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In a nutshell, Anscombe considers utilitarianism to take account, in respect of consequences, solely of the actual consequences of actions. In contrast, consequentialism - a term which she introduced - determines what one should do solely by reference to the foreseen consequences of actions. The distinction is well brought out in the following extract of ...


4

I don't see a path all the way out, but there's a lot more to do to define which bits of what we call ethics can be put on solid objective footing and which bits are matters of style (where anything may work, or where any of a number of different schemes may work). Studies of innate morality and evolution of morality are particularly interesting in this ...


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This is an interesting question (or cluster of related questions), because it highlights the complexity of understanding both what ethics is and how different approaches to ethics "work." First off, there aren't really "three branches of ethics". There's three main ways that some people have categorized approaches to ethics -- but it's not clear these are ...


3

This may superficially seem like a question of ethics --a moral commitment against racism as opposed to the practical value of profiling --but I think that both overstates the practicality of profiling, and understates the practical value of minimizing racial biases. If the suspects --or the guitars! --were arguments, what you are talking about would be the ...


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There is an article by Marcia Baron in which she rejects the view that 'consequentialism, virtue ethics, and Kantian ethics form three distinct and competing ethical theories'. While this does not imply that they are mutually reducible, it goes a long way to reconciling them. I am naturally unable to say whether this is the article to which you refer but it ...


3

On a certain level, the argument that all ethical theories can be construed in consequentialist terms is true. This is exactly because the particular set of consequences we want to maximize is not stated in making this assessment, but this elasticity is also a weakness of this claim. For instance, if we want to represent the Kantian account in "...


3

Not all of my answers are sourced, some are based on my general reading of ethics courses, they are still accurate. I want to prove it is immoral. You can never prove that it is immoral. Immorality is only relative to the ethical system chosen. You can however argue, that even for a consequentialist, slavery can still be immoral. What more could I ...


2

I'd like to discuss a couple of points here: 1st, we've got to define with more clarity what moral relativism is, and 2nd, we've got to understand the cause of your dislike for it and earning for the ethical gurus able to shed the light on one and only true ethics. In order to understand what moral relativism is let's switch for a moment to poli sci and ...


2

The act vs. rule has to do with the unit of analysis--are you calculating the consequences of the individual action or the type of action. the hedonism vs. preference thing has to do with a different question, i.e. what is it that you think is intrinsically valuable, happiness or the satisfaction of our preferences? The other answer correctly says that ...


2

Rand's moral philosophy is normative (obviously) and derived from consideration of consequences, but it is not consequentialist in its framing of moral principles and rights. Rand argued that moral philosophy requires principles that can be applied in the absence of the ability to foresee particular consequences, in the sense of the full outcomes of actions....


2

Rand's view of morality is something like the following. Human beings have the capacity to create knowledge about the world, and to make choices in the light of that knowledge. The world is not set up in such a way that you and other people are bound to be victims dependent on alms. It is possible, and good, for you to gain from trading with other people. ...


2

First thing I want to point out is that you seem to be pre-assuming your position, and then trying to come up with arguments that support it, so that you can "win". This is, I believe, something we all often do, being more interested in finding arguments that make others think we're right than actually in being right. What I suggest is to first think by ...


2

Just because no-one missed the bus because of Ken jumping the queue doesn't mean it couldn't happen. The bus could've been unexpectedly near-full by the time it arrived, which perhaps could've lead to Ken making it in, while others could be forced to wait for the next bus, despite arriving early at the bus station (at least earlier than Ken). In fact, when ...


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I think you're basically right about how the discussion goes on this point, but it's not necessarily a "fallacy." First off, a minor correction in structure: since the action is obviously good, it makes you happy, and that is the consequence that matters. I think the consequentialist position is that the reason an action is "obviously good" is that it ...


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I don't think we have any idea yet in the big picture. Is ad revenue the right way to support web sites? Are the costs of running web sites small enough so that they can be born as an incidental cost? Should your internet provider be charging more and then awarding some fraction of that to the sites you visit? Dunno. Society is complex; one could make ...


