15

Wittgenstein in his intermediate period provided a response, before the age of AI research and Searle's objections. In a nutshell: semantics is another syntax. Words only mean as role players in a linguistic calculus, and their meaning reduces to the collection of rules governing their use in the calculus. Of course, he was thinking of mathematics and ...


14

Your argument is of the following form: Premise 1: x hasn't happened yet. Premise 2: If x was possible, x would have happened by now. Conclusion: x isn't possible. Perfectly valid (it's just modus ponens). Premise 1 is obviously true in this case. But what about Premise 2? There are all sorts of obvious counterexamples of the same form: A manned mission ...


9

For detailed discussions of the so-called Lucas-Penrose arguments, see : Torkel Franzén, Gödel's theorem : An incomplete guide to its use and abuse (2005), Ch.6 Gödel, Minds, and Computers, page 115-on and Francesco Berto, There's Something about Gödel : The Complete Guide to the Incompleteness Theorem (2009), Ch.11 Mind versus Computer: Gödel and ...


9

Will computers ever have consciousness? Depends on who you ask. 3 possible responses: Consciousness and the mind are non physical phenomena, and computers are physical systems so, no, computers can't be conscious since they lack the non-physical component. The idea that consciousness is non-physical is called (mind-body) Dualism. Consciousness is a ...


8

I can think of a few alternatives: One could argue for a case where a human mind grade AI is theoretically producible, but the universe lacks sufficient resources to do so. This would be a practicality argument, not a theoretical possibility argument. Idealism can claim strong-AI is impossible, without being dualistic. Not all finite sized physical ...


8

We can construct a computer that implements an inconsistent formal theory to which Gödel theorem does not apply just like we can construct a computer that implements Peano arithmetic. A simple example is Meyer's relevant arithmetic R# that allows some contradictions, but uses paraconsistent logic (without the law of explosion) to limit their effect. In R# ...


7

This kind of misguided/soft/wrong/vague reasoning about Gödel's theorem is an example of what Franzen had in mind with his criticisms in the book Gödel's Theorem: An Incomplete Guide to Its Use and Abuse. See also Feferman's criticism of Penrose's similar arguments involving Gödel's theorem.


7

Intelligence is typically associated with "how" activities, such as problem solving. What makes Watson so interesting (particularly to potential IBM customers) is how it organizes large volumes of natural language information in a way that yields the "best" answer a remarkably large portion of the time. This is, of course, how we think of it in AI. I ...


7

Different schools of thought within the philosophy of mind would answer your question differently. I will try to describe the answer that each position implies, based on the information from the two links you provided. The various positions with regards to the mind-body problem are richer and more diverse than the 4 I describe below (In each case I refer you ...


7

The answers to your questions are not going to be completely settled because they rely on specific theories of philosophy of language and language's relation to philosophy of mind. One very interesting thing to note before any explanations, however, is that Wittgenstein himself did not believe that machines could think. Additionally, he believes thinking &...


7

To the question whether machines can generate ideas, I will say the answer is affirmative. If you define ideas operationally (like "I have an idea": i.e., solving problems and offering causal hypotheses), clearly machines can be said to generate ideas. Machines do not need specific algorithms or to be pre-programmed to generate this meaning of ideas. "Deep ...


6

I would argue that humans first have a "built in" sense of what's good and bad to themselves - in the form of passions and emotions. Pleasant and unpleasant feelings provide our basic set of motivations, especially in early childhood. Only later do we develop a capability for logical and abstract thinking, which is related to the ability to "reprogram" ...


6

The OP proposal is similar in spirit to the one in Farkas's paper Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge. His primary example is Otto, a guy with severe memory loss, who keeps all important information in a notebook which he carries with him at all times, and which "extends" his mind: "There are parts of knowledge that are too tedious to ...


6

Greek Distinction I think there have been several perhaps innumerable attempts to look at different modes of "knowing" in philosophy (here reading know as a larger category word for know, understand, comprehend, fathom). Obviously, the oldest one we have a substantial amount of writing from is Plato's account of knowledge in the idea of the Forms / ...


6

You seem to be misunderstanding compatibilsim. The compatibilist position isn't that robots can "freely choose to kill their masters", but instead that robots do have freewill even though they never disobey their masters. At the heart of the compatibilist position is a redefinition of the meaning of freewill, so that anyone who is acting according to their ...


6

What you describe is a typical runaway issue with a utilitarian ethics system. There's a few flaws: There's the assumption that we should be considering the happiness of future conscious entities, which gets difficult because we cannot be 100% certain what the future will bring. There's the assumption that, because living appears to bring happiness, that ...


6

John R. Searle is a non-theist who believes in biological naturalism. Wikipedia describes Searle's position as: Searle denies Cartesian dualism, the idea that the mind is a separate kind of substance to the body, as this contradicts our entire understanding of physics, and unlike Descartes, he does not bring God into the problem. Indeed, Searle denies any ...


5

There are preconditions that must be met in order to get an altruism algorithm to produce benefits that reward the storage of additional complexity in living organisms (leaving aside the rather thorny question of what counts as "life"). So although on our planet these preconditions are usually met, there is no logical reason why they must be so (e.g. in a ...


5

The majority of programmers aren't attempting to work themselves out of a job. The majority of programming jobs are not even in the AI field. You could make a similar parallel between ancient Egypt and visiting the moon: "If all these centuries of humans haven't figured out how to fly yet, does that mean visiting the moon is impossible?" Technology builds ...


5

It really depends on how we achieve such a mind. Lets say we do it by fully simulating the human brain and all its biochemistry, then yes, I think it would have emotion. However, John Searle, who doesn't think we can make concious machines, would say even if we simulate the mind, its not a real conciousness. Its no different from running any other kind of ...


5

Your question raises interesting ideas in the the areas of free will as well as the nature of consciousness. We might begin by assuming that humans have free will, as many philosophers do. It seems, after all, we are able to make choices, to "vary ourselves in some way without any externally sourced instructions". You seem to recognize that free will in a ...


5

To complete Cort Amon's answer, I would say that there is a difference between reproducing physical phenomena and computing them. Even if all physical systems can be reproduced using some physical material (say you reproduce the structure of a living cell from similar molecular components), that doesn't mean you can compute them. You only make physical ...


5

Much of Gödel, Escher, Bach concerns the limitations of formal systems, the inherent difficulty of determining the locus of meaning, and the emergence of complex behaviours from simple components. In Chapter XV, anti-mechanical arguments for human intelligence based on Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem are rejected, on the basis that humans are not ...


5

The words "knowledge" and "understanding" are very difficult in the English language. I've even found contrasting documents: one that uses them one way, and one that uses them in almost the exact same way but swapping their meanings! Accordingly, I recommend questioning the author's intent of the words when you see them. To the best of my knowledge (see ...


5

I would like to suggest that your puzzlement arises from confusing intelligence and consciousness. Neither concept is well defined but nonetheless they are distinct. Searle would say that a Chinese room cannot be conscious, not that it cannot appear to be intelligent. In fact the original argument revolves around the concept of understanding which is another ...


5

They can easily separate two types of photos because they employ approaches explicitly inspired by our brain function, in other words they repeat, in a simplified form, what we originally did in making such classifications. Does it mean that the pattern is "mind-independently" there? The answer depends on one's philosophical preferences, and there is a ...


5

Searle isn't suggesting that he can't learn to understand Chinese. He's asserting that, just because a computer can answer questions like a human, does not mean that the computer understands language. In his thought experiment, he's just like a computer when it comes to Chinese because he doesn't understand it. You shouldn't get hung up on it being Chinese ...


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