13

It's not necessarily the language, but the edition you should keep an eye on. As I wrote here, translations of Kant are problematic in and of themselves, partly because even German native speakers might understand some key points quite differently. But in English, the Cambridge Editions are quite a good standard and unmatched so far. When it comes to ...


11

It occurs in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, here it is in context (from 4:418-19, p.29 in the Gregor's Cambridge translation): "He is not capable of any principle by which to determine with complete certainty what will make him truly happy, because for this omniscience would be required. One can not therefore act on determinate principles ...


7

First off, I want to say this is a really good question that reflects real thought on an interpretative issue in Kant studies. Second, I think you're grasping some major things but also thinking backwards (by which I mean imposing contemporary categories on what Kant is doing). In terms of your question, one major issue is going to be where in Kant you are ...


7

You have answered your own question, in part: there is no particular reason why some non-human entity could not have philosophy based in part upon, for instance, Xyoqi, which is something that said entities have that we don't and which is not easily describable (e.g. akin to qualia--very hard to describe to a qualia-free being, I would imagine). However, if ...


6

Kant goes through our three faculties of knowledge (Sensuousness, Understanding, Reason) in the Transcendental Aesthetics, Analytics and Dialectics. In every faculty he is searching for perceptions a priori and their relation to objects. So space and time are a priori knowledge from our Sensuousness (its form !), the categories from our Understanding. The ...


6

This is a nice catch, Kant is indeed inconsistent in his use of "pure". Below I am quoting from the Guyer's 1998 translation of the Critique. In Section I Kant first distinguishes between empirical and a priori, then among the latter, between relative and absolute, and, finally, among the absolute, between pure and impure propositions/judgments. The "pure ...


5

I think this is a solid question, and one that might be difficult to fit into the format of an SE answer. Thus, I'll try to provide a brief sketch of what I take the longer answer to be. First, I want to suggest that one needs to be very careful in how one uses "rational"/"reason" and "understanding"/"knowing" when speaking about Kant. In the paragraph ...


5

I am not much of a Berkeley scholar so my answer will primarily be an attempt to explain Kant with reference to the things you state in your question. I think we need to be very careful about what exactly we mean by it is meaningless to speak of things-in-themselves that are not subject to human evaluation. This sentence can have several different ...


5

Analytic and synthetic judgements His definition is rather straight and it seems as if you correctly applied it: analytic essentially means 'already thought within the concept itself': Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies entirely outside the concept A, though to be sure it ...


5

Glückseligkeit nicht ein Ideal der Vernunft, sondern der Einbildungskraft ist, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten Kapitel I


5

I suppose I would have to suggest it makes the most sense to read it in the language YOU are most fluent in comprehending.


4

You have to take into account that philosophy has to be expressed in some form of a language that other humans could understand. As Wittgenstein said, The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. That's not to deprecate "things that cannot be put in words", but philosophy seems to be based on rational communication. "Philosophy founded on ...


4

There are some features where he is hard to understand, but I don't think they are primarily translation-related. For instance, the symmetry with the categories leads to some pretty strained groupings at times. Also, there are some places where his arguments seem to most Kant scholars just plain wrong or where there are big gaps (in modern work we would say "...


4

Norman Kemp Smith's Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is absolutely brilliant. Find this commentary on Project Gutenberg; and here is the PDF version.


4

The missing piece for you seems to be the fact that Kant builds on the idea of "architectonic" borrowed from Aristotle, as he mentions in the paragraph following the first OP quote:"Borrowing a term of Aristotle, we shall call these concepts categories, our intention being originally the same as his, though widely diverging from it in its practical ...


4

I would deem the translation misleading, to be honest. There are no definitions, really, this is simply a technical usage of language which is historical. That's why it is hard to pin down any sources discussing this as well, it is simply taken as a given. On "XXX überhaupt" (XXX in general/as such) There is one hint available in Ottfried Höffe's ...


3

Everything you said seems fine. You propose to think of intensions as functions from possible worlds to subsets of the domain of individuals. That's a pretty standard way of thinking about intensions (goes back to at least Carnap's work in semantics). That particular criterion of analyticity, namely that: Sentence "s is P" is analytic iff concept(P) &...


3

Both of the terms you're mentioning are odd ways of compressing down what is going on in Kant. Odd enough that I wasn't sure Kant had stated either of them in that way. "transcendental knowledge" is knowledge that is not of objects but rather about the apparatus of knowledge. In other words, for him, it is the metaphysics of knowing, i.e. it is knowing the ...


3

A general advice regarding an approach to this book Understanding the book without having looked into the rest of the system seems hopeless to me. As a more broad possibility and an embedding into the whole history Kants own works and system as well as German Idealism as a whole I would suggest Eckart Förster's The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy For the ...


3

Space and time, for Kant, are essentially different but interdependent; they're essentially different from the categories - if the word essential is to retain its meaning. The categories derive from Aristotles as a way of categorising the things that are; they're part of his onto-logic. Kant reconceptualises them within his critical philosophy so that ...


3

Well, there's pure theoretical reason, pure practical reason, and even pure judgment, but it sounds like this is not the thrust of your question. I definitely disagree with the commenter you cited who claimed that God and human beings have the same faculties of reason. Possibly the single most important distinction for Kant is the distinction between ...


3

I really can't help with the mindspace problem, and I'm not sure I understand your representations, but I do know where to look for Kant's explanation, so here comes. The place you'll have to look is the third chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason, Of the Ground of the Division of all Objects into Phenomena. Although I might tell you right away that you ...


3

It's very hard to understand what a connection between the analytic/synthetic distinction and computational complexity could mean. As an example objection to the idea: if you are saying that synthetic statements are somehow equivalent to an NP-complete question, how would you handle the statement: New Orleans is the largest city in Louisiana. What is NP-...


3

Good chart. Essentially correct but there are a few small things that are not quite on the mark (a lot of confusion often comes from Kant's spread-out presentation of his theory of experience; later on in the Critique, the full theory of experience is better presented and clarified). Empirical knowledge for Kant is conceptualized experience. So it doesn't ...


3

Reading only Kant's own "Preface to the second edition" of the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR) is rewarding, even without knowing any other philosophical work. Kant's preface is short. He gives a good introduction to the problem and his solution. The main part of CPR is difficult to digest. Possibly it needs several months, not to mention years :-) ...


2

Kant discusses the ontological proof of God at around A597/B625... But his discussion of the analytic/synthetic distinction comes right at the beginning of the book - I'm willing to bet it's in the preface. As I'm sure you know though, Kant does think there is synthetic knowledge of a priori truths, though it's debatable whether or not truths about ...


2

Is math independent of our sensory experience? Kants answer, in a sense, is that it is both dependent on sensory experience and also not. He claims that our intuition for space, through which we construct geometry, is a priori and thus independent of experience, but also synthetic, so that it is more than the rules of logic; he says that this is possible ...


2

Kant emphasizes that our experience is not an image but a construction. Our understanding constructs experience with the help of two types of intuition, space and time, and the categories. The intuitions and the categories are a priori. We do not know anything about the thing-in-itself, because we have no direct contact. As a first approximation, thing-in-...


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