19

Welcome to the demarcation problem of science. What is this thing called science? In lower levels of education, one is often given the impression that 'science', whatever that may be, exists as a monolithic entity. There is no sufficiency and necessity definition of what science is. It's better to say 'sciences' or 'scientific' when speculating as to this ...


14

I think one can talk about "the" scientific method as long as it is understood that it is a broad outline rather than anything like a clear prescription. Specific sciences in specific periods provide something more along the lines of the latter, but such standards and best practices are explicitly understood as field specific and revisable, at least ideally. ...


9

No, "the" scientific method does not really exist. Feyarabend has argued that historical case studies do not support the idea of a unique "scientific" method and, further, that such an idea is 'pernicious'. The idea that science can, and should, be run according to fixed and universal rules, is both unrealistic and pernicious. It is unrealistic, for it ...


8

What is Science? The Popperian view of science is that a claim is "scientific" if it can be falsified. Science cannot prove that a hypothesis is true, only that it is manifestly false. If economics can make falsifiable claims, then I think it is justified to say such claims are "scientific", at least on some level (the degree of repeatability is certainly ...


5

The line is typically drawn slightly differently, mostly because the word "explain" is not precise enough for a hard-edged debate on the topic. As given in the introduction to Phyiscalism on wikipedia: A "physical property", in this context, may be a metaphysical or logical combination of properties which are physical in the ordinary sense. It is common ...


5

There is an unbroken chain of tradition from Kant to all major currents in the philosophy of science. As for demarcation, Kant's standard was far stricter than even Popper's. For example, he called chemistry "systematic art or experimental doctrine but not a proper science", and infamously opined that empirical psychology will never become a science because ...


5

There is a simple, straightforward reason that memetics has not 'caught on' and become more widely accepted: the concept underlying it — depending on how one interprets the term 'meme' — are either philosophically derivative or nonsensical pseudoscience. The mere fact that I have to qualify that statement by pointing out that the term 'meme' is in dire need ...


4

As written, your question seems to assume that someone is an important philosopher of science only if they're mentioned in one particular Stanford Encyclopedia article. Both Feyerabend and Quine have entire articles of their own. There's been relatively little work on the demarcation problem in professional philosophy of science over the past 30 years or ...


4

Wikipedia says Natural science is concerned with the description, prediction, and understanding of natural phenomena based on empirical evidence from observation and experimentation. It can be divided into two main branches: life science (or biological science) and physical science. Social science is concerned with society and the relationships among ...


3

I fear, there is a misunderstanding about the meaning of "scientific". An experiment is one method in a lot different methods as a scientific approach. (And there are a lot experiments in economics like in game theory.) Even a repeatable experiment is no guaranteed proof, that a theory is true. There might be edge cases in an experimental setting, which ...


3

The point of the scientific method is to distinguish theories that match reality from theories that do not match reality. To that end, a properly methodological approach will work. But with any methodology, shortcuts can be taken, which sometimes make no difference and other times will invalidate the method. Weaknesses in the scientific method all stem ...


3

Sven Ove Hansson summarizes attempts to create a demarcation between science and pseudo-science after Thomas Kuhn's (1974) use of normal science as a means for demarcation. Under "Criteria based on scientific progress" Hansson notes attempts to formulate a demarcation by Thagard (1978), Roshbart (1990) and Reisch (1998). Others, some after Kuhn, ...


3

Economics is closely allied with political science, which is actually one part science and one part philosophy. Or, to be more precise, economics and political science can both be divided into science, philosophy and ideology, or propaganda. Of course, you can always make a distinction between "economic science" and "economic theory," but if you took a ...


3

From my questions I've asked on the topic, The Scientific Method is understood to be the process you describe, perhaps omitting the last step. However, not all results acquired via The Scientific Method are accepted as legitimate by The Scientific Community. Attached to The Scientific Method is a prologue: what sorts of assumptions you made before starting ...


3

I think Kuhn is just wrong about the nature of daily scientific progress. Just because you're not invalidating the germ theory of disease each time you do an experiment in lab, it doesn't follow that basic progress isn't essentially falsificationist (or castable as falsificationist) most of the time. For instance, most findings are backed up with ...


