism, the idea that the mind is a separate kind of substance to the body, as this contradicts our entire understanding of physics, and unlike Descartes, he does not bring God into the problem. Indeed, Searle denies any ...


5

Currently chess playing machines are absolutely goal directed, they only work towards a goal, be it to win, to not lose, or to a specified level of competence or resource use. Animals (including humans) are not. For instance, at the beginning of a chess game I may feel instilled with the goal to win, but if the house catches fire I'll drop that goal like a ...


5

There are preconditions that must be met in order to get an altruism algorithm to produce benefits that reward the storage of additional complexity in living organisms (leaving aside the rather thorny question of what counts as "life"). So although on our planet these preconditions are usually met, there is no logical reason why they must be so (e.g. in a ...


5

The majority of programmers aren't attempting to work themselves out of a job. The majority of programming jobs are not even in the AI field. You could make a similar parallel between ancient Egypt and visiting the moon: "If all these centuries of humans haven't figured out how to fly yet, does that mean visiting the moon is impossible?" Technology builds ...


5

It really depends on how we achieve such a mind. Lets say we do it by fully simulating the human brain and all its biochemistry, then yes, I think it would have emotion. However, John Searle, who doesn't think we can make concious machines, would say even if we simulate the mind, its not a real conciousness. Its no different from running any other kind of ...


5

Your question raises interesting ideas in the the areas of free will as well as the nature of consciousness. We might begin by assuming that humans have free will, as many philosophers do. It seems, after all, we are able to make choices, to "vary ourselves in some way without any externally sourced instructions". You seem to recognize that free will in a ...


5

To complete Cort Amon's answer, I would say that there is a difference between reproducing physical phenomena and computing them. Even if all physical systems can be reproduced using some physical material (say you reproduce the structure of a living cell from similar molecular components), that doesn't mean you can compute them. You only make physical ...


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