The whole argument seems to be based on the pre-supposition that existence itself has no value. As you already stated, if no-one existed, the question of pain and pleasure would be void.
This seems to me more of a religious than of a philosophical question. The Buddhist take seems to be that it is better not to exist than to suffer, while the Christian view ...
"The whole argument seems to be based on the pre-supposition that existence itself has no value"
Existence clearly contains
(1) pleasure is intrinsically good (value)
(2) pain is instrinsically bad (value)
Whereas the absence of pain can be thought of as something relatively better/good about the counterfactual scenario (3) and the absence of ...
The OP makes the following assumption:
Here is the assumption that, a child will be morally inclined much as those who raised him, but I believe this is empirically backed.
Although there is cultural influence, moral foundations theory would claim that morals are innate and not completely determined by the cultural such as social construction, education ...
Going by the short excerpt here it seems to me that Benetar is mischaracterising her thought; the sentence that you're concerned with is prefaced with an 'if'; but should we grant him his if?
It seems to me that this is as she says 'a sleight of hand'; the if is not justified; Benetar is using her thought as a springboard for his own very different (and ...
I feel that is incomplete when we have 4 choices the table is really more long for the eight cases.
X Exist and presence of pain
X not Exist and Presence of pain
X Exist and no presence of pain
X not Exist and no pro presence of pain
X Exist and presence of pleasure
X not Exist and Presence of pleasure
X Exist and no presence of pleasure
X not Exist and no ...
This philosophy sounds to me like total nihilism founded on an irrational hatred of reality.
But in any case, that the absence of good and bad--rather than just good and bad--are even included here is bizarre. Assigning a moral evaluation to the absence of something in particular, rather than to something in particular or just to nothing, seems arbitrary. ...
sorry this is both an attempt to answer at least subjectively and a question.
perhaps i am misunderstanding here, but when looking at the scenarios it appears to me that something is missing. maybe a discounting of the value of life itself. it seems to me i could make a similar grid with whether the existence of life is good, possibly because this is ...
Yes, it's wrong.
If you think that the 'absence of pleasure' is merely 'not bad' then you are simply failing to imagine a pleasure which is equal in magnitude to your imagined pain. A standard-issue human brain might be evolutionary adept (and indeed in good tune) when conjuring this prejudiced mistake - as living in fear is an evolutionary stable ...