3

You wrote, ... I made the argument that economics is not science, because it cannot undertake repeatable experiments. I'd like to take issue with the view that the ability to undertake repeatable experiments is either necessary or sufficient (or both?) for a discipline to qualify as a science. First off, if your view were tenable, then astronomy could ...


2

If it were accepted, Creationism -- which involves at least a radical revision of geologic timescales and a correspondingly large change in biology -- would be a paradigm shift in the sciences; all of the sciences. Even what would seem to be a more modest idea, like irreducible complexity, would still require radical reconsideration of large chunks of ...


2

Presumably, different dualists have different end games, although I imagine most of them will agree to proving ontologically distinct mental states as goal. But I also imagine most of them will reject reduction of mental states to empirical experience, at least as understood by most materialists. If they thought that possible we would not be talking about ...


2

These questions remain interesting, but I can't see that "dualism" is being adequately defined here. As you yourself imply, the whole idea that dualists could "prove" the existence of the res cogitans or some "cognitive field theory" and then subject it to empirical testing is not, by definition, dualism. Your question is all contained within a naturalistic ...


2

Keynes once quipped that public figures who think they are expressing their original thoughts are usually echoing the words of some dead economist. The same might be said of the dead Kant in respect to science. While his thought provides a comprehensive modern framework for science, most practicing scientists have never read him and large swaths of the ...


2

The so-called Demarcation Problem is a little bit later, emerging with Vienna Circle and Popper. But its origins are in the Tractatus : 4.03 A proposition communicates a situation to us, and so it must be essentially connected with the situation. Thus, a true proposition is the picture of a fact. 4.05 Reality is compared with propositions. 4.06 ...


2

The English word "why" has several meanings, thus the question is ambiguous. Aristotle, for example, recognized four kinds of causation. What he would have called the "material" cause is Rayleigh scattering--the different bending of different colors of light in the atmosphere. There might be other material causes from different perspectives; for example, ...


2

As someone whose professional life revolved around science, I see this as a scientific question which is asking for an event sequence description. If I were a philosopher, I might think it was philosophical. At least one of my kids asked that*, so it must not be a rarity (though that conclusion doesn't necessarily follow.) *I remember having to look up ...


2

The sky being blue is something that we can all observe daily, but which does not seem to have a clear impact on our lives. So it's something that most adults have learned to take for granted and not question. Children, however, have a tendency to notice things that adults don't, and to ask questions about them. So "why is the sky blue?" is a plausible ...


1

To me, the lack of being able to predict (at least on a national level) tells me that economics cannot be a science (at least at that level). It might suggest things about consumer behavior but it can't predict basic things that most people things that economists should know. Ask an economist to predict ANYTHING that will happen 1 year out on a national ...


1

Humanities is art not science, but based on science. In humanities, which economics is the study of humans trading, there are many theories and no facts. Experience, exposure, practise, and training allows you to choose the most useful theory to the specific circumstances. That is the art. The goal is to integrate theory and self because as a human you ...


1

Welcome, Aleesha If economics is a science, we have I think to concede that it is does nor have the explanatory scope or depth of (say) particle physics. But this sort of damaging comparison, though common, is not what is needed. Biology is also a science which lacks the explanatory scope or depth of particle physics yet its status as science is secure. ...


1

Who's on first. What's on second. I don't know is on third. Above and beyond the ambiguity of language there is the ambiguity of human thought, even in a single individual. Put two humans in a room and have them talk and they will inevitably misunderstand both each other and themselves. The question can be either, depending upon context, intent, cultural ...


1

More of an extended comment than a full answer. This is an interesting question at one level, but it loses some of its force if one disagrees with the idea that Nietzsche isn't really a philosopher. I can see how his output can be considered poetry or literature, but I disagree with the overall position. "For example, Nietzsche's entire canon is a matter ...


1

First let me recall the view which is denoted “Hume’s fork” (see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume/): Propositions concerning relations of ideas are intuitively or demonstratively certain. They are known a priori—discoverable independently of experience by “the mere operation of thought”, so their truth doesn't depend on anything actually existing (...


Only top voted, non community-wiki answers of a minimum length are eligible