10

I tend to share your puzzlement. A lot of contemporary metaphysicians seem to have an outdated view of physics, not only about determinism but also about locality or mereology. (This was criticized by Ladyman and Ross in "everything must go".) I think the main reasons are the following: Generally, philosophers are not trained in physics (except ...


6

Note: Whether this is actually an answer as opposed to an extended comment is debatable. I write it not as an answer (because I don't actually believe your question has an answer), but as "the closest one can get" to an answer. At any rate, I've turned it into a community wiki so I don't get reputation for it. The crossroad you have come to is common, and ...


6

Lovely! I was musing on the very same question. I believe it is the sheer complexity of our cognitive machinery, that gives us a much much greater degree of freedom than the chess program, but yes, I believe we are both similar and both have the agency that we call "free will". Hard determinism is very hard to escape, especially with matters of the mind, ...


5

Currently chess playing machines are absolutely goal directed, they only work towards a goal, be it to win, to not lose, or to a specified level of competence or resource use. Animals (including humans) are not. For instance, at the beginning of a chess game I may feel instilled with the goal to win, but if the house catches fire I'll drop that goal like a ...


4

Hume's definition of liberty (=freedom) is close to your second formulation: By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is ...


4

The computer makes decisions that give it the highest probability of winning, with an element of randomness throw in by its maker to make the game more interesting. A human, however, could intentionally lose or attempt to create a stalemate. The computer cannot until a human tells it how to. In short, I would say that it appears to make decisions, but has ...


3

There is possible kind of compatibilism where chess program still doesn't have free will. If we take 'free will' phenomenologically, as mental phenomenon, will it depend on reason? Yes. Otherwise it would be foolish or random action. So even this, perfect free will is determined by reason. And the reason is determined by logic and circumstances. Note, that ...


3

First off, I would like to apologize in advance if my English is not good enough since I am not a native speaker. Please excuse me. Now, regarding your question, Now, I believed Hume's definition for being free, to be that if you are doing what you want to do, you are free. However, I am doubting whether it's not that being free means that you are ...


2

Clearly the person in (6) is not moving because of their own motivation, while the person (1) is not. But the cases in the middle show that the boundary between what constitutes one's own motivations and what doesn't is arbitrary. A compatibilist would argue that the person is always moving or not moving according to their own motivations in each of your ...


2

First, the problem of free will is like a good infinite puzzle — for every good argument one can find, someone else may come up with a wonderful counter argument — and therefore what I write below is naturally arguable. The problem of free will is tightly linked with that of moral responsibility, in the context of living in a society. and this link can be ...


2

In some sub-disciplines of philosophy, a distinction is drawn between free will and autonomy. Free will refers to things a person willfully elects but autonomy refers to things that reflect both rationality and choice. This distinction partially echoes a distinction we find in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics about the difference between actions we will to do ...


2

Compatibilism maintains (roughly): If you could choose differently, then you would act differently (thus keeping some notion of "free will") You cannot, however, choose differently (thus keeping with deterministic physics) Therefore, we can view free will as being "compatible" with "hard" determinism. To use the same quote of Blackburn's, but highlighting ...


2

Compatibilism does not maintain that free will is the only mechanism of “choosing a specific option”. free will, whatever it means, doesn't seem to directly have connotations of complexity or intelligence beyond a basic decision taking capability A radioactive nucleus may decay every moment. It has two choices - to decay or not to decay, evaluates ...


2

Three considerations, First, "compatibalist" and "incompatibalist" are generally labels we apply -- based on the properties you describe rather than being themselves the features that cause claims that "freedom" under some definition is either compatible or incompatible with some other feature of the universe. (if memory serves, you can be an ...


2

The answer to this depends on your definition of "free will." Compatabalism does not define this, other than to state that it can indeed be compatible with the results of a purely physical world. It is up to the compatabalist to dig further. One up-and-coming definition comes from the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness (IIT). It defines ...


2

Sure. Compatibilism is not that hard to understand if you just start from the basic idea that compatibilists use the term "free will" to mean a different thing than--I think--you are using it. When they say "free will" they mean a person took a voluntary action and was not forced to do that action by anything outside of their normal brain operations that ...


2

Materialism and determinism are indeed, I think, closely linked, in the following way: The main attraction of materialism is the ability of material theories to causally explain vast areas of phenomena. An adequate causal explanation by a material theory implies an instance of determinism. Because it consists in a phenomenon completely derived from material ...


2

Being lame and restricted to chair shows that the person is not free to act. But in general, the person is free in her will and decisions like a non lame person. One has to discriminate between free action and free will. The hard problem is the problem of free will. Libertarian view, determinism, and compatibilism refer to the problem of free will. Hence ...


2

If I take the following definition as canonical, the answer is clear: This article [...] considers various strategies by which critics of [Frankfurt-type] examples have tried to rescue the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), or variations of it, and also considers various responses to these critics. It notes that moral responsibility does ...


1

I think the issue you are arriving at is the assumption that freewill must inherently be absolute. If you are incapable of doing a single thing, you are immediately not free. A man in shackles clearly has limited ability to will the movement of his body. A man standing in front of a mountain has limited ability to will the mountain to move aside so that ...


1

If free will is understood as the ability to choose, then free will is perfectly compatible with physics. Quantum mechanics tells us that you should imagine the interplay between you and an external system as a tree of possibilities: the branches are representing the measure-free evolution of this external system (which is deterministic), while the nodes ...


1

This capacity is contained by our body, since we want to exclude any influence from outside this system. This isn't entirely correct. For free will as we think of it to be viable, we must allow for external influences. If the guy at the counter offers me vanilla or chocolate, I must appeal to my mastery of the English language to comprehend his offerings; ...


1

Here I must respectfully disagree with the root of the claim. Given a God that observes what will be does not inherently remove any element of free will and I can't see how the belief that it does so arose. In fact we have a stronger claim in the other direction. The chess grand-master may well brag that he shall checkmate the novice chess player's king ...


1

The difference mostly has to do with rewards and punishments and how we define freewill. With hard determinism, a person who is guilty of a particular law ought to be disiplined. It is the hope that this chastisement (Greek: kolasis, in case you're interested) will cause their underlying behavior to be corrected. If a person does good, they ought to be ...


1

I don't think there is a difference in the "universe" as you phrase it in your question. Compatibilism, as I see it, is more of an attempt to show how free will could (seem to) exist in a deterministic universe, than an attempt to describe a different universe to that of the hard determinists.


1

I consider the view of the first person (the subjective view) to hold the libertarian position and the view of the third person (the objective view) to hold the determinist position. The compatibilist position is the view of most neuroscientists. They strive to resolve the opposites between both other views: To keep the subjective view, but to explain it by ...


1

"Why is libertarian materialism so unpopular?" It is because it seems "subjective". If one looks at the difficulties involved in a serious-minded manner, one sees that almost no one who speaks about the issue has a proper sense of what they are talking about. It's simply an irrational bias which sides this way or that way. The fact that mathematical ...


1

Determinism is derived almost directly from assuming causation. Free will is derived from experienced phenomenology. The free will experience contradicts the theory of causation, just as with consciousness and reductionism. When one prioritizes theory over experience, one will arrive at reductionist materialism, and determinism. When one prioritizes ...


1

If one takes compatibilism to mean “both natural determinism and free will are true” then this can be falsified by noting empirical evidence against the assertion of natural determinism. This evidence has two main sources. (1) Observe the indeterminism in quantum theory. (2) Observe the empirical evidence of common sense when we assert responsibility for ...


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