9
votes
From a functionalist point of view: when is an algorithm an A.I., and when is it just software?
The position of functionalists on AI is similar to the position of compatibilists on free will in two important respects. First, they distance themselves from the Cartesian idea that there is some ...
7
votes
Accepted
What are book recommendations on Philosophy of Consciousness by contemporary authors?
"19th century philosophers are not necessary to understand contemporary debates" is largely true because modern debates regurgitate ideas and arguments explored at length since Kant. Here is an ...
4
votes
Has anyone ever claimed that if Daniel Dennett, or a like-minded person, did actually manage to explain consciousness, humans would be diminished?
As a preamble, the values concern about Dennett's delusionism is not the primary objection to it. Instead, most philosophers treat conscious experience as basic data, and a model of consciousness ...
3
votes
Critique of those missing the Hard Problem?
The problem of subjective experience is best divided into two very different questions. First, whether subjective experience exists; and second, if it does, how to explain it in terms of something ...
3
votes
Critique of those missing the Hard Problem?
the issue is that materialists and physicalists presume a different
question and answer that one instead.
I feel like the two parties are talking across each other.
They are all on the same page but ...
3
votes
Critique of those missing the Hard Problem?
My 2 cents and then some.
The "hard problem" is really hard, I would say insoluble only for a certain point of view. The point of view that accepts only a certain explanatory framework (eg ...
3
votes
What are book recommendations on Philosophy of Consciousness by contemporary authors?
If you aren't reading Professor John R. Searle, you are missing out.
Here's a short article to give you a sense of his writing: "Consciousness"
He's got lots of books and articles on the ...
2
votes
In Chalmer’s understanding, is a “philosophical zombie” roughly identical to Descartes’ automaton?
The first section of the SEP article on Zombies, discusses the relation to Descartes' Automatons.
Descartes held that non-human animals are automata: their behavior is wholly explicable in terms of ...
2
votes
Critique of those missing the Hard Problem?
I can recommend two relatively recent works on this issue.
One is Kim's Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Kim discusses the last 60 years effort to try to fit consciousness into physicalism. His ...
2
votes
What would a possible solution to the hard problem of consciousness look like?
A solution to the hard problem of consciousness would be a mathematical formula to determine what consciousness is present, if any, in a formally described physical system, and what that consciousness ...
1
vote
Is the hard problem of consciousness a question about why a person, as an entity which can experience, exists?
No, it is not asking why we exist. We could exist without consciousness, just as many people (excepting panpsychists) suppose rocks, water, teabags and so on exist without consciousness. The hard ...
1
vote
Has anyone ever claimed that if Daniel Dennett, or a like-minded person, did actually manage to explain consciousness, humans would be diminished?
"Qualia don't even think rationally. Nor do they persist beyond death. They don't cost the body any calories/joules because they don't do any work in the brain or body."
Don't they consume ...
1
vote
Critique of those missing the Hard Problem?
For monists and panpsychists, there is no division between matter and consciousness. Therefore, there is no hard problem. The fundamental stuff of the universe is matter-consciousness. Consciousness ...
1
vote
Chalmers' two-dimensional argument against materialism
Chalmers' argument is difficult to follow, with all his modal conceptual transforms. It is similar to a math proof in which one has multiple variable transforms, but much harder to follow as he is ...
1
vote
Accepted
What is the combination problem for panpsychism?
"...even if we do attribute basic consciousness to the smallest bits of the brain, it’s still not clear how to intelligibly account for the consciousness of the brain as a whole. How do the ...
1
vote
Can the hard problem of consciousness, in principle, be answered with a mathematical formula?
Interestingly, I just listened to this interview with a neuro-mathematician who is proposing exactly what you are calling for -- a math formula explaining consciousness. Here is the interview with ...
1
vote
Can the hard problem of consciousness, in principle, be answered with a mathematical formula?
Re: explanations and formulae
If all you needed for an explanation was a formula describing the observations, we wouldn't need a theory of gravity, a theory of elliptical planetary motion, or even ...
1
vote
Can the hard problem of consciousness, in principle, be answered with a mathematical formula?
Regarding pure apperception, Immanuel Kant at one point writes:
Apperception is something real, and the simplicity of its nature is given in the very fact of its possibility. Now in space there is ...
1
vote
Can the hard problem of consciousness, in principle, be answered with a mathematical formula?
I agree with Conifold and Pertti. There are two points you might like to consider. Firstly, take, for example, a picture of Donald Trump, say, on a computer screen. It is possible, albeit not as a ...
1
vote
Can the hard problem of consciousness, in principle, be answered with a mathematical formula?
Seems like you are totally on a wrong track.
You cannot expect that a mathematical formula could be applied in a context with no parameters to put in said formula.
Subjective experiences are not ...
1
vote
What would a possible solution to the hard problem of consciousness look like?
I am old now, but I remember in my teens being introduced to the idea of dimensional analysis in physics, and it struck me then, as it still does now, that it would be surprising to find a physical ...
1
vote
Critique of those missing the Hard Problem?
Since Dennett doesn't believe in mind, it's not surprising that he thinks of humans as 'robots'. Personally, I think this is a good reason not to believe in Dennett: his solution is worse than the ...
1
vote
Chalmers'argument that the brain in the VAT does not lead to skepticism
Chalmers' point in "The Matrix as Metaphysics" is that the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis should be considered a metaphysical hypothesis rather than a skeptic's thought experiment.
Suppose we are in fact ...
1
vote
From a functionalist point of view: when is an algorithm an A.I., and when is it just software?
Consider the specific questions.
Question 2: Has the question of agency been studied in philosophy of mind and philosophy of artificial intelligence?
Regardless of what has been done, one can start ...
1
vote
From a functionalist point of view: when is an algorithm an A.I., and when is it just software?
Let me start by stating that all algorithms are "just software."
There are two types of software: 1) Software that performs the same function over time, and 2) one who's function changes over time. ...
1
vote
From a functionalist point of view: when is an algorithm an A.I., and when is it just software?
Definitions
Learning: the acquisition of knowledge or skills through experience, study, or by being taught.
Primary Argument
Artificial intelligence is a field which attempts to mimic animal or ...
1
vote
What are book recommendations on Philosophy of Consciousness by contemporary authors?
How Can Physics Underlie the Mind? by George Ellis is fantastic. Published in 2016 so it's very contemporary. The central tenet of the book is that the determinism of fundamental physics is not ...
1
vote
What are book recommendations on Philosophy of Consciousness by contemporary authors?
The Journal of Consciousness Studies is as the name indicates. There are also frequently good discussions in The Journal of Behavioral and Brain Sciences, where target articles are briefly responded ...
Only top scored, non community-wiki answers of a minimum length are eligible
Related Tags
david-chalmers × 18philosophy-of-mind × 10
consciousness × 9
mind-body × 4
dennett × 3
existence × 2
epistemology × 1
metaphysics × 1
reference-request × 1
ontology × 1
modal-logic × 1
descartes × 1
semantics × 1
idealism × 1
bertrand-russell × 1
skepticism × 1
dualism × 1
possible-worlds × 1
qualia × 1
physicalism × 1
kripke × 1
functionalism × 1
information × 1
brain-in-a-vat × 1
william-james × 1