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But how is it, and by what art, that the soul reads that such and such images signify such and such objects? Did we learn such an Alphabet in embryonic state? Then how is it that we are not aware of such inborn knowledge? And thus we attribute to some secret deductions that by variety of symbols we can spell out figures, distances, magnitudes, colours, and ...


4

For your first question, it seems like you're still trying to codify, standardize or otherwise pin down the process of achieving the Dao, which is against the spirit of the sources you're quoting. Therefore I read you as an outsider studying the Dao from an external context, rather than as a student of the Dao yourself. From that point of view, your claim ...


3

It's quite the other way round. Our habitual reactions are mechanical ie "robotic" and contribute a background din which actually dilutes and degrades the freshness of the experience I take the farmer to be (represent) an enlightened being speaking to unenlightened folk. His laconic responses invite the others to a wider perspective The deeper point of ...


3

As a mere psychological occurrence, an emotion cannot be right or wrong. Hume caught this point when he observed that as 'original existences', mere psychological states or happenings, emotions (or 'passions' as he called them) are not 'representative' - reportive or descriptive - of any state of affairs and therefore cannot be true or false, right or wrong. ...


2

Linguistic relativity Popular known as the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis. It has two versions: The strong version says that language determines thought and that linguistic categories limit and determine cognitive categories. The weak version says that linguistic categories and usage only influence thought and decisions.


2

If we interpret 'following logic' in the mathematical sense, i.e reasoning correctly step-by-step beginning with axioms and arriving at conclusions, then it is still possible to be biased: The bias may be built into the axioms. This is particularly pernicious as of course it is not possible to fix the axioms by purely logical reasoning (where would one ...


2

If we look at the title of the question, which is a surprisingly accurate summary of the body: Does following logic necessarily require one to conclude that they are objective and have no bias? we see that we're looking for the truth value of the proposition one follows logic => one is objective && ~(one has bias) It seems at this point that ...


2

According to Wikipedia: In classical logic, a contradiction consists of a logical incompatibility between two or more propositions. Also according to Wikipedia, tacit knowledge does not involve propositions. Tacit knowledge (as opposed to formal, codified or explicit knowledge) is the kind of knowledge that is difficult to transfer to another person ...


2

Short Answer But can emotions be “right” or “wrong”? Yes, depending on one's metaphysics. Long Answer In Catholic theology, the venial and mortal sins specifically list emotions that are both wrong and forbidden. Indeed, a case can be made that 'lust' is arguably the most religiously regulated emotional impulse. While not recognized as emotions in the same ...


2

Reason is, very roughly, concerned with the search for knowledge, mainly intellectual knowledge in reason's most developed stages. Emotion is aligned to reason as when, for example, we act against what reason prescribes ethically and feel ashamed. Then there are the appetites, the ragbag of largely physically-based desires for food, money, sex, drink, and ...


2

Devitt summarizes and defends his claims here. He makes the following distinctions: Distinguish the theory of a [linguistic] competence from the theory of its outputs/products or inputs. Distinguish the structure rules governing the outputs of a [linguistic] competence from the processing rules governing the exercise of the competence. Distinguish the ...


1

In the chess context it is instructive to read about the computational methods, especially weighted tree searches, and evolutionary algorithms. Convolutional neural networks are a powerful tool which seem to mimic methods found in brains. They have a kind of hierarchic structure, say used in vision a layer might be scanning for lines, then pass up ...


1

This seems a reasonable and convincing argument. However, saying that knowledge is hard in the case of chess seems not quite the situation. It don't believe that any one human being could imagine all possible games. We might want to argue that this is at least possible in principle in the precise sense that we know all the rules of the game. But this is ...


1

The problem is the final goal. Good and bad (right and wrong) depend on the goal. If I want to die, poison is good. If I want to continue living, poison is bad. In case of considering that our ultimate goal is survival (not only existence, this instant, but also persistence in the long term, that is, to exist forever) (some consider it debatable), any good ...


1

The reason that Virtue Ethicists do not consider the experimental results to be refutations is because they do not actually test virtue ethics. Virtue ethics does not predict that virtuous people will always behave virtuously, but that virtuous character habits increase the frequency of virtuous actions from the virtuous person. That people are more likely ...


1

It is a sensible point to argue that valid moral theorizing is constrained by empirical findings, though to what extent I do not know. Surely normative claims hold against empirical shortcomings, but they become invalid upon demanding the impossible. Virtue ethics would not seem to be in denial, then, as the reported findings ('weak character', 'no character'...


1

I will try to answer just the first question. I think that, just as in buddhism we can speak of a faith-follower, we may speak of a unconscious/involuntary Dao follower that just follows what somebody else says, but not fully comprehending the implications or reasons behind that prescriptive or normative knowledge. For example, some christians may just ...


1

The text is from Chapter 5 of Joseph Glanvill's Scepsis Scientifica: Or, Confest Ignorance, the Way to Science; in an Essay of the Vanity of Dogmatizing, and Confident Opinion. The subtitle of that chapter reads: "We can give no account of the manner of Sensation." It is to this form of ignorance that Glanvill will turn his attention. Here is the text ...


1

As I mentioned earlier in the comments. You don't need to name your fear. You don't need to name it to recognise it and you don't need to name your fear to overcome it. There are many different fears with names such as arachnophobia or agoraphobia but from personal experience and from what I have learnt through formal training is that you don’t ...


1

I think that one problem you are observing is the conflict between Eastern thinking and Western thinking. The way I see it, Western thinking was established in Ancient Greece with the writings of Aristotle and Plato, which were carried into the governing principles of the Roman Empire. Western thinking was recrystallized many years later by Descartes, who ...


1

Just as in religion there is a leap of faith then in science there is a leap of understanding. The essential notion that physical theory relies upon is that of a universal order; given that understanding, induction are merely attempts to work out the nature, detail and relationships of this universal order.


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Pierre Duhem, in his Aim & Structure of Physical Theory pt. 2 ch. 3 "Mathematical Deduction & Physical Theory" is worth reading. §3 gives "an example of a mathematical deduction that can never be utilized" in a physical theory, which is quoted in ch. 5 of the free Chaos film.* In other words: There are mathematical deductions that do not correspond ...


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