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Dennett doesn't generally speak in the mode of a scientist or philosopher, despite various suggestions he's both. Dennett speaks in the mode of a theologian, but from a secular-materialist perspective. In other words, he does not demonstrate his points the way a scientist would, and he does not reason his way to a conclusion the way a philosopher would. ...


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Short answer: Because no one did successfully, as of yet. And because Dennett's view is counterintuitive; very far from common-sense. A little longer answer: Daniel Dennett thinks that when you are experiencing the qualia of the colour red, what really happens is something else. The experience of qualia is merely an illusion. Namely, what really happens is ...


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There are two distinct perspectives or point of view on consciousness. The first we acquire as we grow up is the objective perspective. We can see people being either awake and therefore, by definition, conscious, or asleep, and therefore by definition, unconscious. In the objective perspective, people are conscious if they are responsive to their ...


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There are several reasons why Dennett's "Explanation" of consciousness is not accepted as definitive: Dennett did not construct "Consciousness Explained" as a classical reasoning argument, with precepts, justifications, and rebuttals of counterarguments. He instead constructed it mostly as a set of intuition pumps. His objective, as he ...


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I think you are misunderstanding Eternalism, which to my eyes is essentially just another way of thinking about a deterministic universe. If the universe is deterministic, there is nothing special about the present. The present is simply the state of the universe at time t and no more or less real than the state at time t+1 or t-1 No reincarnation or ...


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There is no stasis (not even the idea of stasis) without movement, and vice versa. A circulating moving spotlight of a fixed context is thus one at least coherent depiction of an eternalistic universe. What else would categorize such a universe, as gleamed by Hinton, Mach, Planck, Einstein and William James, and succinctly codified by Lawrence LeShan, can ...


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The problem with the chinese room argument is that the man only receives input from a single source, the message where as semantic understanding requires that the message be associated with other inputs. So almost by definition the room cant have semantic understanding. However, if you added extra inputs say time of day, weather and memory the man might soon ...


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Searle's argument was framed in times when we only had Symbolic AI which is built on rule-based logic. This sort of system is inflexible and non-dynamic. It works statically through proof-theoretic systems and/or truth tables. Every extension and addition of rules need to be implemented manually by hand. One of the examples of a Symbolic logic environment ...


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It's not impossible for an AI to have semantic understanding at all. All semantics is preceded by a strict syntax, of sorts, but instead of such an AI "reading" the input, it is the input. If I prick your finger and your body has learned to react, has it not understood the semantics of the event? Because such an event is associated with pain or ...


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A machine could conceivably have its own semantic. This would only require that it had its own internal representation of the world. However, what would be the use of that? Each human obviously has his or her own private mental representation of the world. However, despite this, we do share most of it and this simply because we are essentially biologically ...


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I think the simplest way to explain it: syntax can be parsed computationally, yet computation can be abstracted to ridiculous or "funny" instantiations. Since we don't know how mental states (e.g. semantic understanding, consciousness, awareness, etc) arise from the physical--"the unfathomable gap between physical process and subjective ...


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tl;dr– The Chinese room argument is a pure silliness, on-par with flat-Earth theory. Without having done a formal survey, it's my general understanding that those in the field largely disregard it as an anti-intellectual position. The "Chinese room argument" is pure silliness. Searle's argument is basically: Assume that AI are mindless machines....


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The Chinese Chinese Room The main problem with the Chinese Room argument is that it presupposes a massive, massive thing: an algorithm which provides "Chinese language responses". We are just supposed to accept this black box without question so we can focus on the "real issues" in the debate. But we can utterly destroy the Chinese Room ...


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TL:DR; If we view brains as computing machines (which, for all we know, they are), there is no basis for Searle's claim. According to the Church-Turing thesis, which is a very respected result in computer science, there is no computation that cannot be performed by an ordinary computer. You can view it as a challenge: show me a solvable problem that cannot ...


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What is consciousness ? In simplified terms, if you have an AI machine (no matter how complex it is ), it could be described by three things : state of the machine (both internal and external) S , input into machine I , and output O . Output would be a function of input and state O=f(I,S) , and any randomness would be modeled trough state (pseudo-randomness)...


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There is a blatant problem with Searle’s argument and it’s quite hard to understand why it hasn’t been pointed out before: None of Mr. Searle’s brain cells understands English, yet he claims that he can? What argument can he make that an AI can’t reverse and throw right into his face?


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Another argument I’ve seen against the experiment is that “together with a book of instructions for manipulating the symbols (the program),” capable of interpreting Mandarin like a native speaker, could not in fact exist. Natural human languages don’t work that way, and there are an infinite number of possible sentences in Chinese. Even if you somehow did ...


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I find it odd that his main argument for why programs could not think was that because programs could only follow syntax rules but could not associate any understanding or semantics to words( or any object/symbol). That was more his conclusion than his argument. His actual argument about the Chinese Room thought-experiment was that if the room was occupied ...


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Short Answer There's a number of positions outlined in your SEP link to Searle's Room that make clear that philosophy has not decided by consensus one way or another the question of human and semantic understanding. The history of AI is an ongoing debate, in fact, about the question. A great introduction into that history is Nils Nilsson's The Quest for ...


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As I see it, Searle is getting at the point that syntax is algorithmic — a system driven by predefined rules and procedures — but semantics is (as far as we can tell) not. In other words, it's easy enough to create and recognize a syntactically well-formed sentence on purely procedural grounds, but judging the meaningfulness of a sentence requires something ...


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Let us call a comprehending agent a thinking being possessing "semantic understanding" of the meaning of words arranged propositionally. Suppose now there is in the input stream of a comprehending agent a word which the agent hasn't encountered before. Now when a translation machine for instance may encounter an "original" or nonsense ...


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