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13

These are all terms that one frequently reads in texts on Cognitive Science. I will try to find some exemplary definitions: Consciousness: Many philosophers have argued that consciousness is a unitary concept that is understood intuitively by the majority of people in spite of the difficulty in defining it. Others, though, have argued that the level of ...


9

Assuming this can be made sense of, not only is it possible, there is no conceivable way to prove otherwise at the moment, although pragmatic arguments can be given along the lines of Harding. One reason has to do with a problem called indeterminacy of translation, which applies not just to colors, but to any private "meanings" or "qualia". The meaning of ...


7

In short, Kant's answer is that 'causality' isn't, contra Hume, merely constant perceived conjunction. If this is the case, then the problem of induction applies and it is not possible to infer that there is a necessary connection between a cause and its effect. Instead, Kant argues that causality is an a priori concept of the faculty of understanding. ...


5

True. Wittgenstein's argument against a private language (simpler wiki version) is relevant: without an external reference which establishes the meaning of signs (words), one does not have a 'language'. This external reference must be external to at least two people in order for actual communication to happen. The issue's significance can be seen by ...


5

If you mean do actual human languages reflect Nature and its laws, yes, of course! As one of very many examples, that we have names for objects reflects laws of nature (mostly electrostatics, in the context of available elements on the surface of the Earth). If you mean is it impossible to create a language utterable by humans that is independent of laws ...


5

John Searle wrote a lot about "problematic features" of mind. His favourites are consciousness intentionality subjectivity causality You can read about that e.g. in Mind, Brains and Science. I'll try and give a shot summary as well as my personal two cents. Searle is trying to get rid of the evil dualism introduced by Descartes that has been haunting ...


5

There has been a vast literature critiquing Searle's viewpoints, enough to be collected, e.g., John Searle and His Critics. Ernest Lepore and Robert Van Gulick, eds.; 1991. (Wiley link) There are also collected criticisms of his Chinese Room Argument; see the excellent Wikipedia article, and this collection: Views into the Chinese Room: New essays on ...


4

What are the arguments that speak against that the mind or human consciousness emerged from the properties of the underlying systems? There are arguments based in the explanatory gap of our incomplete understanding of how consciousness might depend upon a nonconscious substrate, especially a physical substrate. And there are arguments based in the ...


4

Your question raises interesting ideas in the the areas of free will as well as the nature of consciousness. We might begin by assuming that humans have free will, as many philosophers do. It seems, after all, we are able to make choices, to "vary ourselves in some way without any externally sourced instructions". You seem to recognize that free will in a ...


4

The scenario you describe is sometimes referred to as the inverted spectrum problem. One method of seeing if it is possible has been explored by C.L. Hardin and Austin Clark. Their method notes that any particular colour can be given a detailed description in terms of its relation to other colours. When these relations are made explicit, they form an ...


4

Just a few. For continuous identity, "Ship of Theseus" paradox; for consciousness and identity, Donald Davidson's "Swamp Man Argument;" for scientific perspective on teleporting, Vlatko Vedral "Decoding Reality" and related papers. There is undoubtedly much, much more and there is just as undoubtedly no settled agreement on any of it.


4

I would say this is similar to what is sometimes called "argument to moderation". The most common cases of this take the form of arguing that some position is plausible because it lies between two others that are more extreme. It appeals to our willingness to seek a compromise in order to resolve a disputed claim, but it is not of itself a cogent argument ...


4

First note that the phrase "selfish gene" is just a metaphor for the gene-centered view of evolution. The "selfish gene" view is not a pop culture scientific explanation (and definitely not Sci-Fi) at all. It is a view that attempts to explain the facts of evolutionary biology (it has other proponents in the field beside Dawkins, and it actually makes a lot ...


3

The halting problem says nothing directly about minds. It says something about recursive sets and recursively enumerable sets. A recursively enumerable set is a set of integers that can be generated (enumerated) by a Turing machine. (We can create a Turing machine that will print each member of the set on its tape.) Turing's theorem is: given any ...


3

I found it. It was Clark paraphrasing him, in (at least) two articles: Magic Words: How Language Augments Human Computation (1998): http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/people/clark/pubs/magic.pdf Linguistic Anchors in the Sea of Thought (1996): http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/people/clark/pubs/linguist.pdf As Rex Kerr suggested, it was indeed from Consciousness ...


3

I think his main point in the interview in question is that the "decision" to pick up the cup isn't really the sort of free will most people mean or care about. It's kind of a straw man version where showing certain trivial reflex like actions don't require the sort of reflection that is necessary for some version of rational free will. The point he's ...


3

Kim's book is very good. There are other general intros to the mind/body problem like Jaworski or Heil. At some point you'd want to read some of the primary sources. This collection, also by Heil contains many seminal papers. The "contemporary debates" series is good for cutting edge discussion, but tends to be quite advanced.


3

In philosophy of mind, a starting point for discussing the difference between the mental and the physical is the fact that one's own mental states are infallible, self-intimating, and immediate. This provides mental states with a privileged epistemic status compared to other objects in the world. Presumably in the situation you are discussing, this ...


3

I'm not sure what the name of the fallacy is but as I suggested in my comment that's not very important. What you're describing is in the family of "non-sequitur" or "red herring" fallacies. Formalized, they have the structure: A B ... Ergo, Q. (where Q does not appear in the argument). The psychological feature might overlap with some aspects of ...


3

I concur with Eliran H, so I'll answer mostly the second part of the question. First, I don't understand the pairing of Dawkins' "selfish gene" and Dennett's "consciousness explained". I am not aware of any collaboration between the two on either of these works. I know they did not coauthor the books, but I'm talking about collaboration for the concepts ...


3

One should begin by asking insight into what? For example, there is such a thing as mathematical and physical insight. The disciplines aligned with this - mathematics and physics - have come up with many pedagogical devices to help train intuition in such a way that the possibility of insight becomes developed. So on this reading insight is indeed ...


3

If you reduce your statement to the known facts, of course there is nothing wrong with the statement. "I saw something in the sky on three separate occasions." "The thing or things was alive / mechanistic / inert and personal / impersonal." "I did not know what the thing or things was / I did know what the thing or things was." "The thing behaved in a ...


2

Most words are ambiguous. "Realize" is no exception. Merriam-Webster suggests the definition "to understand or become aware of [something]", which I think is the sense that you use the word in several of your examples, Themis. To become aware of something in the real world, you have to observe it. So realizing that the mountain is far away is based on ...


2

It's hard to talk specifically about consciousness, given that we still lack a widely-accepted definition of what it even is, as far as I know. That aside, the question can be rephrased to a more general form: assuming pure materialism (i.e. consciousness arises from some material interactions in the brain/neocortex), how can complex high-level phenomena ...


2

The Mandelbrot Set can be generated with less than 225 lines of code but is infinitely complex --and fractal geometry is deeply embedded in all biology. Is the complexity just an artifact of the millions of reiterations of the algorithm or does its emergence tell us something fundamental about the nature of the world we live in? Similarly, is the complexity ...


2

There's no question it is a highly sophisticated piece of information for besides the schematic plan it necessarily must also contain the bio-program which executes the plan and builds the 10 trillion or so specialized cells in the right place, amount, etc. it must also do some import/export of materials, processing/assembly of materials, etc. etc. ...


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