11

As you know, the two terms mean something different, as spatio-temporal relations aren't in themselves causal relations. Being spatio-temporally isolated simply means not standing in spatio-temporal relations like “before,” “10 minutes after,” “beside,” “10 meters below.” Being causally-isolated just means not having any causal relations, such that nothing ...


7

In a sense, Deleuze's virtual and Lewis's possible worlds compete to provide the "right" conception of the possible. The descriptions are indeed similar but this is deceptive, Deleuze and Lewis, in part reflecting their respective traditions (continental and analytic), are far apart on the possible because they are far apart on the real. Lewis's &...


3

You're not wrong, but rather than thinking of possible worlds as being "inside" other possible worlds, it's better to think of some worlds as being possible relative to others. For example, let's say it's possible to fly to the moon. That means that there is a world - call it v - which is possible relative to our world, in which we do fly to the moon. But ...


2

I agree with Bumble that it depends on what you're looking for. I initially approached Lewis in a piecemeal way reading his papers and those he cited. If I could do it over, I'd have approached Lewis systematically, trying to understand what he was trying to accomplish overall. Lewis provides a lot of that overall picture in OPW, but it assumes a lot of ...


2

To a large extent, it depends what you looking for. On the Plurality of Worlds is Lewis' account and defence of modal realism. He thinks possible worlds are not merely hypothetical entities but are as real as our own world or universe is. When we speak of what is actual, we are speaking indexically about our own world, but it has no privileged status among ...


2

Very interesting question. If naturalism means in part that there is no philosophy prior to science (philosophy is continuous with science) as Quine says then there are reasons to think that Lewis' philosophyical views may not be completely naturalist. I have in mind his appeal to what he calls perfectly natural properties and their role in his accounts ...


2

The question is a little bit vague, but I'll take it to mean what it says literally. I'll try to explain David Lewis account on that matter, though somewhat using Randall Holmes (chapter 8: Philosophical Interlude) terminology about it, and I'll also add some of my account on it. Think of a class as a totality of many labeling atoms, i.e. an object whose ...


2

By far the best thing is to read Deleuze himself; on this question I think Proust and Signs and Cinema 2 are maybe most useful. A few indirect (and probably too elliptical) suggestions follow below. One apology is that rendering this material “flat” is an injustice to it. The virtual could feasibly be said to name this place where factual and counter ...


2

Lewis observes that our ordinary language of modality contains apparent quantifiers. We commonly say that there are ways the world could be, or ways the world could have been, but actually aren't. According to Lewis, the quantifier "there are" is most simply understood as saying that there exist possible worlds where such things are true, and these ...


1

Lewis invites us to consider some counterfactual conditionals: Φ1 □→ Ψ Φ1 ∧ Φ2 □→ ¬Ψ Φ1 ∧ Φ2 ∧ Φ3 □→ Ψ He points out that in the way such conditionals are ordinarily used, all of these may consistently be true, which is one way of saying that counterfactual conditionals are typically non-monotonic. This creates difficulties for the position that ...


1

A modal sentence such as []p has its meaning inside a world. It does not tell you that p holds for every world but p holds in the related worlds. For example, suppose that we have only one world W in which p holds and R is empty relation. Even if there is no world ~p holds, but we still have []~p holds in W since W is isolated. If you think possible ...


Only top voted, non community-wiki answers of a minimum length are eligible