2

I'm not a big fan of defining definitions. However to draw line to present a captured concept, maybe I should. a) Morality could only be applied when there are more than oneself present. b) In gross morality defines an act that preserve others interest, or increase others interest. In such case Ken's jumping the queue can never be morally permissible. If ...


2

From what I read in the license, such actions are explicitly intended to be taken. The contributors accept that when they license their software under MPL. Of course, the product must include the license in Exhibit A to even be legal (presumably you are not interested in the ethics of illegally renaming the product). That exhibit is: "The contents of ...


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▻ THE TROLLEY PROBLEM STATED For the benefit of anyone not familiar with the problem : THE TROLLEY CASE: Edward is the driver of a trolley, whose brakes have just failed. On the track ahead of him are five people; the banks are so steep that they will not be able to get off the track in time. The track has a spur leading off to the right, and Edward can ...


1

In place of my own interests, I now have to take into account the interests of all those affected by my decision. This requires me to weigh up all these interests and adopt the course of action most likely to maximize the interests of those affected. Thus at least at some level [in very unusual circumstances] in my moral reasoning I must choose the ...


1

There are a number of epistemological issues with Situation A. First, which specific group is "notorious for violent behavior and extremists beliefs"? In the US, profiling typically focuses on Muslim, Arab, or African-American men. But (again in the US) terrorist attacks by conservative white men were much more common than terrorist attacks by Muslims. ...


1

You are way too narrow in your focus. "How can we decide if this is moral?" It completely depends on your moral beliefs. How can I answer this for you? Only you know exactly what you believe. What does your moral framework say? If it says to pursue self-interest, then Ken was morally correct. If it says to maximize the well-being of as many people as ...


1

First of all, there is a category error here, comparing utilitarianism -- an entire class of related forms of ethics, to Kantianism -- a very specific theory, is not possible. If one chose utility functions in such a way that autonomy was a highly valued form of pleasure and utilities topped out at a given level, you could pretty much achieve a form of ...


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This is a complex issue. I Just make a little sketch, since I am not certain what the core of your investigation is concerned with. If one asks in terms of moralitate (morality, as manifested by individuals), and sittlichkeit (formal and supposedly higher guidance), somehow, theoretical ethics, is very vexed. Since what is in power, in government practices,...


1

Well it always feels unfair to those who didn't know his friend. And imagine the situation had his friend also known 10 others who could join him at the front of the queue. This is not acceptable unless every other person in the queue also offers Ken the position. They have after all been forced to give up their current position without consent or ...


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Rights can be transferred. If Ken's friend, who had the right to get on first, relinquished his position to Ken and himself went to the back of the queue, none of the other queuers would be disadvantaged, relatively or absolutely. The friend would merely have transferred his first-position right to Ken. It's unusual but morally unobjectionable. What would ...


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I see no reason why consequentialists would have a definition of terrorism different from anyone else. I'd think that a proponent of any ethical system would realize that war involves terror, some accidental and some deliberate, and the question of whether war is terrorism would be independent of ethical evaluation. You mention what appears to be the nukes ...


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Some theistic bases for morality do not require consequentialism as typically defined. If what god wills is good, then it's good whatever the consequences. More generally, addressing the perceived problems involved in "killing one person to use his/her organs to save eight others" (the "transplant" problem) often requires appealing to (or making a case ...


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I should kill the person myself and become a murderer. What could be a refutation for such a tricky situation? Have you looked at rule utilitarianism? It states that: "the rightness or wrongness of a particular action is a function of the correctness of the rule of which it is an instance" So in your murderer example, the moral thing for you to do ...


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If a murderer tells you he will kill 2 people if you don't kill 1 person, why not just kill the murderer? By labeling him a murderer then hes killed before already. Kill him and you save the 2 people he was planning to kill and avenge the people he has already killed. If you just kill the 1 person the murderer tells you to, that will not stop him from doing ...


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I interpret this quote as indicating that there is always an "ends" that must be considered when considering an action is morally justified. However this does not entail consequentialism, since the "ends" need not be specified in terms of the consequences of the action. Kant doesn't care whether following the Categorical Imperative leads to actions with ...


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